The National Intelligence and Security Agency of Somalia occupies a paradoxical position within the Horn of Africa’s security. Ostensibly a partner in efforts against Al-Shabaab the agency has become the focal point of a governance crisis marked by the intertwining of clan loyalty, political survival, and counterterrorism. This examines the tenure of Director General Mahad Mohamed Salad and argues that the current administration’s approach to Al-Shabaab has shifted from sustained confrontation toward a form of managed accommodation. Drawing on defector accounts, operational irregularities and geopolitical responses the paper contends that the use of NISA for internal political purposes rather than the defeat of the insurgency has weakened the legitimacy of the Federal Government of Somalia strained relations with Western partners and created conditions favorable to the expansion of extremist influence. The central thesis is that the security apparatus in Somalia currently operates under a logic of clan realism in which kinship ties and political expediency take precedence over the institutional mandate of national defense.

In Somalia’s politics where the state often functions as a coalition of competing clan interest’s intelligence services frequently serve as decisive instruments of power. Unlike conventional agencies oriented toward external threats NISA has increasingly been directed toward internal political management. The return of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to the presidency in 2022 coincided with a noticeable decline in large scale vehicle borne improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia. However this reduction did not result primarily from battlefield success. Instead it appears linked to informal arrangements that have blurred distinctions between state authority and insurgent networks.

Central to this pattern is Mahad Mohamed Salad. His appointment placed an individual whose genealogical ties to the insurgency are widely discussed within Hawiye clan networks at the head of the state’s counter insurgency apparatus. Within these networks Salad is identified as a cousin of Mahad Karate the commander of Al-Shabaab’s Amniyat security wing and a designated global terrorist carrying a substantial United States bounty. Reports circulating in Somali political and security circles allege that Salad engaged in direct communications with Karate. These contacts according to the same accounts occurred without formal presidential authorization and suggest a parallel channel grounded in kinship rather than institutional procedure.

This presents a departure from conventional counterterrorism practice. It indicates that elements within the Somali government have moved away from exclusive reliance on a monopoly of legitimate force toward a patrimonial arrangement in which the state manages the insurgent threat in part through blood intermediaries. The result a quieter capital masks a deeper erosion of sovereign authority. By appearing to rely on kinship links to Al-Shabaab’s internal security chief the FGS risks outsourcing aspects of Mogadishu’s security to the network it is charged with confronting.

The integrity of NISA has been strained by rivalry between factions loyal to Salad and those aligned with his predecessor Fahad Yasin. Yasin currently based in Turkey and associated with former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo has alleged that Salad while still a member of parliament conspired with Al-Shabaab in a plot against a former prime minister. Such claims if substantiated would imply that the current intelligence chief once viewed the insurgency as a potential instrument of political elimination. Upon assuming office Salad carried out a broad removal of officers associated with the previous leadership. The arrests that followed were widely interpreted as political consolidation rather than solely anti corruption measures. In the process institutional memory and operational cohesion within the agency were disrupted.

During subsequent security actions approximately ten NISA officers were detained on suspicion of espionage for Al-Shabaab. Two officers reported to be close to Salad’s circle later escaped. One is alleged to have carried sensitive military operational plans detailing forthcoming Somali National Army offensives these plans reportedly reached Al-Shabaab command. Government forces subsequently encountered prepared ambushes indicating that the compromise extended beyond low level infiltration. The fugitives are said to remain in Al-Shabaab controlled areas of southern Somalia under the group’s protection.

Additional allegations from Yasin include the claim that Salad removed or destroyed sensitive cyber and criminal records prior to earlier transitions of power. Separate accounts also reference the 2021 abduction and killing of cybersecurity specialist Ikran Tahlil Farah among the broader feud between the two intelligence factions the intensity showing of internal contestation.

The United States a major supporter of Somali security sector reform and specialized units such as Danab identified Salad as an impediment to effective counterterrorism cooperation. United states requested his removal. After an initial dismissal in 2024 and subsequent reinstatement in June 2025 the United States suspended substantial financial and logistical assistance. This decision reflected a loss of confidence in the FGS’s capacity or willingness to pursue Al-Shabaab without parallel arrangements.

Ethiopia regards the reported links between NISA leadership and Al-Shabaab as a direct national security concern. The possibility of a compromised Somali security apparatus interacting with regional militant networks has prompted Ethiopia to exercise heightened caution and intensified intelligence monitoring. These developments have also accelerated Ethiopia’s pragmatic engagement with Somaliland as a more predictable security partner along the Red Sea littoral. The erosion of trust in Somalia’s security institutions is contributing to a more fragmented regional security in which formal sovereign boundaries carry diminishing weight.

President Mohamud’s employment of NISA appears oriented primarily toward consolidating federal authority against member state leaders including Ahmed Madobe of Jubaland and Abdiaziz Laftagareen of South West State. Resources and intelligence capacity directed toward political monitoring and pressure on regional administrations have correspondingly reduced support available for sustained military campaigns against Al-Shabaab. The insurgency continues to expand in areas where governance is weak or extractive. As NISA’s focus remains on domestic political surveillance the rural periphery increasingly falls under insurgent influence.

The cumulative picture that emerges is of an intelligence service whose operational priorities have shifted from counterterrorism toward the preservation of a particular political configuration. Kinship ties to Amniyat leadership unresolved allegations of past collusion the transfer of operational plans to the enemy and the willingness to accept the loss of external support to retain contested leadership all point to institutional capture by clan and political logics.

sustained investment in a security apparatus whose senior leadership is widely perceived as maintaining informal channels to the insurgency yields diminishing returns. The reduction of spectacular attacks in Somalia  should not be read as victory it more closely resembles a symptom of normalized relations between elements of the state and the insurgent movement. Until Somalia’s political leadership elevates institutional integrity above clan loyalty and short term political survival the Horn of Africa will remain locked in a pattern of managed instability in which the boundary between state intelligence and the insurgency has become dangerously blurred.

By Hermela Kidane, Researcher, Horn Review