Ethiopia’s foreign policy has long been guided by a map that separates the sahel from the rest of the continent. The Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Nile Basin have consistently defined the core of its strategic thinking. while the Sahel stretching across Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania has been treated as distant and secondary. This perception is deeply rooted in history reinforced across successive governments, and rarely questioned in a systematic way. Yet the reality has shifted. The Sahel is no longer a remote western belt but part of a continuous and increasingly interconnected zone of instability and competition that now reaches toward Ethiopia’s strategic environment. Recognizing this shift requires both a historical reassessment and a forward-looking redefinition of Ethiopia’s foreign policy priorities.

Historically, Ethiopia’s engagement with the Sahel has been indirect rather than absent. During the reign of Yohannes IV in the late nineteenth century Ethiopia’s western frontier was shaped by confrontation with the Mahdist state in Sudan during the Mahdist War. Although this conflict is often framed narrowly as a Sudanese-Ethiopian encounter, the Mahdist state was embedded in wider networks that extended into Darfur and toward the Sahel. In this sense, Ethiopia’s engagement was already indirectly connected to Sahelian dynamics. This early pattern established a conceptual boundary in Ethiopian strategic thinking: Sudan became the western limit of concern and the Sahel beyond it remained outside the field of vision.

The bond was forged not in the marketplace but in the corridors of intellectual and revolutionary power, beginning with the medieval scholars of Harar and Timbuktu who recognized each other as peers in a trans-continental Islamic and African consciousness. This spiritual and intellectual symmetry evolved into a potent political symbol after Ethiopia’s victory at Adwa in 1896, which served as a psychological blueprint for Sahelian resistance against French colonial expansion. By the 1960s, this Adwa Prestige allowed Emperor Haile Selassie to act as a father figure to Sahelian independence leaders like Mali’s Modibo Keïta, effectively anchoring the Sahel into the newly formed Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa.

While Ethiopia played a central role in fostering this Pan-African solidarity and supporting decolonization, these early diplomatic relations remained largely symbolic and ideological rather than strategic or bilateral. Because many Sahelian states remained oriented toward European networks post-independence while Ethiopia pursued a path shaped by its unique history of non-colonization, the era lacked significant economic, military, or infrastructural linkages. However, this foundational period of multilateral engagement established the sovereignty-first framework that continues to define their modern alignment against external intervention today.

The relationship reached its most intense, “blood-brother” phase during the 1970s and 80s, when the Derg regime in Ethiopia and revolutionary figures like Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara synchronized their military-marxist doctrines, sharing a cynical view of Western intervention and a radical commitment to state-led transformation. They mirrored each other’s internal structures, from mass literacy campaigns to the mobilization of  vanguard committees, creating a Sovereignty Bloc that prioritized national survival over international approval

The period of the Derg did little to change this pattern. Despite ideological overlaps with some Sahelian governments, Ethiopia’s foreign policy was dominated by immediate security concerns, including internal insurgencies, the Eritrean conflict, and the Ogaden War with Somalia. These pressures constrained the state’s ability to think beyond its immediate environment. While other regional actors, notably Libya, actively engaged in Sahelian politics and conflicts, Ethiopia remained focused on survival and territorial integrity. Its interactions with Sudan, including support for southern Sudanese movements in response to Khartoum’s backing of Eritrean insurgents, had indirect implications for Sahelian dynamics but did not constitute a deliberate Sahel policy. The Sahel remained outside Ethiopia’s strategic horizon, reinforcing the perception of distance.

The post-1991 era under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front introduced a new layer of engagement through Ethiopia’s role as host of the African Union. This positioned Addis Ababa as a hub for continental diplomacy, including discussions on Sahelian instability, governance challenges, and the rise of jihadist groups. Ethiopia participated actively in these multilateral processes, contributing to peace and security frameworks that addressed Sahelian crises. However, this engagement remained institutional rather than strategic. Ethiopia did not develop a distinct Sahel policy, Instead it continued to prioritize its immediate neighborhood, particularly Somalia, Eritrea, and the Nile Basin. Even as the Sahel experienced a dramatic escalation in instability following the collapse of Libya in 2011 leading to the proliferation of armed groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Ethiopia’s response remained limited. The Sahel was acknowledged as a problem but not integrated into Ethiopia’s core strategic thinking.

Under the current government led by the Prosperity Party, Ethiopia’s external focus has increasingly shifted toward the Red Sea and its relations with Gulf states, particularly United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. These relationships are driven by economic considerations, investment flows, and the strategic importance of maritime access. In contrast, the Sahel continues to be approached primarily through African Union mechanisms, with limited direct engagement. This imbalance reflects a broader pattern in which Ethiopia prioritizes regions, while underestimating the long-term implications of instability in more distant areas.

This approach is increasingly untenable. The Sahel has undergone a profound transformation over the past decade, evolving into a central arena of conflict, governance breakdown, and external intervention. Armed groups operate across borders with relative ease, exploiting weak state structures and porous frontiers. The movement of weapons, fighters, and illicit networks has created a fluid and interconnected security environment that extends beyond the Sahel itself. These dynamics are no longer confined to West Africa; they are spreading eastward through Chad and into Sudan, creating a continuous belt of instability that links the Sahel to the Horn of Africa.

Chad, in particular, has emerged as a critical bridge between these regions. Its geographic position at the intersection of North, Central, and West Africa makes it a key node in the movement of people, goods, and armed actors. As pressures from the Sahel intensify, they are increasingly transmitted through Chad into Darfur and across Sudan. Sudan’s own internal fragmentation has weakened its ability to function as a buffer, allowing these pressures to move more directly toward Ethiopia. The traditional assumption that Sudan would absorb or contain Sahelian instability is no longer valid. Instead, Sudan has become part of the same interconnected system, amplifying rather than mitigating the effects of Sahelian crises.

For Ethiopia, this shift has significant implications. The Sahel is now effectively part of its extended neighborhood, not because of proximity in a geographic sense, but because of the intensity of the connections that link the two regions. There is no ocean or natural barrier separating Ethiopia from the Sahel. The distance between them is bridged by a chain of weakly governed spaces through which instability can travel. Refugee flows originating in the Sahel intersect with those from Sudan, creating complex patterns of displacement that can place additional strain on Ethiopia and its neighbors. These movements also carry security risks, as they can be exploited by transnational extremist groups seeking to expand their reach. The combination of weak border controls, ongoing conflicts, and the presence of illicit networks increases the likelihood that such groups could use these pathways to move closer to Ethiopia.

At the same time, external powers are increasingly active across both the Sahel and the Red Sea region, further linking the two spaces. This external involvement reshapes local dynamics and creates new forms of competition that extend across regions. Ethiopia’s strategic environment is therefore no longer defined solely by its immediate neighbors but by a broader system in which developments in the Sahel can have direct and indirect effects on its security and stability. In this context, continuing to treat the Sahel as a distant region is not simply an oversight; it is a strategic miscalculation.

Ethiopia must therefore rethink its approach and begin to view the Sahel as part of its immediate strategic neighborhood, in much the same way that it has come to view the Gulf. This does not mean equating the two regions in all respects, but it does require recognizing that both have a direct impact on Ethiopia’s interests. The Gulf is important because of its economic and maritime significance, while the Sahel is becoming increasingly important because of its role in shaping security dynamics across the continent. Ignoring one while prioritizing the other creates an imbalance that could leave Ethiopia vulnerable to emerging threats.

Reconceptualizing the Sahel as an immediate neighbor involves more than simply increasing diplomatic engagement. It requires a fundamental shift in how Ethiopia understands proximity and interdependence. Proximity should not be defined solely by shared borders but by the degree to which developments in one region affect another. By this measure, the Sahel is already closer to Ethiopia than traditional maps suggest. The pressures emerging from the Sahel, whether in the form of extremism, displacement, or external intervention are moving along pathways that lead toward Ethiopia through Sudan and Eritrea. Recognizing this reality would allow Ethiopia to adopt a more proactive approach, engaging with Sahelian states not only through multilateral forums but also subregional initiatives.

Such a shift would also enhance Ethiopia’s role within the African Union, enabling it to move from being a host of continental institutions to a more active shaper of their agendas. By taking a more strategic interest in the Sahel, Ethiopia could contribute to the development of coordinated responses to shared challenges, including counterterrorism, border management, and conflict prevention. This would not only strengthen its own security but also reinforce its position as a key actor in African affairs.

Ethiopia’s historical relationship with the Sahel has been characterized by distance, indirect engagement, and a persistent focus on more immediate concerns. This approach was shaped by specific historical conditions, including geographic constraints, internal challenges, and the structure of international relations during different periods. However, the context has changed. The Sahel is no longer a distant region but part of a connected system that directly affects Ethiopia’s strategic environment. Recognizing this shift is essential for developing a foreign policy that is responsive to contemporary realities. By redefining the Sahel as an immediate neighbor, Ethiopia can better anticipate and manage the challenges that arise from this evolving landscape, ensuring that it is not merely reacting to external pressures but actively shaping its own security and future.

By Rebecca Mulugeta, Researcher, Horn Review