Recent warnings issued by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) regarding the possibility of renewed conflict in northern Ethiopia have attracted considerable international attention. Yet understanding the significance of these communications requires moving beyond the language of imminent catastrophe and examining the broader political and security dynamics shaping Ethiopia’s post-war landscape. The international community must avoid sensationalizing TPLF narratives that consistently frame the group as primary victims while downplaying its own role in escalating tensions.The central challenge facing the country is no longer simply ending active hostilities. Rather, it is ensuring that the 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement evolves from a ceasefire framework into a durable political settlement capable of preserving stability, sovereignty, and national cohesion.

The June 2026 appeals by TPLF leaders emerged at a particularly sensitive moment. Ethiopia continues to navigate the difficult transition from one of the most destructive conflicts in its modern history while simultaneously confronting economic pressures, regional instability, insurgent violence in multiple regions, and a rapidly changing geopolitical environment across the Horn of Africa. Against this backdrop, recent tensions in Tigray should not be viewed as isolated developments. They form part of a broader contest over political authority, territorial disputes, post-war governance, and the interpretation of Pretoria itself.

The primary objective since the signing of Pretoria has been the restoration of constitutional order and the reintegration of Tigray into Ethiopia’s federal framework. Since its signing, there has been visible progress in re-establishing telecommunications, banking services, and transportation links. However, implementation has been markedly uneven, with significant disagreements persisting over the pace and sequencing of disarmament, territorial questions, and political reintegration. While the federal government maintains that long-term stability requires strict adherence to constitutional provisions and the agreement’s terms, other parties argue that important commitments remain unfulfilled. This divergence continues to complicate the transition from a fragile ceasefire to a sustainable political settlement.

The difficulties that have emerged since Pretoria are not solely the product of implementation gaps. They also reflect deeper disagreements regarding political legitimacy and authority within Tigray itself. Internal TPLF factionalism, particularly the consolidation of power by hardline elements under Debertison Gebremichael, has driven more confrontational positions, including the reinstatement of pre-war institutions and exclusion from the June 2026 national elections echoing the 2020 legitimacy crisis. Internal divisions among TPLF factions have increasingly shaped developments in the region. The consolidation of power by more hardline elements has coincided with renewed confrontational rhetoric, efforts to restore pre-war political structures, and growing criticism of both the federal government and transitional arrangements established after the conflict. These developments have raised concerns among observers that portions of the TPLF leadership may be prioritizing political recovery and organizational influence over the gradual implementation of a negotiated settlement.

TPLF communications have evolved through three distinct phases. In the first phase (2018–2020), pre-war letters framed disputes with Addis Ababa as constitutional disagreements over federalism. TPLF rejected the federal parliament’s legitimate term extension, held a unilateral regional election in September 2020, and declared the federal government illegitimate. In the second phase (2020–2022), wartime appeals emphasized humanitarian access and atrocities while downplaying their own military actions and alliances.

In the current third phase after Pretoria communications such as the June 2025 Aide-Mémoire, February 2026 warning of a “comprehensive campaign,” October 2025 letter to the UN Secretary-General, and the June 2026 “An Urgent Call to Avert an Imminent and Catastrophic War” blend implementation grievances with justifications for parallel authority. These Phase Three instruments not only warn of wider conflict but, behind the humanitarian language, are linked to reported political-military consultations in Cairo and Port Sudan that coordinate positioning with Egypt, Eritrean and Sudanese actors.

The strategic environment has become even more complex due to the emergence of Tsimdo engagement between Eritrean authorities and elements within the TPLF. While framed by Eritrean communications to the United Nations and diplomats as normal “people-to-people” engagement, often dismissing Ethiopian concerns in strong language, Tsimdo is better understood as a deliberate strategic fabrication. For TPLF hardliners, it provides potential supply lines, a second-front deterrent, and elevated regional status. This convergence has facilitated a loose insurgent coalition involving TPLF hardliners, elements of Fano, OLA fragments, and support from Sudan’s SAF through Army 70 Tigrayan forces. The international community’s tendency to treat Tsimdo with analytical charity is structurally dangerous, as it normalizes sovereignty bypass and creates permissive space for proxy escalation.

These developments cannot be separated from wider regional dynamics. Sudan’s civil war, Red Sea competition, Nile Basin tensions, and Ethiopia’s legitimate pursuit of maritime access have intensified shifting alignments.Historical patterns from the 1960s–1980s remain instructive, a period when external actors, most notably Sudan and Egypt , which provided vital sanctuary, logistics, and cross-border rear bases, actively supported various Ethiopian insurgent movements, including the early TPLF, to project influence and counter Derg.

One of the most sensitive unresolved issues remains the status of the contested areas along the regional borders. These territories are viewed by one community as an essential component of its regional identity and territorial continuity, while another regards them as historically reclaimed areas whose status cannot be settled unilaterally. The dispute has become deeply intertwined with questions of national security, displacement, historical narratives, and post-war legitimacy, while IDP return blockages and reported starvation incidents have further inflamed tensions. Without a credible, mutually acceptable federal mechanism to address these competing claims, these contested areas are likely to remain a persistent source of tension regardless of progress achieved elsewhere.

The risk facing Ethiopia today is not necessarily an immediate return to large-scale war, but rather a gradual deterioration of confidence in the Pretoria framework. Two overlapping scenarios are visible: one driven primarily by external actors leveraging proxies, and another centered on efforts to regain the contested areas with external support. Escalatory rhetoric, parallel political structures, unresolved territorial disputes, and expanding regional rivalries are creating conditions that could increase instability if left unmanaged. At the same time, the devastating experience of the 2020–2022 conflict has generated widespread war fatigue and strong incentives among many Ethiopians to avoid another round of destruction. The economic and humanitarian costs of renewed fighting would be profound.

For this reason, the international community should approach recent developments with caution and balance. Sustainable peace requires accountability and restraint from all actors, as well as recognition that implementation challenges exist on multiple sides. Preserving the integrity of the Pretoria Agreement remains essential. Diplomatic engagement should reinforce constitutional processes, support reconstruction, encourage genuine dialogue on disputed issues, and discourage actions that undermine agreed frameworks.

Ultimately, the central question facing northern Ethiopia is not whether grievances exist, they are present across multiple communities and regions. The more important question is how those grievances are addressed. Ethiopia’s long-term stability will depend on whether political actors choose negotiation over confrontation, institutional solutions over parallel structures and strategic compromise over zero-sum competition. The future of Pretoria and indeed the future of stability in northern Ethiopia will be determined by that choice.

By Bethelhem Fikru, Researcher, Horn Review