The question of what kind of Somali state best serves Ethiopia’s national interest and, by extension, the stability of the Horn of Africa sits at the intersection of history, geography, security realities, and an increasingly competitive regional order. For many analysts and policy makers alike, the temptation has often been to frame the issue in binary terms: a strong centralized Somalia versus a loose federal arrangement. Yet Somalia’s political evolution over the past three decades, and Ethiopia’s own experience engaging with it, suggest that the most consequential outcomes lie not at the extremes, but in the uneasy space between them.

Assessing the current Somali architecture requires a sober look at its genesis. Federalism in Somalia was not a choice of deliberate policy reform, but the byproduct of total institutional liquidation. The 1991 collapse of the Siad Barre regime did not merely trigger a transition; it fractured the Somali state into localized power centers. In this administrative vacuum, governance devolved by default rather than design. Entities like Somaliland and Puntland consolidated autonomous bureaucracies and security apparatuses, while the south devolved into a fluid, clan-based contestation and burgeoning insurgencies.

When Somalia formally adopted a federal framework in 2012, it was less a blueprint for decentralization and more an attempt to retroactively organize fragmentation. Federal member states Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug emerged through a mix of local dynamics and external facilitation. The federal government in Mogadishu was reconstituted with international backing, but its authority remained limited, often negotiated rather than imposed. The result was not a coherent federal system in the classical sense, but a hybrid political order where sovereignty is layered, contested, and incomplete.

For Ethiopia, this historical context is a matter of national survival rather than academic interest. Unlike peripheral actors, Ethiopia is intrinsically linked to Somalia’s stability through military, political, and strategic necessity. While interventions are often framed as immediate tactical responses to Al-Shabaab, they are governed by a more profound strategic logic. This  is dictated by a long-term mandate to manage the structural volatility on Ethiopia’s eastern flank.

Ethiopia’s wariness of a strong centralized Somali state is rooted in lived experience. During the Cold War period, Somalia’s central government pursued an assertive nationalist agenda that directly challenged Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. The Ogaden conflict was not just a border dispute; it was a manifestation of a centralized state mobilizing ideology, military power, and external alliances against its neighbor. While today’s Somalia is far removed from that moment, the structural lesson endures in Ethiopian strategic thinking: centralized power, once consolidated, can be projected outward.

This threat has transitioned from conventional interstate conflict to a more sophisticated strategic encirclement. The primary concern is no longer a localized border war, but the risk of a centralized Mogadishu acting as a conduit for external powers to disrupt the regional equilibrium. In an era where the Horn of Africa serves as a place for Middle Eastern and global competition, a unified Somali state with absolute sovereign leverage could provide a platform for rival actors to project influence directly onto Ethiopia’s eastern border.

This is the foundation of the argument that a federal power shared Somali center is preferable. A federal government with limited coercive capacity and constrained authority is less able to unilaterally enter into binding security arrangements that might threaten Ethiopia. It diffuses power and reduces the likelihood that Somalia can act as a unified geopolitical actor against Ethiopian interests. In this sense, decentralization functions as a form of strategic insulation.

Yet this position, while grounded in rational concern, is only partially sufficient. A Somalia that is too weak at the center does not simply remain neutral; it becomes porous. And in the Horn of Africa, porous states do not remain passive spaces. They become arenas where non-state actors and external powers operate with greater freedom.

The most acute symptom of this structural dysfunction is the sustained resilience of Al-Shabaab. The group’s endurance is less a feat of ideology than a direct exploit of Somalia’s systemic governance gaps. This fragmented authority and the lack of a cohesive security architecture provide the operational latitude for the insurgency to survive and adapt. For Ethiopia, this necessitates a permanent defensive posture transforming Somalia’s internal administrative friction into a continuous requirement for Ethiopian military engagement and cross-border risk management.

The burden is not trivial. Ethiopian forces have been central to stabilization efforts in Somalia for years, operating under both national and regional mandates. This involvement carries financial costs, political risks, and human consequences. It also creates strategic exposure. The longer Ethiopia remains embedded in Somalia’s internal security landscape, the more it risks being drawn into its internal rivalries and conflicts. In this light, a weak Somali center does not eliminate Ethiopia’s security concerns; it redistributes them into a prolonged, low-intensity engagement that can be equally draining and used by external parties like Egypt and Eritrea

There is also a structural contradiction within Somalia’s federal system that complicates Ethiopia’s preferred model. Federal member states are not uniformly strong or cohesive. Some, like Puntland, have relatively stable institutions and clearer political identity. Others are more fragile, shaped by shifting alliances and internal contestation. Without an effective central authority to coordinate policy and security, these disparities can deepen, creating uneven zones of governance. For Ethiopia, instability in one region rarely remains isolated. It tends to spill over, whether through displacement, informal armed networks, or economic disruption.

The recent tensions between Somalia’s federal government and regional states illustrate another dimension of this challenge. Efforts by leaders in Mogadishu to consolidate authority have often been met with resistance from regional administrations. The case often cited in analytical circles is the political struggle during the presidency of Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo,”  and said barre whose attempts to strengthen the central government led to sharp confrontations with federal member states. The resulting standoff did not produce a stronger Somalia; it deepened fragmentation and political mistrust. The lesson here is not simply that centralization is difficult, but that poorly managed attempts at centralization can destabilize the entire system.

For Ethiopia, this dynamic reinforces the appeal of a decentralized structure. Strong regional states that are cooperative and pragmatic can act as buffers and partners. Jubaland and South West State, in particular, have strategic importance due to their geographic proximity to Ethiopia. Their relative autonomy allows Ethiopia to engage directly on security and economic matters, creating a layered approach to regional policy. This reduces reliance on the often unpredictable politics of Mogadishu and provides a degree of continuity in bilateral engagement.

The economic dimension, particularly the question of sea access, further strengthens this logic. Ethiopia’s status as a landlocked country has long shaped its strategic outlook. Reliable access to maritime routes is not just a matter of trade efficiency but of national resilience. In a centralized Somali system, negotiations over ports and corridors would be tightly controlled by the federal government, potentially influenced by broader political considerations or external alliances. In a decentralized system, regional administrations may have both the incentive and flexibility to pursue mutually beneficial arrangements. While such agreements are not without controversy, they reflect a pragmatic pathway that aligns with Ethiopia’s long-term interests.

However, this model also intersects with broader regional competition. The Horn of Africa is increasingly influenced by external actors with divergent agendas. Egypt and Eritrea, among others, have strategic reasons to counterbalance Ethiopia’s regional influence. A fragmented Somalia provides multiple entry points for such engagement, whether through political support, economic investment, or security cooperation. For Ethiopia, this creates a more complex environment. It is no longer just managing bilateral relations with Somalia, but navigating a multilayered geopolitical landscape where local actors can become conduits for external influence.

The concern that prolonged instability in Somalia could overstretch Ethiopia’s military and weaken its broader strategic position is therefore not unfounded. Counterinsurgency campaigns are inherently resource-intensive, and their outcomes are often incremental. If Somalia’s federal system continues to produce uneven governance and persistent insecurity, Ethiopia may find itself locked into a cycle of engagement that limits its ability to focus on other national priorities.

So what, then, is the most viable configuration for Somalia from an Ethiopian perspective? The answer lies in moving beyond rigid formulations and embracing a calibrated balance. Ethiopia’s national interest is best served not by a deliberately weak Somali center, but by a politically constrained yet functionally capable federal government. Such a center would need sufficient authority to coordinate national security, manage borders, and engage with external partners, while remaining embedded within a genuinely federal structure that preserves regional autonomy.

In this model, federal member states are not isolated power centers but integrated components of a broader system. They retain the flexibility to manage local affairs and engage in pragmatic cooperation with neighbors, including Ethiopia, but operate within a framework that ensures coordination and coherence. This reduces governance gaps, limits the operational space for insurgent groups, and creates a more predictable security environment.

For Ethiopia, this balance addresses its core concerns. It prevents the emergence of a highly centralized Somali state that could act as a unified adversary or host hostile external forces, while also avoiding the chronic instability associated with extreme fragmentation. It supports more effective border management, reduces the need for direct military intervention, and creates a more stable foundation for economic engagement, including access to maritime infrastructure.

Ethiopia does not need a Somalia that is either overwhelmingly strong or persistently weak. It needs a Somalia that is stable enough to govern itself, integrated enough to cooperate with its neighbors, and balanced enough to avoid becoming a platform for regional rivalry. For Ethiopia, the challenge is not to impose this outcome, but to align its policies in ways that support it engaging both the federal center and regional states, managing external competition, and prioritizing long-term stability over short-term tactical advantage.

The idea that a weak center with strong, cooperative regions in the federal system serves Ethiopia’s interest captures an important part of this reality. But on its own, it is incomplete. Without a functioning core, decentralization risks drifting into fragmentation, and fragmentation in the Horn rarely remains contained. The more sustainable path lies in a middle ground one that reflects the complexity of Somalia’s political landscape and the strategic depth of Ethiopia’s national interests.

By Rebecca Mulugeta, Researcher, Horn Review