South Sudan decided to proceed with the Grand Fulla Dam not because it had obtained Egypt’s consent, but because developing its water resources is the right of a sovereign Nile Basin state. South Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Dams announced that Juba would proceed with Fulla, alongside other dam projects intended to support economic development and meet the country’s growing power-generation demands. Four days later, Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Hani Sewilam, mentioned that Cairo had agreed to the project after examining its technical aspects. Yet this statement raises a fundamental question: why should Egypt’s agreement be presented as a condition for South Sudan’s development? Juba’s position was clear: as a sovereign Nile Basin state, it had the right to build dams without fearing opposition from downstream countries.

The timing and framing of Cairo’s statement are politically significant. By presenting its support for Fulla as the outcome of the technical examination, Egypt risks creating the impression that South Sudan’s development became legitimate only after Cairo had assessed the project. The issue, however, is not whether Egypt supports Fulla, but why its support should carry the meaning of authorisation. Cairo’s announcement can therefore be understood as an attempt to position Egypt as a consenting authority over a project that Juba had already justified through its sovereignty and development needs.

The significance of this framing becomes clearer when Fulla is considered in relation to Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). By presenting Fulla as a project that received Egyptian agreement after technical examination, Cairo can portray itself as supportive of upstream development, while continuing to oppose Ethiopia’s project. Fulla can therefore reinforce the message that Egypt’s opposition to Ethiopia is based on procedure rather than a desire to preserve its influence over the Nile. Instead of openly opposing South Sudan and widening divisions with other Nile Basin states, Egypt can use the project to reinforce its position against Ethiopia. Yet this raises the more fundamental question: who gave Egypt the mandate to determine which Nile Basin projects are acceptable?

Egypt is a member of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), alongside the other nine member states, but it is not a party to the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). South Sudan acceded to the CFA in August 2024. The NBI provides a framework for consultation, coordination and cooperation among Nile Basin states and is jointly owned by all ten member states. It does not give Egypt a superior institutional position or a unilateral authority to approve or reject projects undertaken by other Nile Basin states. Egypt’s agreement to Fulla, therefore, should not be confused with sovereign authorisation that South Sudan was required to obtain. The relevant principles are cooperation, equitable utilisation and the prevention of significant harm, not Egyptian permission.

This institutional question leads directly to the wider significance of the GERD. Ethiopia’s dam challenged the old Nile narrative in which Egypt’s historical claims were treated as the foundation for determining how other countries could use the river. Egypt’s continued reliance on colonial era agreements has supported an arrangement that excluded major upstream contributors from an equitable role in Nile development. The GERD changed that dynamic by demonstrating that Ethiopia would pursue its development interests rather than accept a permanent Egyptian veto. Egypt’s acceptance of a cooperative Nile Basin framework, instead of continuing to invoke colonial water agreements as the basis for determining the rights of other Nile Basin states, would represent recognition of this changed reality.

The problem of unilateralism is therefore central to the Nile dispute. Egypt’s water policy remains primarily centred on protecting its downstream interests, while its historical claims and water-security concerns have been used to challenge upstream development, particularly Ethiopia’s. The problem is not that downstream interests should be ignored; it is that Egypt has repeatedly presented its own interests as if they should determine the development choices of the entire basin. Such an approach is difficult to reconcile with a basin-wide framework in which all Nile Basin states have legitimate development interests and responsibilities.

Ethiopia’s position exposes this contradiction. Ethiopia contributes 86 percent of the Nile’s water, yet its development ambitions have faced persistent opposition from Egypt. A country that contributes such a substantial share of the river should not be expected to surrender its development interests to a downstream state while respecting the principles of the CFA. The Nile cannot become a system in which the countries generating much of its flow are expected to limit their development so that one downstream country can preserve its established position.

Egypt’s resistance to Ethiopia’s development ambitions also has a wider geopolitical dimension. Ethiopia’s growing economy and political influence, and its emergence as one of Africa’s leading states, challenge Cairo’s established regional position. The GERD can strengthen Ethiopia’s economy, expand electricity generation and support its development ambitions. These changes have implications beyond the dam itself because they alter Ethiopia’s economic and strategic weight in the region. Cairo’s opposition should therefore be understood not only through its stated concerns about water security, but also through the broader geopolitical implications of Ethiopia’s rise. Preserving the old Nile narrative serves to protect a regional order in which Egypt has enjoyed disproportionate influence.

The GERD has already challenged that narrative. Its operation provides a basis for questioning the catastrophic outcomes that Egypt warned against, including the water crisis Cairo predicted. Such concerns cannot serve as a permanent justification for denying Ethiopia’s development rights. Water security should be addressed through cooperation, technical coordination and equitable utilisation, rather than through an approach that treats upstream development as inherently threatening to the established downstream order.

Fulla therefore exposes the outdated nature of Egypt’s claimed veto, while the GERD demonstrates why that veto can no longer define Ethiopia’s development choices. South Sudan does not need Egyptian permission to pursue its development, and Ethiopia should not have to ask Cairo for approval before building additional dams. Ethiopia’s responsibility is to respect the principles of the Nile Basin framework, including equitable use, mutual development and no significant harm, while retaining its right to pursue development. Together, Fulla and the GERD point to the same transformation: the Nile is moving away from a system in which Egypt’s preferences determine the limits of upstream development.

The future of the Nile therefore depends on whether its riparian states can move from competing claims of control towards a genuinely basin-wide framework. Fulla has made clear that upstream development cannot depend on the approval of a single downstream state. The same principle should apply consistently across the basin, including to Ethiopia’s development ambitions. The era in which colonial agreements and unilateral control could define the Nile’s future must give way to a framework based on equitable utilisation, cooperation and mutual development.

Abraham Abebe, Researcher, Horn Review