Claims that Ethiopia is hosting a secret military base to train Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rest on inference rather than verified fact, and the evidence presented does not meet the threshold required to establish such a serious allegation. The reporting relies heavily on unnamed sources, internal security notes, and interpretations of satellite imagery, none of which constitute conclusive proof of state-sponsored training of a foreign militia. Notably, no Ethiopian government institution, military authority, or named official has been directly quoted confirming the existence, purpose, or occupants of the alleged facility. In the absence of on-the-record attribution, the claims remain allegations rather than established facts.

The assertion is not supported by basic geographic and operational realities. The camp in question is located inside Ethiopian territory. On the Sudanese side of the border, the Yabus–Ulu axis is controlled by the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, beyond which lie areas held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The Rapid Support Forces’ core areas of operation are much farther inside Sudan, including locations such as Babanusa. Any movement from RSF-controlled areas to a site inside Ethiopia would require traversing multiple zones controlled by hostile or non-aligned forces, making the use of such a camp operationally implausible. There is no credible pathway by which RSF units could access, supply, or utilize a camp situated within Ethiopia under these conditions.

Beyond immediate border security, Ethiopia has significant strategic interests in the region, most notably the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a critical national infrastructure project whose security is paramount for the country’s economic and energy future. The western frontier, including Benishangul-Gumuz, forms a key approach corridor to the dam and surrounding installations. Hosting a foreign militia such as the RSF in this sensitive area would risk drawing conflict spillover directly into Ethiopia’s heartland, threatening both civilian populations and strategic assets. Ethiopia has consistently demonstrated a cautious and defensive approach to its borders; it is inconceivable that the government would deliberately invite armed actors, especially those in direct confrontation with Egypt and Sudan, and whose presence could destabilize the very region it must protect. Maintaining security in Benishangul-Gumuz is therefore not only a matter of local stability but of safeguarding a nationally transformative investment, reinforcing that Ethiopia’s posture is strictly defensive and rational.

It is also worth considering that the narrative portraying Ethiopia as supporting the RSF may serve broader strategic purposes for neighboring actors, particularly Egypt. By framing Ethiopia as complicit, such claims could provide justification for air operations in areas adjacent to, or even inside, Ethiopian territory, including zones near the GERD, where Ethiopia has a vital national interest. As stated above, given the dam’s strategic importance, Ethiopia has no incentive to host or cooperate with foreign militias that could destabilize the region; doing so would risk conflict spillover directly into its own territory where its critical infrastructure is located. The timing and framing of these allegations suggest they may be part of a broader information strategy to pressure Ethiopia and legitimize external intervention inside of its territory, rather than reflecting any actual Ethiopian involvement.

In addition, Benishangul-Gumuz is one of Ethiopia’s most sensitive and vulnerable regions due to persistent cross-border security threats. For years, this corridor has been used for the trafficking of arms and fighters into Ethiopia, supplying local insurgent groups and fueling instability. Its proximity to Sudan has also exposed it to irredentist rhetoric and militia movements. These realities have compelled successive Ethiopian governments to maintain a robust military presence, including permanent barracks, logistics hubs, and rapid-deployment units. Ethiopia’s deployment is a defensive posture aimed at securing its borders, preventing infiltration, and protecting civilians. Viewed in this context, the presence of military installations reflects legitimate national security priorities rather than covert support for a foreign armed group.

Satellite imagery cannot independently determine intent, function, or identity. Cleared land, tents, and newly constructed structures are not inherently indicative of a foreign paramilitary training camp, particularly in a militarized region. Alternative explanations for the observed sites have not been adequately considered. The structures highlighted closely resemble gold mining camps currently under development as part of Ethiopian government projects. Images previously released by the Office of the Prime Minister documenting these initiatives closely match the same locations now presented as evidence of a rebel training facility. Ignoring this publicly documented context undermines the credibility of the interpretation.

The physical layout shown in the imagery contradicts the training-camp narrative. There are no visible training grounds, drill areas, firing ranges, obstacle courses, maneuver spaces, or weapons staging points. At most, the site appears consistent with a conventional military camp used to barrack Ethiopian forces, which is entirely normal given the volatility of the region. There is nothing that would lead anyone familiar with military installations to conclude that this is a training facility.

Equally important is the absence of a strategic rationale for Ethiopia to support the RSF. Ethiopia has little to gain and much to lose from hosting a foreign militia. The RSF is associated with instability, mass displacement, and cross-border violence, which directly threaten Ethiopia’s western regions. Ethiopia’s military posture is guided by the need to secure its borders, prevent spillover of Sudanese conflicts, and maintain civilian safety. Analyses that fail to account for these legitimate defensive interests present an incomplete picture.

Claims of foreign involvement, particularly regarding funding or support by the UAE, remain unverified. Even the original reporting acknowledges that these assertions could not be independently confirmed and were denied by those allegedly involved. When the most consequential elements – financing, command, training, and sponsorship – are unproven, presenting the conclusion as fact is unwarranted.

There are also serious inconsistencies in the reporting’s numerical claims. It is stated that the alleged camp had the capacity to accommodate approximately 2,500 people as of 24 November. Elsewhere, it claims that on 19 November, 56 trucks arrived at the site, each allegedly carrying between 55 and 60 fighters, followed two days later by an additional 70 trucks. Even using the lowest estimate of 55 per truck, this amounts to more than 6,900 people delivered within 48 hours. This far exceeds the stated capacity, yet no explanation is offered for how such a contradiction could be resolved.

There is also a notable disparity between the cautious language used in the original investigation and the certainty with which the story has been repeated by secondary outlets. Conditional phrases such as “sources say” and “appears to show” have been stripped away, transforming a tentative allegation into an asserted fact. This pattern is not new; whenever Ethiopia undertakes security operations against Eritrea and TPLF-linked factions, weakly sourced narratives emerge and gain traction internationally.

An additional factor in assessing credibility is the historical perspective of the authors. The journalists responsible have previously been openly critical of Ethiopia’s government, particularly during and after the Tigray conflict. Their reporting has often aligned with narratives favorable to factions opposed to Addis Ababa, including elements linked to the TPLF. This history raises questions about potential bias in source selection, framing, and interpretation of ambiguous evidence.

Even if, hypothetically, Ethiopia were providing a site for foreign militia activity, it must be understood within the broader dynamics of the ongoing Sudan war. Egypt has reportedly conducted air operations against RSF positions, while Eritrea has deployed ground forces and facilitated logistics in support of SAF operations. Sudanese territory has also served as operational space for multiple armed elements, including TPLF and Fano splinter groups. Within this regional logic, Ethiopia’s posture in Benishangul-Gumuz is consistent with protecting its borders, preventing infiltration, and maintaining stability in a historically exploited frontier.

From a legal and diplomatic standpoint, the allegations fall short of the standards required to attribute responsibility to a state. The mere presence of a military camp does not constitute training, sponsorship, or command and control of a foreign armed group. International law requires clear evidence of direction or effective control, none of which has been demonstrated.

Finally, the broader context cannot be ignored. The Horn of Africa is a region where intelligence, leaks, and media narratives are often shaped by geopolitical competition. Claims circulated without attribution may reflect political agendas as much as verified reality. This does not mean such reports should be dismissed outright, but they must be treated with caution rather than certainty.

The geographic implausibility, regional security context, Ethiopia’s legitimate defensive rationale, alternative explanations for the imagery, absence of training infrastructure, internal numerical contradictions, lack of strategic incentive, potential author bias, and the broader context of external narratives significantly undermine the credibility of the assertion that Ethiopia is hosting or operating a training base for the Rapid Support Forces. Ethiopia’s actions reflect a reasoned effort to protect its sovereignty, borders, and critical infrastructure, including the GERD, rather than to support foreign militias. Claims suggesting otherwise may be part of a broader narrative designed to justify external intervention in Sudan or to pressure Ethiopia, rather than based on verified facts. Presenting the allegation as fact conflates possibility with proof and misrepresents the careful, defensive posture that Ethiopia has maintained in a historically volatile region.

By Horn Review, Editorial