Eritrea’s recent decision to withdraw from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comes wrapped in accusations that the organization has failed in its mandate, targeted Eritrea, and disregarded its own obligations. But these claims collapse under scrutiny. Eritrea’s relationship with IGAD has been defined less by exclusion and more by Eritrea’s own chronic unwillingness to participate meaningfully in any multilateral framework. What its Foreign Mjnistry deliberately omits in its accusations against IGAD is that it never legally bound itself to the organization in the first place.

Despite announcing its return following Ethiopia’s rapprochement in 2018, Eritrea did not ratify its IGAD membership agreement, nor did it ratify any of the organization’s core protocols or decisions. Its participation remained political and tactical, not legal or institutional. A state that refuses to formalize its obligations, contribute financially, or submit to agreed frameworks cannot credibly accuse the institution of violating duties it never accepted. An organization cannot benefit a member that refuses every responsibility and rejects every form of engagement. IGAD nevertheless remained committed to sustained engagement with Eritrea in the interest of regional stability. Eritrea’s withdrawal, therefore, is not an exit from a binding commitment, but the abandonment of a relationship it never fully entered.

Its disengagement has also been consistent in its practice of chronic absenteeism and selective attendance. Eritrea has never taken its role seriously, with its head of state attending IGAD only twice in the organization’s entire existence. For decades, Eritrea simply did not show up – literally or diplomatically. Institutions cannot function around members who refuse to participate, and Eritrea’s chronic absenteeism has always undermined its credibility within IGAD far more than any external action ever could. Eritrea’s IGAD participation record makes its recent complaints even more hollow. While Eritrea was present as a member during the November 1996 IGAD revitalisation summit in Djibouti – when IGADD formally transformed into IGAD – this early involvement never translated into consistent engagement.

Beyond that foundational moment, Eritrea’s top-level presence has been extremely limited. President Isaias Afwerki has attended only a handful of IGAD-related meetings in more than three decades: a two-day summit in Addis Ababa on 6–7 September 2020 when Eritrea was accepted back into the organization; a 15 August 2008 meeting where Afwerki received an IGAD delegation rather than participating in a full summit; a two-day visit to Kenya in February 2023 where he pledged Eritrea’s return; and now, after barely two years of renewed membership, the December 2025 withdrawal. These isolated appearances – typically lasting one to three days and chosen entirely at his discretion – underscore that Eritrea never demonstrated sustained commitment or participation at any point in IGAD’s modern history.

This withdrawal is also not occurring in a vacuum. It fits neatly into a wider geopolitical campaign, particularly Egypt’s longstanding effort to undermine Ethiopia’s regional influence. Sudan’s recent suspension from IGAD is another part of this same constellation, and Eritrea’s departure aligns conveniently with that trend. The notion that Eritrea is reacting purely to IGAD’s shortcomings ignores the broader political alignment in which this move is situated. At the same time, Eritrea’s regional conduct has grown increasingly disruptive and confrontational. Its behaviour has raised the risk of renewed conflict, and its exit from IGAD looks very much like a pre-emptive attempt to avoid scrutiny or coordinated pressure from the organization. Rather than being pushed out, Eritrea is retreating before it can be held accountable. The withdrawal is, in essence, a cry for attention and a defensive maneuver to evade regional oversight at a moment when Eritrea’s actions have generated heightened concern among its neighbours.

The behaviour of the Eritrean leadership in recent months reinforces this pattern. The president’s continued foreign trips to his longstanding allies from the days of insurgency – Cairo, Sudan, and now Saudi Arabia – alongside earlier visits by Somalia’s opposition leader, Sudan’s prime minister, and others, reveal a leadership seeking reassurance and geopolitical leverage outside multilateral frameworks. The recent release of 13 prisoners arbitrarily detained for 18 years in unknown locations, followed by sudden exte outreachsive to diaspora communities, further signals that the regime is attempting to reshape its image and consolidate external alliances. In an unprecedented move, Isaias Afwerki and his delegation met leaders of the Eritrean community and national associations – youth, women, PFDJ branches in Riyadh yesterday, him reaffirming that “Eritrea’s strength lies in the patriotism of its people”. Yet such carefully staged encounters only highlight the disconnect between domestic repression and external theatrics.

Isayas Afeworki’s recent actions and strategic positioning suggest that he is steadily laying the foundations for a potential conflict he is gearing withto start with Ethiopia. The regime’s pattern of intensifying foreign trips to longtime allies combined with outreach to opposition actors and diaspora mobilisation, signals a deliberate effort to strengthen external support and hedge against regional isolation, reflecting a posture consistent with pre-conflict preparation. Its withdrawal from IGAD removes institutional oversight, reduces diplomatic pressure, and allows it greater freedom to act unilaterally, effectively eliminating mechanisms that could mediate tensions with Ethiopia. This move also aligns Eritrea with regional actors, including Egypt and Sudan, whose strategic interests intersect with a weakened or destabilised Ethiopia, amplifying the geopolitical risk.

Eritrea’s behaviour has grown increasingly provocational and confrontational, raising the potential for escalation, while the regime continues to leverage external hostility as a tool for domestic consolidation, reinforcing military and political mobilisation as a core survival strategy. Taken together, these elements reveal a deliberate, multi-layered approach in which Eritrea is actively shaping conditions that could precipitate conflict, even if war has not yet erupted.

Most importantly, this outcome is entirely predictable given Isayas Afeworki’s longstanding anti-multilateralist orientation. Since Eritrea’s inception as a state in 1993 and him automatically assuming power, he has exhibited a consistent pattern of undermining multilateralism and rejecting institutional cooperation. Eritrea has repeatedly weakened the African Union, dismissed regional frameworks, and avoided any structures that require shared commitments or collective accountability. It has never demonstrated genuine political will for regional integration or cooperation under multilateral frameworks, and its recent tensions with Ethiopia further underscore its preference for improvised, destabilising minilateral proxies over serious engagement with established institutions. This withdrawal is simply an extension of that long-standing posture.

Besides, Eritrea’s exit can also not be fully understood without considering Afeworki’s centralised, authoritarian, and intensely personalistic leadership style. In Eritrea, foreign policy is his prerogative alone – institutions exist only to rubber-stamp his decisions. IGAD membership was never a binding commitment but a matter of his convenience. This withdrawal reflects a leader prioritizing personal calculation over regional obligations, sidelining multilateral accountability entirely. Afwerki’s style ensures that Eritrea’s foreign policy is reactive, idiosyncratic, and unmoored from institutional norms, turning international disengagement into an extension of his grip on power.

In the end, Eritrea’s withdrawal reveals far more about Eritrea than it does about IGAD. The claims in its press release serve as a political smokescreen for its own disengagement, its geopolitical alignments, its disruptive behaviour, and its refusal to operate within any multilateral system that it does not control. While IGAD, like most regional blocs, has its own structural limitations, Eritrea’s exit with no prior complaints logdged or commitments delivered, is not a principled exit from a failing institution – it is the predictable outcome of Eritrea’s long-standing aversion to cooperation, accountability, and collective regional governance.

By Horn Review Editorial