There is an increasing concern that there could be a major inter-state conflict in the Horn of Africa. An armed confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, neighboring countries with a troubled and complicated history, is becoming more and more likely. The war of words, both through official and unofficial channels, is becoming intense. There are also reports of large-scale mobilization and preparation  on both sides. Most commentators opining on this situation focus on the Assab port, which Ethiopia aspires to regain and utilize. While the Assab angle is a crucial part of the equation, it does not present the whole picture. In fact, it overlooks a critical part of the entire saga.

The missing part is the role of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in this escalating situation. In this convoluted story of shifting alliances, the TPLF and the Eritrean government have been frenemies for decades. Before Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia, the current ruling party of Eritrea and the TPLF had fought side by side against the central government in Addis Ababa. In fact, the Eritrean rebels were instrumental in the formation of the TPLF and have served as its mentors and Godfathers. Together, these two rebel groups defeated the government of Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991, took control of Ethiopia, and paved the way for Eritrean secession. The leader of the Eritrean rebels, Isayas Afeworki, became President of Eritrea and Meles Zenawi, leader of the rebels from Tigray, became the President and later the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. In addition to their joint armed struggle, both rebel groups came from the same ethnic and linguistic background and hence had a strong bond of solidarity. Therefore, in the aftermath of their victory, the governments they formed in Asmara and Addis Ababa were on very friendly terms. 

But this friendship did not last for too long. In the late 1990s, the growing competition for supremacy in the horn of Africa between the former comrades-in-arms resulted in a bloody two-year conflict. That conflict was wrongly perceived by the international community as a boundary dispute between the two states. Then, as is the case now, the international community could hardly understand the genesis of the conflict. After that devastating war came to an end in 2001 through the Algiers agreement, the antagonism between President Isayas and the TPLF continued unabated for close to two decades. Meles Zenawi, chairperson of the TPLF and Prime Minister of Ethiopia, orchestrated the international isolation of President Isayas who in turn funded and mobilized armed rebels against the Ethiopian government. In 2018, when a new administration led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to office in Addis Ababa, the new Prime Minister managed to make peace with Eritrea and began normalizing relations between the two countries. 

This effort was not welcomed by the TPLF, who were dislodged from power in Addis Ababa and have decamped to Mekelle , the regional capital of the Tigray region. Although, Prime Minister Abiy defeated the TPLF stalwarts in a democratic internal party leadership contest, the TPLF bigwigs who until then were in control of political and economic power in Addis Ababa, were not willing to accept the ascent of the new Prime Minister. They were exploring all avenues, including an open insurrection, to remove the new Prime Minister from power. They felt that the emerging friendship between Addis Ababa and Asmara could be an alliance against their return to power.

In fact, when the TPLF launched its insurrectionary war against the federal government, Eritrean support to the Federal government in Addis Ababa had been instrumental in frustrating the TPLF’s aspiration to regain its former status as the supreme political overlord in Ethiopia.

While the Government of Prime Minister Abiy was able to build its defensive capabilities and become more self-reliant in due course, in the initial conflict with the TPLF, Eritrean support was essential for the victory of the federal government. Although both the federal government and the Eritrean government wanted to defeat the TPLF and considered it to be an enemy, through the course of the conflict, the divergence in their approach and objectives became evident. For the federal government, forestalling the TPLF’s bid to return to Addis Ababa in a triumphant second coming was the major objective.

For the Eritrean Government, the total defeat, surrender, and annihilation of the TPLF appeared to be the objective. Despite this purpourted objective, there were also those who argued that for the Eritrean government the ultimate objective is to fuel instability and chaos in Ethiopia. Hence, after a conflict that ravaged northern Ethiopia for about two years, while the Federal Government wanted to make peace with the TPLF in a manner that would meet its own political objectives, President Isaias of Eritrea wanted the war to continue. His insistence on seeing the war continue aroused suspicions in Addis Ababa. 

While his support in the first round of the conflict were considerable, in the second and third rounds of the conflict, his forces had no discernible contribution in the victory of the federal government.  Furthermore, the campaign of looting and atrocity that the Eritrean troops engaged in led many to conclude that they are mainly motivated by hatred towards and a desire to exact vengeance against the people of the Tigray region. Taking all this into account, the Federal Government spurned the advice of the Eritrean government and made peace with the TPLF through the Pretoria agreement. President Isayas’s disdain for the Pretoria agreement was shared by some within the TPLF. These hardliner elements within the TPLF, led by the former security chief Getachew Assefa, found the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities brokered in Pretoria to be unpalatable. They wanted a temporary ceasefire that would enable them to regroup and continue fighting. They viewed their comrades who negotiated the Pretoria agreement as being sellouts who surrendered to the federal government. These hardliners then began a secret liaison with the Eritrean government. Initial reports of contact between the TPLF hardliners and the regime in Asmara were viewed by many as being ludicrous.  Many found it hard to believe that these “archenemies” could find common ground and would be able to work together. Now, their alliance has in many ways become public and even has a social media hashtag #ፅምዶ.  

Their ultimate objective is to reenact their victorious march towards Addis Ababa in the early 1990s.  They believe that by mobilizing the malcontent ethnic armed groups in Oromia and the Amhara region, they can bring about a change in government in Addis Ababa. In this script, just like Mengistu Hailemariam, Prime Minister Abiy will be forced out of power and the TPLF would once again cobble together a coalition of ethnic parties behind it which will rule Ethiopia. Even if the alliance between the TPLF and the Eritrean government was to become victorious against the federal government, it is obvious that this will only lead to an endless cycle of violence that would spin totally out of control. Right now, hardliners within the TPLF, the Fano and OLA, as well as the Eritrean government, might have been able to forge a common front against the federal government. But if they were to prevail against their common foe, they are bound to fight against one another and plunge the whole region into the kind of conflict that would make the conflict in Sudan a very tame affair. The fulcrum in the dynamics between the Eritrean government and the Government of Ethiopia is the Tigray region. So long as the hardliner group in Tigray is capable of waging war against the federal government, the opportunistic adventurism of the Eritrean government will come into play. President Isayas will use this as an opportunity to weaken Ethiopia and increase his influence in the internal affairs of his more populous and prosperous neighbor.

So, where does Assab fit in with all of this? The Ethiopian Government has for a very long time openly expressed its desire to secure a port that it could develop, utilize, and control through negotiation with its neighbors. Assab, due to its geographic location, is an ideal candidate for these purposes. However, the Eritrean government, despite the substantial economic benefit it could gain from leasing the port of Assab to Ethiopia, has refused to even consider such a proposal. This categorical rejection has caused frustration in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia’s growing economy and ambition have made securing an additional outlet to the sea imperative. For Asmara, supporting the TPLF hardliners and launching a campaign against the government in Addis Ababa would be a means to weaken both the TPLF and the Federal Government, making Ethiopians collectively weaker and poorer. The position of the Ethiopian government seems to be that an attack by the TPLF hardliners, aided and abetted by Eritrea, will be considered as an attack by Eritrea against Ethiopia thereby justifying Ethiopia’s response in self-defense against Eritrea. Furthermore, in any such conflict, the government of Ethiopia seems to be determined to create conditions that would enable it to realize its aspirations over the port of Assab.

Given these circumstances, the effort of any actor, local or international, intending to engage in preventive diplomacy should not simply focus on the question of sea access or the issue of Assab. The fuse for the conflict lies in Mekelle, with the hardliners of the TPLF being the main protagonists. Unless a way can be found to pressure the TPLF hardliners to abandon their plan to resume hostilities, the conflagration in northern Ethiopia becomes inevitable. Without the hardliners and the sizeable armed forces that they still command, the Eritrean government will not be capable of waging war against Ethiopia. And so long as these hardliners refrain from acts of belligerence, the federal government in Addis Ababa could be counted to continue its policy of restraint in the face of various provocations it has faced from the TPLF hardliners. The TPLF hardliners are training and arming new combat units, have forcibly taken over some of the contested areas, such as Raya, they have used force to dismantle the interim administration established by the federal government in accordance with the Pretoria agreement.

The same TPLF faction is also openly consorting with the Government of Eritrea against the Federal Government. Despite these facts, the federal government has opted not to retaliate or escalate the situation. But it will be difficult to think of a scenario where the Federal government would accept with equanimity a march by the TPLF towards Welkait or Humera, which is exactly what the TPLF and Isayas seem to be planning. Eritrea’s bellicosity does not have legs without the TPLF’s rogue generals. The road to peace lies in making the warlords in Mekele give up their delusions of grandeur, and there would be a rapid improvement in the situation. There should be no excuse, even the cause célèbre of IDPS and contested areas, should be used to justify a resumption of hostilities.

Targeted individual sanctions and similar measures to pressure the proponents of war within the TPLF could go a long way in reducing their appetite for risk. The role of folks like Getachew Assefa and Fetlework Gebregziabher should be subject to closer scrutiny and accountability. Otherwise, they are poised to instigate a conflict that would drag the whole Horn of Africa into an unprecedented scale of violence. The role of the rogue generals in human trafficking and illicit gold trade, and how all of these contribute to their desire to see an endless state of war, should be given sufficient attention. As important as the issue of port and access to the sea are, more mundane considerations such as the greed, caprice, and insatiable thirst for power that animates the hardliners of the TPLF are very critical when it comes to war and peace in northern Ethiopia. Would peacemakers need to consider this sad reality?

By Ambassador Lencho Bati, Former Ethiopian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia