28
May
Reassessing the Somali Federal Government’s Role after the May 2026 Mandate Crisis
Who governs Somalia when regional administrations engage directly with great powers?
In the span of a single week Somalia’s federal government confronted a sequence of political, diplomatic and security developments that collectively raised serious questions about the extent of its effective authority over the Somali state. Puntland formally withdrew recognition of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration following the expiration of his mandate on May 15. A senior United States delegation simultaneously conducted direct engagements with Puntland’s leadership on political and security matters bypassing Mogadishu in ways that would once have been diplomatically unthinkable. Somaliland accelerated its international diplomacy through ties with Israel while former intelligence chief Fahad Yasin publicly questioned the viability of relying exclusively on military force against Al-Shabaab. Considered individually each of these developments might be interpreted as another episode in Somalia’s politics. Taken together however they strongly indicate a deeper pattern of federal disintegration, weakening institutional legitimacy and diminishing central authority.
What distinguishes the current moment is not simply the occurrence of political disagreement between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States. Somalia has operated within persistent tensions between the center and the periphery. Rather these developments lie in the degree to which multiple crises converged simultaneously across constitutional, diplomatic and security domains. The effect is a political environment in which the federal government increasingly appears unable to enforce consensus, maintain unified national legitimacy or monopolize external representation of the Somali state. In the middle of this crisis lies the constitutional and mandate dispute that intensified after May 15 when the federal government’s legitimacy became openly contested by several key political actors. Puntland’s withdrawal of recognition from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration is not just a symbolic protest. It is a direct challenge to the authority of the federal center and deepened a constitutional rupture that had already been widening for several years. Puntland had previously declared in 2024 that it would govern independently from certain federal processes due to disputes over constitutional amendments. The latest decision however moved from procedural disagreement and effectively treated the federal presidency as politically illegitimate after the expiration of its mandate.
The implications of this development are deep because Puntland is not a marginal actor within Somalia’s federal system. It is one of the country’s most politically established Federal Member States and has historically played a deep role in shaping Somalia’s federal structure. Its refusal to recognize the federal administration therefore raises serious questions about whether Somalia continues to function through a consensual federal compact or whether the country is entering a period of increasingly disintegrated sovereignty. The constitutional dispute over term extensions and electoral reforms has intensified these concerns. Opposition groups, Puntland, Jubaland and various political actors have criticized the federal government’s unilateral constitutional amendments and its approach toward one person one vote elections as lacking legitimacy and inclusiveness. Somalia’s political order remains heavily dependent on negotiated legitimacy among clans, regional authorities and federal institutions. Once that negotiated legitimacy begins to erode, the risk of parallel institutions and competing centers of authority increases considerably.
The growing divergence between Mogadishu and regional authorities is also increasingly reflected in the behaviour of international actors. The U.S. delegation led by Justin Davis accompanied by AFRICOM’s Colonel Shane Jones held direct discussions with Puntland officials concerning political cooperation, counterterrorism coordination and economic engagement. Such interactions strongly indicate that international partners are adapting pragmatically to Somalia’s political realities. While the United States continues formally to recognize Somalia’s federal government direct engagement with Puntland reflects an acknowledgment that effective authority on the ground is often decentralized and regionally dispersed.
This development is notable because external actors typically bypass central governments only when they perceive those governments as constrained in their ability to implement national policy uniformly across territory. In federal systems, international engagement with subnational authorities can gradually institutionalize fragmentation by strengthening the autonomy and international relevance of regional administrations. Puntland’s ability to engage directly with major international security actors on issues traditionally reserved for sovereign governments demonstrates how Somalia’s federal arrangement is increasingly functioning less as a centralized state structure and more as a negotiated network of semi autonomous political entities. The situation becomes even more consequential when viewed alongside Somaliland’s expanding international diplomacy. The announcement of plans for mutual diplomatic representation between Somaliland and Israel challenges Somalia’s claims of territorial unity and sovereignty. Although Somaliland’s international recognition remains limited, its ability to conduct independent foreign relations increasingly resembles the behaviour of a sovereign state rather than a regional administration within a federal republic. For the federal government in this presents both a symbolic and a setback. Symbolically Somaliland’s growing international visibility undermines Somalia’s claim to unified statehood. Strategically, it demonstrates the inability of the federal government to prevent external powers from engaging directly with semi-autonomous regions. The regional backlash from organizations and states such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Egypt and various Arab governments further complicates this position. Rather than reinforcing federal authority, the controversy surrounding Somaliland’s diplomacy has exposed Somalia’s limited capacity to shape or contain geopolitical developments involving territories it officially claims as sovereign.
At the same time Somalia’s internal security discourse is beginning to reflect growing uncertainty regarding the direction of national strategy. Former intelligence chief Fahad Yasin’s public comments advocating consideration of dialogue with Al-Shabaab alongside military pressure reveal mounting frustration with the limitations of purely kinetic counterinsurgency approaches. While discussions about negotiation are not entirely new within Somali political circles, the timing of these remarks is particularly important. Somalia’s military campaigns against Al-Shabaab have yielded tactical gains in some regions but have failed to eliminate the insurgency’s operational resilience. Political disintegration at the federal level risks further weakening the coherence of national security coordination. The importance of this debate lies not just in the question of whether negotiations with Al-Shabaab should occur but in what the discussion reveals about the condition of the Somali state. Effective counterinsurgency campaigns typically require unified political leadership, coherent institutional coordination and sustained legitimacy among local populations. Somalia’s current constitutional crisis undermines all three. Regional administrations increasingly pursue their own political plans,federal legitimacy remains contested and national consensus over political direction appears increasingly elusive. Under such conditions, security policy itself risks becoming disintegrated, reactive and inconsistent.
These developments collectively point toward a pattern of state fragility that has been seen in Somalia for decades but which now appears to be entering a more acute phase. It is important to emphasize that Somalia is not collapsing suddenly in the conventional sense of immediate state disintegration. Rather the country appears to be experiencing the deepening institutionalization of fragmentation. The federal government continues to function, international partners continue to recognize it diplomatically and key state institutions remain operational. However effective authority increasingly appears negotiated, contested and territorially uneven. This distinction matters because Somalia’s current road reflects not a singular political rupture but the cumulative consequences of unresolved structural weaknesses within the federal system. Since the reestablishment of federal governance after years of civil conflict, Somalia has struggled to reconcile competing visions of sovereignty, regional autonomy, constitutional order and clan representation.
What makes the present moment particularly consequential is the extent to which these tensions are now intersecting simultaneously with geopolitical competition, diplomatic fragmentation and security fatigue. Ultimately these developments strongly indicate that Somalia’s federal government is confronting a crisis of authority, legitimacy and cohesion. The constitutional dispute following the expiration of the presidential mandate, Puntland’s withdrawal of recognition, direct international engagement with regional administrations, Somaliland’s expanding diplomatic profile and growing uncertainty over national security strategy are are interconnected manifestations of a deeper structural problem within Somalia’s federal order. The political crisis in Mogadishu has accelerated regional defiance. Regional defiance in turn has encouraged external actors to hedge their relationships beyond the federal center. As external engagement becomes increasingly decentralized, the authority of the federal government weakens further contributing to drift in governance and security policy. The central question confronting Somalia today is therefore not whether the federal government still exists in formal terms but whether it retains sufficient legitimacy and authority to function as the undisputed center of national political life. As regional administrations expand their autonomy, as external powers diversify their partnerships and as internal consensus continues to erode a more difficult question inevitably comes to light that in practical and political terms, who is truly in power in Somalia?
By Samiya Mohammed, Researcher, Horn Review









