The activation of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan raises important questions about the effectiveness of existing regional security arrangements in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia played a leading role in establishing the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in 2020 to promote cooperation among littoral states. Yet, when confronted with escalating Houthi threats, Riyadh has turned to a separate defence partnership for additional military capabilities. This development exposes a gap between the Council’s regional ambitions and the security arrangements states rely on when facing immediate threats. It also raises questions about whether member states, particularly Eritrea, possess the capacity to contribute effectively to regional security, and what an increasingly complex regional security order means for the Council’s effectiveness.

The Makkah Pact, signed on 7 August 2026, commits its three members to treating an armed attack against one as an attack against all. Following renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, the signatories moved to implement their collective-defence commitments. On 7 October, Reuters reported that Türkiye was providing mainly defensive and technical support, including strategic planning, logistics, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities. The agreement therefore offers a mechanism for mobilising military capabilities and responding to immediate threats through a partnership outside the Red Sea Council.

The significance for the Council lies not in a direct legal contradiction but in the gap between its regional ambitions and the security arrangements states turn to in practice. Saudi Arabia helped establish a regional framework intended to advance maritime security, yet its response to emerging threats has involved a defence partnership with countries outside the Council’s membership. The Makkah Pact does not necessarily undermine regional cooperation, and external military assistance can strengthen maritime security. However, Saudi Arabia’s reliance on this separate arrangement raises a fundamental question: if the Council cannot provide an effective mechanism for coordinating responses to major security threats, how much practical value does it offer beyond diplomatic consultation.

This institutional gap also reflects a difference in function between the two arrangements. The Council provides a framework for cooperation among states bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with a mandate that includes maritime safety and security, while the Makkah Pact establishes a mutual-defence commitment among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. The Pact can help address military capability gaps, but it does not automatically create a coordinated regional security system. When military partnerships develop independently, states may strengthen their national defences without establishing shared threat assessments, common operating procedures or reliable mechanisms for regional crisis response. The central challenge is therefore to ensure that external defence arrangements complement regional institutions rather than leave them without an effective coordinating role.

Eritrea illustrates why this institutional challenge matters beyond the relationship between Saudi Arabia and its external defence partners. As a member of the Council of Arab and Africa States Bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Eritrea participates in a framework intended to promote collective maritime security. Yet the emergence of a separate defence arrangement involving Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan raises questions about the influence of the Council and its members over regional security decisions. Eritrea’s coastline and ports provide strategic advantages, but geography alone does not establish the military, logistical or institutional capacity needed to secure a major maritime corridor. If regional security increasingly depends on partnerships among states with greater military resources, Eritrea risks remaining geographically important without exercising a commensurate role in delivering or shaping regional security. This makes practical contributions, institutional coordination and confidence among member states essential to the Council’s credibility.

Questions about confidence become particularly important when external relationships intersect with threats to maritime security. Iran’s support for the Houthis, including weapons transfers, training and intelligence assistance, has strengthened their capacity to threaten maritime navigation. In 2026, the Century International examined how Eritrean territory and the Dahlak Islands could serve as transit points for Iranian arms destined for Yemen. Its analysis of satellite imagery and vessel-tracking data identified activity at the sites in question. These findings raise concerns about the possible use of Eritrean territory to facilitate Houthi operations, although activity at the identified sites could establish the Eritrean government’s direct involvement. For the Red Sea Council, such concerns highlight the importance of establishing whether member states can cooperate effectively in identifying and responding to cross-border maritime threats.

That challenge extends beyond identifying particular threats to ensuring that sensitive security information can be shared reliably. Effective intelligence-sharing requires confidence that information about port operations, maritime surveillance and defensive deployments will be protected from unauthorised access. Where trust is limited, states may be reluctant to share intelligence or coordinate their responses, weakening the collective capacity that regional institutions are intended to provide. The emergence of competing security partnerships therefore reinforces the need for clear procedures governing information-sharing, intelligence protection and joint threat assessment. Eritrea’s contribution to regional security should consequently be assessed through demonstrable cooperation and reliable safeguards, rather than its membership in the Council or possession of a strategically located coastline alone.

These institutional and trust-related challenges form part of a wider problem: the fragmentation of Red Sea security arrangements. The Makkah Pact signals that states are prepared to organise defence cooperation around selected partners and their capabilities rather than rely exclusively on existing regional institutions. Such arrangements may improve immediate defensive capacity, but they can also create overlapping frameworks with different memberships, priorities and levels of operational coordination. When missile and drone attacks, threats to commercial shipping and regional conflicts affect several countries simultaneously, fragmented arrangements can complicate crisis management. The security of the Red Sea therefore depends not simply on establishing additional defence partnerships, but on ensuring that their capabilities are coordinated with the regional institutions responsible for maritime security.

The consequences of this fragmentation extend beyond the littoral states to economies that depend on the Red Sea for access to international markets. Ethiopia, although landlocked, depends heavily on Djibouti’s ports and the Addis-Djibouti trade corridor, making the security of maritime traffic and connected transport routes central to its economic interests. Disruptions can affect imports, exports, fuel supplies and wider economic activity. Ethiopia’s exposure demonstrates that Red Sea insecurity is not solely a coastal security concern: it also threatens the economic resilience of countries whose trade depends on the waterway. Consulting major economies that rely on the maritime system could therefore broaden regional security planning, strengthen supply-chain resilience and ensure that security decisions account for their wider economic consequences while respecting the sovereign rights of coastal states.

Addressing these challenges requires the Red Sea Council to move beyond broad commitments towards more practical coordination. It needs clearer operational priorities, regular engagement among maritime and security authorities, reliable information-sharing channels and effective mechanisms for responding to emerging threats. Structured cooperation with external defence partners would also help ensure that their capabilities reinforce regional security efforts rather than create parallel arrangements with limited coordination. For Eritrea, meaningful participation should be demonstrated through practical cooperation, joint threat assessment and collective responses to regional risks. For the wider region, the objective should be a security framework capable of connecting national capabilities, external partnerships and regional coordination.

Ultimately, the Makkah Pact exposes the gap between the Red Sea’s regional security ambitions and the mechanisms available to implement them. Turkiye’s support for Saudi Arabia demonstrates the value of capable external partners, but the effectiveness of the wider security order will depend on whether their capabilities can complement regional cooperation. Eritrea’s position underscores the distinction between geographical importance and a demonstrated contribution to maritime security, while Ethiopia’s economic exposure shows why the consequences of insecurity extend beyond the coastline. A durable Red Sea security order therefore requires more than additional defence agreements: it requires capable states, credible regional institutions and coordinated partnerships that translate political commitments into practical protection of maritime navigation and regional stability.

By Abraham Abebe, Researcher, Horn Review