Dr. Shimels is a human rights lawyer by profession with a hybrid experience working both in academia as a lecturer and researcher, and through his practical engagement in the field of human rights advocacy. He holds a Doctoral Degree (Dr. iur.) in International Human Rights Law, Terrorism and Counterterrorism from the European University of Viadrina, in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. He received his master’s degree in Human Rights Law from Addis Ababa University and LLB Degree in law from Haramaya University.
Currently, Dr. Shimels serves as the Ethiopia Country Director for the International human rights NGO called Freedom House. He also works for European Center for Electoral Support (ECES) as Electoral Trainings Coordinator and the Legal Expert on Civic and Voter Education and Inclusion. He also holds a visiting professorship position and teaches the African Human Rights Regional System at the Faculty of Law, European University of Viadrina, Germany.
The 1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia
The Code’s wide-ranging coverage of similar crimes committed against a foreign state or interstate organizations might also be cited as indicators of Ethiopia’s earlier attempts and its political willingness to take part in the pressing demands of cooperation and transnational responses to crimes of international concern, despite that, an act of terrorism has never got an explicit mention within such category. A typical practical example that Ethiopia mentioned in its report was the successful investigation, prosecution, and trial of the offenders who participated in the assassination attempt of the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.24
A typical practical example that Ethiopia mentioned in its report was the successful investigation, prosecution, and trial of the offenders who participated in the assassination attempt of the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
The third category of essential provisions of the old Penal Code – perhaps the most contiguous and highly affiliated offenses with that of the crime of terrorism, both in times of peace and war – are those proscribed in the second title of the Code, under Arts 280 and the following, as offenses against the law of nations. In exactly similar fashion or with direct reference to the international law instruments to which Ethiopia is a party, the Code had defined crimes of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes against the civilian population; and war crimes against the wounded, sick, shipwrecked persons, prisoners, and interned persons and branded them as grave offenses against the international community. There are tendencies equating terrorism with that genocide when committed systematically against a particular targeted group of civilians, or as a war crime when perpetrated targeting civilians not actively taking part in hostilities during armed conflicts. Accordingly, only a few might have contested if one would have quoted these provisions of the Code in dealing with acts of terrorism in the absence of any discrete law explicitly addressing this conduct as a separate crime.
Apart from that, as provided under Art. 17, the Penal Code had also established national jurisdiction prosecuting crimes committed in a foreign state against international law or universal order – an international offense specified in Ethiopian legislation, or in the international treaty or convention to which Ethiopia has adhered and implemented in the domestic jurisdiction. With this integrationist approach, those specific conventions dealing with particular offenses, or acts related to terrorism, could have domestic application even if the proscribed conduct has been committed neither inside the territory of Ethiopia nor against the national interest of the state, hence giving effect to the already highlighted conventions beforehand.
Furthermore, stressing the importance of some other sections of the penal code in the prevention of terrorism, Ethiopia had been invoking its capability of remedying any potential crimes of terrorism.25 With a particular focus on the suppression of financing terrorism, for example, solicitation of funds for a commission of criminal acts, including that of terrorism, had been treated as intentionally associating oneself with the principal offense leading to criminal liability either as principal joint-offender or as an accomplice – pursuant to Arts 32 and 36 of the Code, respectively. At the same time, Arts 267, 438, 439, and 473 of the Code had been invoked as pertinent provisions in criminalizing failure of reporting the commission or preparation to commit serious crimes; harboring, comforting, or aiding of alleged offenders; and indirect aid or encouragement for the commission of such crimes, including a crime of terrorism. Besides, the recruitment of terrorist groups and the supply of weapons for the commission of the crime had also a special coverage under the Code as general offenses despite the absence of explicit reference to the crime of terrorism.
Besides, the recruitment of terrorist groups and the supply of weapons for the commission of the crime had also a special coverage under the Code as general offenses despite the absence of explicit reference to the crime of terrorism.
Apart from the general Penal Code of 1957, other proclamations enacted, either to amend a particular provision of the Code or to regulate a new criminal behavior had also been contemplated as pertinent normative frameworks, mainly in the prevention aspect of the State’s obligation in relation to terrorism. Laws, such as the Amended Legal Notice No. 229/1960 and the Special Penal Code Proclamation No. 8/1974, alongside the Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 67/1989 were enacted to regulate the manufacturing, repairing, import-export, selling, possession, and dispossession of weapons in Ethiopia, and thus criminalizing illegal trafficking in arms and explosives. The Provisional Military Administrative Council Revised Special Penal Code Proclamation No. 214/1981 had also apportioned a separate provision in Art. 41 proscribing illegal trafficking in arms as one of the serious crimes punishable with the gravest penalty up to death.26
There had been also laws aimed at regulating the establishment, registration, and financial and operational supervision of associations – be it religious, charitable, cultural, or whatsoever – as potential normative watchdogging tools to monitor the legitimate functioning of the associations and minimize illegal purposes like that of channeling the financing of terrorism.27
The 2004 Revised Ethiopian Criminal Code
It has to be noted from the outset that almost all the values ascribed to the 1957 Penal Code and the other supplementary statutes mentioned hitherto in the context of the suppression and prosecution of terrorist crimes are also the defining characters of the Revised FDRE Criminal Code;28 indeed with the more intriguing articulation of the provisions incorporating new advancements entrusted in modern criminal law as well as the radical changes in the political and socio-economic environment of the country. Accordingly, this section focuses only on those add-ons that the Code has brought into the domestic criminal justice system as the most significant progressions bearing upon or connected with the matter at hand.29 Fathomably, one of the justifications necessitating the revision of the old Penal Code has been the need to proscribe the newly emerged crimes born out of the complexity of modern life, and hence terrorism being one as such.30
one of the justifications necessitating the revision of the old Penal Code has been the need to proscribe the newly emerged crimes born out of the complexity of modern life, and hence terrorism being one as such.
To begin with, the vain attempt made at the drafting stage of the Revised Criminal Code, the crime of terrorism was proposed as one of the newly included separate crimes of its own. In an exact replication of the definition provided under the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, draft Art. 252 of the Criminal Code defined the crime as follows:
1. Whosoever commits a terrorist act which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or causes serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons, or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environment or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
(a) Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or seduce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
(b) Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or
(c) to create a public emergency; or Create a general insurrection in a state; is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from ten to twenty-five years; or in grave cases, with rigorous imprisonment for life or death.
2. Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with intent to commit any of the acts referred to in Sub-Art. (1) of this Art. shall be punished in accordance with Sub-Art. (1) hereof.
Furthermore, some related crimes, inter alia, arson; damages to installations or protective works; explosions and causing dangers by the use of explosive, inflammable, or poisonous Substances; damages to services and installations of public interest; and grave endangering or sabotage of communications or transport could undoubtedly deter and incriminate conducts which terrorist perpetrators mostly employ as methods and means in the commission of the crime. Moreover, when the aforementioned crimes have caused loss of life, injury to the body, or impairment of health, the degree of the crime is treated as a grave offense with rigorous punishment up to life imprisonment or the death penalty.
Most importantly, prohibited acts proscribed under the discrete international terrorism-related conventions are explicitly criminalized on separate provisions of their own. Arts 507–511 of the Revised Criminal Code, for example, have integrated almost all acts proscribed under the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
In doing so, Art. 507 criminalized unlawful seizure or control of an Aircraft or exercising control of a fixed platform on a continental shelf stating that:
[w]hoever, by violence or threats thereof or by any other form of intimidation, by deceit or by any other unlawful means intentionally seizes or exercises control of a fixed platform on a continental shelf or an aircraft in flight or landing in an airport or a ship on navigation or harboring on a port, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from fifteen to twenty-five years.31
Not only the seizure or excessing control of these protected objects but also an intentional and unlawful act of endangering these assets and any act of violence against a person on a fixed platform on a continental shelf or an aircraft in flight or landing in an airport or a ship on navigation or harboring on a port which is likely to endanger the safety of the platform, the aircraft, or the ship is also proscribed as one of the gravest crimes punishable with rigorous imprisonment or even up to death penalty if the act causes death or bodily injury or impairment of health.
What can be asserted is, therefore, despite the absence of any distinct comprehensively articulated provision fastening the crime of terrorism with aptly defined legal, moral, and material elements of its own, the Revised Criminal Code had further boosted the domestic legislative domain and the criminal justice machinery that the State needed to uphold its obligation in the prevention and combating of terrorism.
This said, however, such unwarrantable omission of the crime of terrorism from the newly Revised Criminal Code – a law enacted in 2004 by the time when terrorism has gained the choosiest attention as a serious threat to international peace and security, and given one of the justifications necessitating the revision of the old code being the need to incorporate crimes of such a threat – depicts the missed opportunity of the time. Perhaps, the drafters might have had better comparative insights and augmented portrait as to the distinctive features of terrorism and the abovecited crimes that are successfully inserted in the Code, but misleadingly assimilated or synonymized with an act of terrorism.
Tellingly, as it has been empirically witnessed in most terrorism charges instituted against alleged perpetrators since the adoption of a discrete antiterrorism law in 2009, there remains discernible purviews intermingling those genuine acts of terrorism with the aforementioned crimes, the commission of which by no means constitute an act of terrorism per se. 32
Post-2009 Terrorism and Related National Legislation
The ‘no-specific-terrorism’ law standing came to an end in 2009 following the issuance of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No.652/2009 as one of the most controversial laws enacted in the recent legislative history of the State. 33 Soon after, the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation No.657/2009 proceeded,34 which was later replaced by Proclamation No. 780/2013.35 It is then in pursuance to these fledgling normative frameworks that the issue of terrorism and conducts allegedly constituting the crime are being regulated in the national criminal justice system.
Indeed, the overall impact of these antiterrorism laws has not been limited only to the actual administration of the crimes. It goes rather beyond, to the extent of triggering the revision of the laws and policies which are deemed to have direct or implied ‘cause–effect’ corollaries in their enforcement. In this regard, the National Intelligence and Security Agency Re-Establishment Proclamation No.804/2013;36 the Information Network Security Agency Re-Establishment Proclamation No.808/2013;37 the Adver- tisement Proclamation No.759/2012;731 the Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers of Criminal Offences Proclamation No. 699/2010;732 the Computer Crimes Proclamation No.950/2016;733 and the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties Proclamation No.662/2009734 are few among others, as laws inevitably moulded and reformulated to complement the nuanced contents and approaches tinted in the antiterrorism proclamations.
The tilting repercussion of the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation is not only limited to the aforementioned laws enacted in the aftermath of its entry into force. Even laws that are proclaimed before have been retrospectively stricken and their content and normative values have appeared futile. The two most affected laws in this regard are the 2008 Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation No. 590/2008 38 and the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation No.621/2009.39 Most notably, Art. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, which criminalizes any intentional or negligent publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by a section of a society either as direct or indirect encouragement to terrorism – showing no venial by imposing rigorous imprisonment up to 20 years – have accelerated the already thinning status of the right to freedom of expression and political dissent in the country. Ethiopia’s marque image as a State with the highest number of journalists in exile next to Iran, and with the highest number of journalists in jail with speech related offences next to Eritrea, alongside the number of leading opposition figures held in prison would exhibit the untold implication of the proclamation on the ground. 40
Most notably, Art. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, which criminalizes any intentional or negligent publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by a section of a society either as direct or indirect encouragement to terrorism – showing no venial by imposing rigorous imprisonment up to 20 years
The same impact of the antiterrorism laws on the actual application of the Charities and Societies Proclamation can also be posited from the ever-increasing number of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations whose licenses are being annulled on allegations of violating their obligations imposed by the law, and their involvement in activities other than their objectives.41 The more sensitive, unrestrained, and vaguely articulated provision under Art. 69 of the Proclamation authorizes the Ethiopian Charity and Society Agency to refuse a license if the proposed Charity or Society is ‘likely to be used for unlawful purposes or purposes prejudicial to the public peace, welfare or good order in Ethiopia’ 42 and thus, such a wider discretionary power has posed a loophole as a potential normative tool in stifling the work of human rights advocacy and human rights defenders under the guise of banning illegal organizations and their financial source from the outset in the larger context of preventing the financing of terrorism.43 In this regard, the skeptics do not seem groundless if one takes into account the strict notion stipulated under Art. 12 of the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation No.780/2013, as it subjected any religious or non-profit organization for oversight to ensure that the funds they collect are not used for financing of terrorism.44
The overall influence and thrums of the Ethiopian anti-terrorism law have been also vividly noticeable in the recently drafted national criminal law policy. The Policy unequivocally, barred a crime of terrorism as one of the non-bailable offenses proscribing that a person arrested with suspicion of having committed any terrorist crime shall not, in any circumstance, exercise his right to be released on bail.45
Generally, it has to be noted, therefore, when it comes to thoughts regarding the Ethiopian legislative and policy frameworks on issues of terrorism, the bigger theme has to be posturized beyond the two antiterrorism proclamations currently in force given the direct or indirect stamp that these laws have cemented, at least, as inspirational standard precursors in the drafting and/or application of the other highly connected laws and policies hitherto discussed.
This said in regard to the opposite broader picture while harnessing the national statutory amasses pertaining to terrorism in general, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No.652/2009 remains, however, the solitary domestic law that set out and attempted to respond to the two most pivotal, but controversial, issues in terrorism discourse. That is, matters concerning the definition and scope of the crime of terrorism and issues relating to the power, reasons, and procedures of proscribing entities as terrorist organizations. Needless to say, be it in dealing with the rest of the related crimes prohibited in this proclamation – such as membership, incitement, encouragement, financial or material support, training, or participation – or other prohibitions and restrictions postulated in allied statutes referred above, the foundational basis for each of the crimes radiates from the definitional stance on the very concept of the crime of terrorism itself and the prescription measures. Furthermore, the special and extended investigative powers and tactics entrusted to the old or newly restructured enforcement organs as well as the slackened evidential standards are also justified based on the definitional characteristics of the crime of terrorism and the perceived distinctive features of entities purportedly branded as masterminds of the act.46
Glancing the Content and Structure of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009
The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation is a composite of only thirty-eight provisions, with a considerable number of them vested on matters substantially insignificant as such, like the title and miscellaneous parts.47 Given the very first of its type, and considering the national statutory and jurisprudential dearth on the subject, it is not snobbery to reasonably expect a full-bodied and more comprehensive with detailed regulatory frameworks. Perhaps, such a thicker approach might have minimized the undesired outcomes of those contentiously and vaguely articulated sections of the proclamation, and it might also have genuinely responded to many of other issues left unsettled and muffled lacking an apposite legislative answer.
These thirty-eight provisions of the Proclamation are subsumed into seven sequential constellations. Whilst Art. 2 of the general part provides a definition of terms used in the text, the second section has stipulated a comprehensive definition and elements of a ‘terrorist act’ under Art. 3, followed by a bunch of other crimes related to terrorism. These crimes include planning, preparation, conspiracy, incitement, and attempt of terrorist act; rendering support to, and encouragement of terrorism; participation in terrorist organization; possessing or using property for terrorist act; possessing and dealing with the proceeds of terrorist act; false threat of a terrorist act; failure to disclose terrorist acts; and inducing or threatening witness and destroying or hiding evidence relevant to the case. Alongside the crimes, the corresponding penalties upon conviction are robustly cemented ranging from the least intrusive three years of rigorous imprisonment to that of the gravest punishments of life imprisonment or sentence to death.48
The third part – embracing the other ten provisions of the proclamation – on the other hand, embodies the conspicuous rules on investigation powers and measures in the prevention of terrorism. Of more intriguing in this section are the rules governing the conditions and procedures in the exercising of powers vested to the police and the National Intelligence personnel for the gathering of information, operationalizing sudden searches, and covert searches, effecting arrests, and the taking of samples. Whereas, evidentiary and procedural rules on cases relating to terrorism are governed by Arts 23 and 24 of the proclamation. Accordingly, some critical quarries on the source of th evidence and its admissibility, the weight, and credibility of the evidence, the burden of proof and statute of limitations for prosecution are inexplicably entrenched.49
The other most contentious feature of the proclamation is traced under part five which addresses the mandate, justifications, and procedures in the course of proscribing an entity as a terrorist organization and the ramifications therefrom.
The other most contentious feature of the proclamation is traced under part five which addresses the mandate, justifications, and procedures in the course of proscribing an entity as a terrorist organization and the ramifications therefrom.50 Accordingly, apart from the aforementioned individual criminal liabilities as a result of participation in different forms, inter alia, as leader, trainer, recruiter, or supporter of the organization in question, measures against the legal status quo and the various interests of organization on its own personality, particularly the ceasing of its legal personality, the freezing and seizure of, as well as forfeiture of its property are also incorporated as consequences of the decision of proscription.
Last but not least, part six of the proclamation tends to accredit the directly responsible institutional setups entrusted to follow-up cases of terrorism with a special mention to the ministry of Justice, Federal Police and the National Intelligence and Security Service, the latter being in charge of the leadership role. Besides, unlike other crimes, the jurisdiction to adjudicate terrorism cases is solely restricted as a federal matter, as such an exclusive power is vested in the Federal High Courts and the Supreme Court.
The New Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 1176/2020: Substantial discoursal change or a piecemeal move entwined with the older purview?
As one of the bolder moves driven by the post-2018 legislative and political reform initiatives, Ethiopia revised the previous draconian anti-terrorism law and adopted Proclamation No. 1176/2020 as a new regulatory framework aimed at preventing and controlling the crime by enabling the security forces to take strong precautionary and preparatory acts centered at the nature of the crime while ensuring the rule of law and fundamental rights of individuals as for provided under the FDRE Constitution and international human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia.
While the new proclamation is commended for its progressiveness in terms of addressing some of the normative, interpretational, and enforcement gaps under the previous law, this latest legislation has also encountered substantial critics as it still reflects specific problematic nuances
While the new proclamation is commended for its progressiveness in terms of addressing some of the normative, interpretational, and enforcement gaps under the previous law, this latest legislation has also encountered substantial critics as it still reflects specific problematic nuances of the old version that may have a negative impact in legitimizing potential abuse by the government as some of the provisions and the practical interpretation and application of which may create loopholes to erode fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. In this context, some of the proscribed acts as crimes of terrorism – such as the vaguely articulated crime of “intimidation to commit a terrorist act as stipulated under article 5 of the Proclamation” – lack clarity to the extent of defining the legal, the moral, and material elements of the crime. Other components of the new proclamation, such as the mandate and the procedure under which a certain entity could be proscribed as a terrorist organization; the degree and gravity of the punishments which still maintain the death penalty; and standards and degree of evidential proof while establishing criminal guilt also call for an in-depth and critical review and auditing vis-à-vis their compatibility with that of the international law relating to terrorism and international human rights law standards.
References:
24 The first Ethiopian Report to the 1373/2001 Committee, supra note 33, p. 6.
25 See generally: Supplementary Report of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), United Nations Security Council, S/2002/1234, 8 November 2002. 701 Ibid., p. 5.
26 Art. 41, Revised Special Penal Code of Proclamation No.214/1981, Federal Negarit Gazeta, No.2, Provisional Military Administration Council, 5 November 1981.
27 The Supplementary Report, supra note 56. In this regard, Regulation No.321/1966 and Proclamation No.84/1994 had paramount importance.
28 The Criminal Code of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 414/2004 [hereinafter, the Revised Criminal Code], entered into force on 9 May 2005. See generally Arts 238–280.
29 See more on the overall justifications necessitating the new criminal code: Kassa, W. D., Examining Some of the Raisons D’être for the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law, Mizan Law Review, 7:1 (2013), pp. 49–66.
30 See the Preamble of the Revised Criminal Code. Supra note 64.
31 Art. 507 (1), Revised Criminal Code.
32 See more: Gordon, L. (ed.), Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Law: A Tool to Stifle Dissent, The Oakland Institute and Environmental Defender Law Center, Report, 2015. See also: Sekyere, P. and Asare, B., An Examination of Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation on Fundamental Human Rights, European Scientific Journal, 12:1 (2016), pp. 351–371.
33 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009, supra note 5.
34 The Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation
No.657/2009, supra note 6.
35 The Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation
No.780/2013, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 19th year, No 25. Addis Ababa, 4 February 2013.
36 House of Peoples’ Representatives; The National Intelligence and Security Service Re- establishment Proclamation No. 804/2013, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 19th Year, No. 55, Addis Ababa, 23 July 2013. For more details on the overall implication of this proclamation, see infra, Chapter 9, Section 9.7.
37 House of Peoples’ Representatives; The Information Network Security Agency Re-establishment Proclamation No. 808/2013, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 20th Year, No. 6, Addis Ababa, 2 January 2014.
38 House of Peoples’ Representatives, Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to information Proclamation No.590/2008, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 14th year, No. 64. Addis Ababa, 14 December 2008.
39. House of Peoples’ Representatives, Charities and Societies Proclamation No .621/2009, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 15th year, No 25. Addis Ababa, 13 February 2009.
40 Tadeg, M. A., Freedom of Expression and the Media Landscape in Ethiopia: Contemporary Challenges, University of Baltimore Journal of Media Law and Ethics, 5:1-2 (2016), pp. 69–99; Ali, M. S., Jurisprudential Challenges to Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia: Critical Reflections on Selected Legislations of the Country, the Internet Journal Language, Culture and Society, 42 (2016), pp. 1–12.
41 During the year 2008 Ethiopian calendar alone (July 2015–June 216), 108 organizations were banned while other 167 were given warnings of different levels. Ethiopian News Agency, 27 June 2016.
42 Art. 69 (2) Charities and Societies Proclamation, supra note 92 [emphasis added].
43 Centre for International Human Rights North Western University School of Law, Sounding the Horn: Ethiopia’s Civil Society Law Threatens Human Rights Defenders, November 2009.
44 Art. 12, The Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation, supra note 82.
45 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, Criminal Justice Policy
(unpublished), 4 March 2011.
46 Conte, A., Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Human Rights: Common Wealth Approaches: The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Springer, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 424–425.
47 See Arts 1, 37, and 38, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, supra note 80.
48 See the penalties imposed up on conviction on crimes under Arts 3, 4, 5 (2), and Art. 7 (2) of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation.
49 On evidence-related concerns arising from the Proclamation, see, generally, Chapter 8, Section 8.5.
50 Art. 25–27 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation.