As Mogadishu confronts renewed violence following clashes between government forces and opposition-linked militias on June 3-4, 2026, the implications extend far beyond the capital’s streets. The unfolding constitutional crisis has created a precarious political environment, one that Al-Shabaab is well positioned to exploit. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term officially expired on May 15, 2026. Constitutional amendments passed in March, extending both presidential and parliamentary mandates by one year, were justified as necessary for preparing direct elections. However, opposition leaders, former presidents, and federal member states such as Puntland and Jubaland have rejected the move as unconstitutional. The resulting tensions escalated into armed confrontations across districts including Howlwadag, Abdiaziz, and Hodan.

Beyond the immediate human toll, the crisis has generated a deeper strategic vulnerability. Elite Somali security units, many of them trained for counterinsurgency operations, have been redirected toward managing internal political rivals. This diversion of resources is occurring at a particularly fragile moment, as the broader campaign against Al-Shabaab has already been losing momentum.

Over the past two years, the intensity and coordination of operations against Al-Shabaab have declined. While the 2022 offensive generated significant territorial gains and raised expectations of sustained pressure, that momentum has not been consistently maintained. Coordination between federal and regional forces has weakened, operational tempo has slowed, and previously recovered areas in central Somalia, particularly in Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, and Hiiraan, have proven difficult to stabilize. Recent field dynamics further indicate a pattern of insurgent re-infiltration in previously cleared rural areas. This has been accompanied by the expansion of shadow governance networks and increased operational pressure along strategic corridors leading toward Mogadishu, underscoring the fragility of earlier territorial gains. This pattern is not merely operational but structural. Al-Shabaab has evolved since the mid-2000s into one of the most resilient insurgent movements in the region, sustained by the military, political, and economic weaknesses of the Somali state and the fragmented nature of its federal system. The group has repeatedly exploited tensions between Mogadishu and regional administrations, which continue to undermine unified counterinsurgency efforts.

                                                                                                                                                             International stabilization initiatives, including African Union deployments and U.S. support operations, have struggled to deliver lasting containment. Although sustained airstrikes, including a record level of U.S. operations in 2025, have degraded parts of the wider militant ecosystem, they have not fundamentally altered Al-Shabaab’s territorial resilience or its capacity to regenerate. Meanwhile, shifting political priorities within the federal administration have further limited strategic focus on sustained stabilization.

                                                                                                                                                                         The current political crisis risks accelerating this trajectory, turning gradual stagnation into a more pronounced strategic reversal. For Al-Shabaab, the opportunity is clear. The group does not need to seize Mogadishu outright to advance its objectives. Instead, it thrives in fragmented political environments where state authority is contested and security coordination breaks down.

First, the redeployment of government forces creates immediate operational gaps in rural and peri-urban areas. These vacuums allow Al-Shabaab to regroup, reassert control, and expand influence in territories where state presence has become inconsistent.

Second, the group benefits from narrative leverage. Political infighting reinforces its long-standing messaging that Somalia’s federal leadership is divided, self-serving, and incapable of governing effectively. By presenting itself as a disciplined and predictable alternative, Al-Shabaab strengthens recruitment, expands taxation networks, and consolidates local control.

Third, the psychological dimension remains critical. Even without major offensives in Mogadishu, sustained attacks elsewhere will erode public confidence in the government’s ability to provide security. The group has historically intensified asymmetric operations during periods of political uncertainty, using violence not only as a tactical tool but as a means of deepening political fragmentation.

A further concern is the evolving regional and technological dimension of the threat. According to United Nations reporting, Al-Shabaab militants have reportedly received training in Yemen in drone operations and the manufacture of more sophisticated explosive devices, signaling a clear intent to upgrade their tactical capabilities. While the group has so far relied primarily on drones for surveillance and intelligence gathering, there are growing indications that networks associated with the Houthis may have supplied armed drones, with reports also suggesting interest in more advanced systems such as guided missiles. Widely used in Houthi operations across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, such capabilities would significantly enhance Al-Shabaab’s operational reach and lethality. Even limited access could shift the tactical balance against Somali forces already under strain, underscoring the risk that the insurgency is not only enduring but becoming more technologically adaptive and increasingly embedded within broader regional security dynamics.

The broader implications are equally serious. The crisis risks straining cooperation with international partners, including the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission, while raising the prospect of donor fatigue. External actors have increasingly emphasized the need for political dialogue, recognizing that internal divisions are undermining counterterrorism efforts. At the same time, Al-Shabaab faces structural limits. Somali forces, supported by international partners, have previously degraded the group’s leadership and disrupted its operational capacity. Its reliance on coercion and extreme violence continues to generate local resistance, particularly in areas where communities mobilize against its presence. However, this local resistance is not uniform. Recent tensions have also emerged following an incident in which federal security forces attacked a clan leaders’ meeting where the former prime minister Hassan Ali Khaire was present during a political gathering, raising concerns that such actions could alienate clan constituencies and weaken trust between local actors and the federal government. In Somalia’s historical experience, particularly during the 1990s U.S. mission, similar patterns of tension between security forces and clan structures reshaped local support dynamics. When U.S. strikes killed elders and clan leaders from Aidid’s clan, it undermined broader efforts to dismantle the Somali National Alliance by eroding crucial clan-based legitimacy and support.

Ultimately, the extent to which Al-Shabaab can capitalize on the current crisis will depend on how Somalia’s political impasse evolves. A prolonged period of instability could accelerate territorial losses, intensify asymmetric attacks, and increase pressure on the capital. Conversely, a swift political compromise would help restore strategic focus and prevent further erosion of state authority. What remains unequivocal is that Al-Shabaab’s strength lies not only in its military capabilities but in its ability to exploit political fragmentation. In moments of elite disarray, it does not need to create instability,  it simply expands within it. Unless Somalia’s political actors move decisively toward de-escalation and consensus, the current window of opportunity for the insurgency will remain wide open.

By Dagim Yohannes, Researcher, Horn Review