As global competition for critical minerals intensifies, the U.S. remains gripped by its heavy reliance on China. This dependency has fueled strategic anxiety since the Trump administration. Especially, Beijing’s recent export controls on processed rare earth elements, implemented in response to U.S. tariffs, have further heightened concerns in Washington about supply chain dependencies. Even though both countries paused their trade war for 90 days, the move did not ease the U.S. anxiety over securing essential mineral deals.

The cautious, often bureaucratic approach of U.S. mineral security policy contrasts sharply with China’s decisive engagement strategy. While Washington debates policy frameworks, Beijing secures long-term access agreements. This hesitancy stems partly from legitimate concerns about governance standards and political stability. Thus, Trump’s demand to secure new mineral deals beyond China requires addressing these facts.

This strategic gap becomes particularly evident when examining the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a coalition of 14 countries and the European Union formed to finance critical mineral projects. Despite its focus on global mineral security, the MSP notably lacks any African member nation, a telling omission that has raised concerns about representation and equity in resource governance. For instance, the 2024 agreement to finance Tanzania’s Kabanga Nickel Project through this partnership demonstrates both the recognition of Africa’s importance and the persistent exclusion of African nations from decision-making processes. 

Under the Trump administration, due to the U.S.’s need to reduce its dependency on Chinese rare earth mineral imports, it began to look toward other resource-endowed regions, including Africa. Nonetheless, it seems as if the United States has belatedly recognized this strategic opportunity. Moreover, Trump’s approach has been characterized by cautious engagement and slow policy execution in Africa. While the administration emphasized domestic mineral production and secured deals elsewhere, such as with Ukraine for critical minerals, it largely treated Africa as peripheral to its strategic calculus. This contrasts sharply with China’s long-term, integrated involvement in Africa.

Africa possesses an extraordinary geological endowment that positions it at the center of the global critical minerals conversation. With its 30% of the world’s proven critical mineral reserves, including over half of the global cobalt supply, Africa situates at the heart of the global shift toward renewable energy technologies and electric vehicles. Global demand for these critical minerals is projected to grow more than three-fold by 2030, creating both opportunity and geopolitical tension.

However, despite this abundance, Africa’s role remains largely limited to raw material extraction. The continent’s marginal position in mineral processing and value addition is captured by external actors. China recognized Africa’s strategic mineral importance years before Western powers and has systematically established dominance across the continent’s extractive sector. The resulting infrastructure-for-resources deals and extraction contracts have given China unprecedented control over supply chains crucial for everything from electric vehicle batteries to missile guidance systems. For the U.S., attempting to replace China’s influence over Africa’s mineral resources would be a challenging undertaking.

Without sustained, strategic partnerships that prioritize African agency and capacity building, the U.S. risks perpetuating Africa’s role as a passive supplier rather than a strategic partner. This approach also undermines the potential for Africa to develop local processing industries, which would not only increase the continent’s bargaining power but also reduce vulnerability to global supply shocks.

The critical question is not merely whether Africa possesses the minerals the U.S. needs-it undoubtedly does—but whether African nations are willing and able to become strategic alternatives to China on terms that serve their own development objectives. This requires examining both capacity constraints and strategic interests from an African perspective.

Africa’s critical minerals landscape is characterized by a fundamental paradox: resource abundance coexists with persistent value chain marginalization. Despite providing much of the world’s cobalt, platinum, and other critical minerals, African nations capture minimal value from these resources. The processing, refining, and manufacturing stages, where the greatest economic value is created, remain largely beyond Africa’s shores, perpetuating a colonial-era extractive relationship.

Consequently, mineral-rich African nations are beginning to leverage their resource positions more strategically, as evidenced by the DRC’s recent outreach to the United States proposing a strategic alliance to counter Chinese dominance in its mining sector. This demonstrates how mineral resources are becoming diplomatic tools in complex geopolitical negotiations. However, realizing this potential depends on Africa’s ability to overcome structural challenges and negotiate terms that prioritize long-term development over short-term extraction.

For Africa to become the strategic alternative in U.S. critical mineral security, a new model of engagement is necessary, one that moves beyond paternalistic or transactional approaches to genuine partnership. African nations must insist on technology transfers and joint ventures that build local processing capacity and align mineral projects with national development plans. This approach would create sustainable industries rather than perpetuate raw material dependency.

The competition between the U.S. and China over African minerals creates an opportunity for African countries to leverage this rivalry to secure better terms. By demanding transparency, environmental safeguards, and equitable revenue sharing, African governments can ensure that mineral wealth translates into broader economic and social benefits.

Furthermore, creating a genuine alternative to China’s dominance requires reimagining the fundamental nature of U.S.-Africa engagement. A transactional approach focused solely on securing mineral supplies would merely replace one extractive relationship with another, failing to address the structural imbalances that have historically characterized resource politics on the continent.

A more comprehensive approach would recognize that true mineral security cannot be achieved through offshoring vulnerability. African nations are increasingly positioned to demand such terms. The continent’s collective bargaining power is enhanced by the essential nature of its mineral endowment. However, leveraging this position effectively requires coordination among producing nations and strategic investment in value addition capabilities. The path forward requires re-conceptualizing Africa’s role from passive resource supplier to active strategic partner.

In sum, Africa could indeed be the strategic alternative to Chinese mineral dominance, but only if engagement occurs on terms that recognize African agency and serve African development objectives. Moreover, for the U.S., challenging China’s dominance in Africa will require a tremendous amount of effort and a new approach.

The intensifying global competition for critical minerals showcased by recent developments from Ontario’s threats to halt nickel shipments to the U.S. to Chinese acquisition of African mining assets, creates leverage that forward-thinking African leaders could utilize to reshape resource relationships. Africa must transition from being merely the place with the resources to becoming the place that determines how they’re used.

By Yonas Yizezew, Researcher,Horn Review