Eritrea’s recent escalation in northern Ethiopia represents a deliberate, structurally grounded strategy rather than a contingent or reactive phenomenon. It is premised on a political logic in which militarization substitutes for institutional legitimacy, proxy operations substitute for diplomacy, and external destabilization functions as an instrument of regime preservation. Contrary to some characterizations of the conflict as an internal Ethiopian war, the evidence indicates that the primary agent of escalation is the Eritrean state itself under Isaias Afwerki. Eritrea has initiated hostilities through both proxies -:most notably splinter elements of the TPLF and the Fano militias -:and through the deployment of its own forces within Ethiopian territory, establishing Eritrea as an active belligerent rather than an ancillary actor.

This distinction is analytically crucial. The TPLF and Fano, while operationally significant, do not determine the strategic trajectory of the conflict. Their autonomy is constrained, and their actions often serve the broader operational logic dictated by Eritrean objectives. Eritrean forces are currently engaged as direct combatants in Tigray, which has implications both for the characterization of the conflict and for the legal framework governing Ethiopian responses. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Ethiopia possesses an unambiguous right to defend its territorial integrity against foreign armed intervention. Accordingly, federal military operations targeting Eritrean forces are not escalatory; they are constitutive acts of sovereign defense.

Eritrea’s conduct during the previous Tigray conflict illustrates the operational logic now being replicated. The regime systematically exploited transitional gaps and coordination failures between federal and regional authorities to assert autonomous operational control. Eritrean forces engaged in targeted attacks against both Tigrayan combatants and federal positions, while civilian populations were exposed to looting, displacement, and systematic violence. These actions were not incidental but consistent with a strategy of coercive territorial influence, designed to weaken both state and non-state actors simultaneously. In the current phase, Eritrean operations within Tigray again demonstrate a focus on disruption and attrition rather than the consolidation of political authority or governance.

Eritrea’s objectives are strategic and long-term. The state’s goal is not the triumph of any Ethiopian faction but the persistent fragmentation of Ethiopia’s political and institutional capacity. By maintaining a condition of internal volatility, Eritrea aims to constrain Ethiopia’s potential as a regional power, thereby enhancing its own security and leverage in the Horn of Africa. The timing of escalatory actions, including deliberate operations immediately prior to major diplomatic events such as the African Union summit, reflects an instrumental logic intended to generate political pressure rather than to achieve decisive military outcomes.

The operational relationship between Eritrea and its proxies underscores the asymmetry inherent in this conflict. Proxy forces benefit from material support and tactical coordination, yet they operate under structural constraints imposed by their external patron. Strategic initiative resides with Eritrea, which calibrates escalation and disengagement according to broader security objectives. Proxies absorb both the human and political costs of military engagement, while Eritrea accrues the strategic advantage without directly jeopardizing domestic legitimacy.

The civilian consequences, while severe, are analytically distinct from the durability of the Ethiopian state. Young Ethiopians, particularly in Tigray, are exposed to renewed cycles of violence, yet this exposure does not translate into a diminution of state sovereignty. Ethiopia retains a coherent institutional structure, international recognition, and the demographic and administrative capacity to reconstitute governance and security functions despite disruption. By contrast, Eritrea and its proxies lack comparable capacity for governance or nation-building; their operational logic is confined to coercion, disruption, and temporary territorial control.

Consequently, this conflict should be interpreted as a war initiated by Eritrea rather than an internal civil struggle. Ethiopia’s defensive operations are both legally justified and strategically necessary. While Eritrean operations may amplify local instability and impose significant humanitarian costs, they do not undermine the structural integrity or continuity of the Ethiopian state. Eritrea’s strategy, predicated on episodic disruption and proxy warfare, is inherently limited: it can destabilize but cannot dismantle, disrupt but cannot govern, and inflict suffering but cannot eliminate sovereignty.

Eritrea’s renewed military engagement in Ethiopia is a calculated projection of power, reliant on proxies and tactical opportunism, yet fundamentally constrained by its inability to substitute for state authority. Ethiopia’s capacity for institutional continuity and territorial governance ensures that, despite the intensity of current operations, the state retains both the legitimacy and the means to defend itself. Historical and structural analysis suggests that, while Eritrean actions may prolong conflict and exacerbate human suffering, they are unlikely to achieve strategic objectives that compromise the existence of the Ethiopian state.

By Horn Review Editorial