After becoming landlocked in 1993, Ethiopia has made a determined effort to regain its maritime influence. Through negotiations for transit rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, and a training partnership with Russia, Ethiopia is actively working to secure a naval base and improve its training. The core question is: Will the Ethiopian navy rise again from the depths after 33 years of Dormant? The recent Ethiopian naval revival is not merely an attempt to revive a some section military branch, it is a reflection of a new recasting of sovereignty, security, and regional integration for a nation that is landlocked. Despite the loss of direct access to the sea with the separation of Eritrea in 1993, its strategic interests still remain heavily connected with the Red Sea corridor where nearly one hundred percent of its imports and exports move.

The Nile and Red Sea are Ethiopia’s lifeblood economic and security endeavors. Following the historic commissioning of the grand Ethiopian renaissance dam (GERD) Ethiopia marked another milestone in history with the mandating of its Navy Headquarters which shows Ethiopia to settle its long awaited maritime ambitions. The inauguration of the Ethiopian Navy Training Centre in Addis Ababa, the July graduation of the first cohort officers and the virtual operationalisation of an advanced Navy Headquarters, mark a historic milestone that points to the resolve by Ethiopia to restore itself as a prime naval force in the Horn of Africa.

Historically, Ethiopia possessed a small but efficient navy during the mid-1950s until the 1990s, which was based in the coastal ports of Eritrea with the navy formed as an independent entity under the Ethiopian military forces which mainly functioned to protect the red sea, with the officers being trained at the high-level experts of the Italian, Russia, Norway and US navy forces. In spite of the fact that the navy was ordered by the senior officers it was limited in war since there were no such terror groups like this before and there were no such biggest gulf navy in the region which balance the Ethiopian navy and relocation of funds to the ground and air force in the Ogaden war in 1978 make limited the navy to implement the war activity.

The Ethiopian navy, a force that took 35 years to build, was disbanded in a single day. Its ships were abandoned, with some left on the coasts of Yemen and others falling into private hands for over 14 years. This abrupt dissolution in 1996, a direct result of the nation becoming landlocked, wiped out decades of capacity-building among its seafarers.

Some countries in history lost their navy by war like Ethiopia, among them  are Bolivia and South Sudan. Bolivia lost its pacific coast after the pacific war against chile in the end of 19th, bolivia remains land locked but has symbolic navy in lakes and sea, our neighbor south sudan very similar situation which we can observe that countries will lose their in war, south sudan after independence in 2011 it became landlocked and experienced problems to ensure access to port and maritime routes that hampered the economic growth and regional integration of the nation. Yet, unlike most landlocked countries that give up maritime needs, for the past decades Ethiopia invested in naval training and engineering, retaining institutional memento necessary for comeback. Modern naval comeback draws on that heritage but with a wider and more advanced vision integrating hard security with economic and diplomatic strategy.

The revival of the navy in Ethiopia needs to be interpreted with a fresh lens, one that contradicts centuries of notions about geographical coastline-based sovereignty. Ethiopia is leading an era of relational and negotiated maritime sovereignty, served best in its port cooperation. Its venture with Somaliland to make Berbera Port a naval base is the defining example of this new model, where landlocked countries exert maritime extension through mutual port access rather than singular territorial possession. This naval diplomacy expands the notion of control on the sea to encompass networked nodes of access and shared strategic interests, with dynamic spheres of influence cutting across borders.

Ethiopia’s navy is crucial not only for nationalistic or pride purposes but as an imperative security component in a neighboring region highly militarized by Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea, all developing their naval strength and acquiring advanced arms. War today largely relies on heavy weapons deployable via the sea, posing a direct threat to urban centers like Addis Ababa. With the exorbitant amounts to be paid on land in the capital, adversaries can try to use sea transport to strike, calling for Ethiopia’s reawakening in the sea to avert such attacks, defend sovereignty, and guarantee sea trade routes.

Furthermore, Egypt and Somalia have also formed a military alliance through signed deals and troop deployment, with Egypt reportedly supporting Somalia’s military strength, including integration into the African Union mission. Eritrea is also included in a trilateral security agreement between Egypt and Somalia, which Ethiopia considers a cooperative challenge aimed at decreasing its regional influence and GERD-related ambitions. Ethiopia’s maritime force will improve regional security architecture by facilitating multipolar governance in the Red Sea, preventing piracy, terrorism, and smuggling, and reducing dependence on powerful maritime players.

Economically, Ethiopian naval modernization is an economic strategic move to diversify corridors of trade and reduce reliance on single regional ports, least of which is Djibouti. A capable navy secures safe maritime passages and defends key infrastructure connecting Ethiopian markets to international trade. This is favorable to Ethiopia’s vision of economics generally under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), linking naval capability to continental integration, infrastructure diplomacy, and economic sovereignty.

The renaissance also reshapes geopolitics. Ethiopia’s growing coordination with Russia for naval training and capacity building is a shifting of alliances that may alter the balance of power in the Red Sea. Though offering better expertise, this shift poses new strategic challenges Ethiopia must handle deftly in competition against Egypt, Sudan, Gulf states, and world powers whose own interests converge in the Horn.

Ethiopia’s naval plans represent a singular experiment in maritime role expansion in inland states. In contrast to Bolivia’s limited riverine naval forces nominally symbolic of lost 19th century sea claims, Ethiopia’s strategy systematically combines naval presence with diplomatic access to ports and port infrastructure expansion. This integrated and pragmatic strategy converts the navy into a functioning and diplomatic tool of statecraft, maritime capability being inextricably entwined with economic and political goals.

Intrinsically, Ethiopia is presenting a new sea model, one in which geographical limits no longer preclude maritime sovereignty in which naval power is conceptualized as fluid, relational, and networked and in which security, economy, and diplomacy are seamlessly entangled at sea. This rediscovery has implications that reach far beyond the confines of Ethiopia that shows it upends conventional geopolitical categories, deepens regional integration paradigms, and provides a model for other landlocked nations to seek influence beyond their shores.

Ethiopia’s re-emergence to have naval power is thus not just about recapturing the red sea but about redrawing the very terms of geopolitical engagement, Ethiopia has a historical relationship with the red sea. It offers an intriguing narrative of resilience, strategic innovation, and regional leadership amidst a rapidly changing and contested maritime domain. For policymakers, scholars, and regional actors, Ethiopia’s unfolding maritime venture offers valuable lessons on sovereignty, cooperation, and power in our globalized world.

By Rebecca Mulugeta, Researcher, Horn Review