The recent denunciation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has been both emphatic and repetitive, with African Union officials, Arab states, and international commentators characterizing the act as contravening international law. Such pronouncements invoke Somalia’s territorial integrity, the African Union’s principle of inviolable inherited borders, and the United Nations Charter. While these statements carry significant political weight, a careful examination of the applicable legal framework demonstrates that they conflate normative and political judgments with legally binding obligations. Diplomatic recognition constitutes a sovereign and declaratory act, which, absent coercion, annexation, or the use of force, does not per se violate the Charter or customary international law.

The UN Charter codifies the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention. Articles 2(1) and 2(4) prohibit member states from employing force or coercion to compromise the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and from intervening in the internal affairs of other states. These provisions are restrictive in scope, targeting coercive conduct rather than acts of diplomatic acknowledgment. In the jurisprudence and doctrine of state recognition, scholars distinguish between the constitutive and declaratory theories: the former predicates statehood on recognition by other states, whereas the latter recognizes an entity as a state once it satisfies objective criteria of population, territory, governance, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. Under either framework, recognition remains a political act of sovereign discretion, rather than a juridically mandated obligation. Historical precedents—including the recognition of Kosovo, South Sudan, and partially recognized entities—illustrate that unilateral recognition may occur without breaching the Charter or binding norms of international law.

The African Union’s engagement with Somaliland further elucidates the distinction between political norms and legal obligations. In 2005, the Organization of African Unity conducted a fact-finding mission which assessed Somaliland’s governance capacity, historical claims, and relative stability. Although the report acknowledged the entity’s de facto functionality, it was never codified as binding policy, nor did it precipitate formal recognition. By 2025, the AU articulated a more rigid posture, explicitly rejecting recognition and reaffirming Somalia’s territorial integrity in accordance with its principle of respecting borders inherited at independence. This evolution reflects a normative and precautionary policy stance, aimed at preventing secessionist precedent and preserving continental stability. From a legal standpoint, the AU’s position is politically prescriptive rather than juridically obligatory, and it does not alter the legal permissibility of recognition under the UN Charter. The framing and emphasis of AU pronouncements rather illustrates the interplay between normative institutional posture and realpolitik considerations within multilateral governance structures.

The selective nature of international condemnation further underscores the political character of recognition disputes. Many states criticizing Israel – including Saudi Arabia, other Arab League members, and several AU partners – have previously engaged in unilateral recognition of Palestine, often outside the framework of comprehensive UN endorsement. This reveals a striking inconsistency: the legal and functional rationale underpinning recognition in both instances is materially analogous, grounded in de facto governance, claims to historical statehood, and sovereign discretion. The political opprobrium directed at Israel, therefore, is not legally necessitated but is contingent upon normative, strategic, and geopolitical considerations.

While Palestine and Somaliland differ in terms of the scope and degree of international integration – Palestine benefits from recognition by over 130 UN member states and participates in multiple international organizations, whereas Somaliland remains unrecognized – they share significant legal and functional characteristics. Both exercise effective territorial administration, maintain institutional structures, and assert claims to statehood. Both exist in geopolitically sensitive regions where recognition carries normative and strategic ramifications. These parallels underscore that selective condemnation of Israel replicates criteria previously applied to Palestine, emphasizing that the opposition is normative and political rather than strictly juridical.

In sum, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland cannot be construed as a violation of the UN Charter or customary international law. The AU’s 2025 position and the broader regional denunciation reflect normative, political, and strategic judgments, rather than legally binding constraints. International law recognizes the sovereign discretion of states in matters of recognition, and the selective character of opposition – particularly given prior unilateral recognition of Palestine – demonstrates that the debate is politically contingent. Assertions of illegality conflate normative advocacy with legal obligation, obscuring the distinction between diplomatic discretion and binding international legal constraints.

By Horn Review Editorial