HornReview: Dr.Mukerrem: having contextualized the current complex political gridlock in Sudan, what lessons can be taken for other states in the region?

First, there needs to be a solid understanding between all the stakeholders, i.e. amongst the political groups, academics, government, and civil entities. This means that all the groups need to agree on the fact that there is a problem. In addition to a common understanding between the groups, there needs to be a level of understanding among each group, i.e. each group should have a level of cohesion internally.
In Sudan, their national dialogue had multiple phases. Given the lack of agreement, on a rudimentary level, expectations of past privileges on the part of the military became a serious cause of concern for the other parties. This also happens when one or more parties opt to play politics. For example, Abdullah Hamdok, as the civilian head of Government, publically promised that“we are going to take care of our government” in the early days of the transition. However, Abdalla Hamdok later decided to expel the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNIMAS). Hamdok instead requested for another such mission more suited to the Transition; This new mechanism would also answer to the Sudanese Rapid Support Force(RSF).
As you can imagine, this was a great cause of concern for the Darfur people who accused the Rapid Support Force of being the Janjaweed paramilitary forces in different clothing. The people of Darfur decried the exit of UNIMAS expressing that the central government, with the military at its helm, will overlook their plight. The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), comprised of members of the civil society, think tanks, political parties, members of the Sudanese professionals Association, unanimously agree that the RSF has to be disbanded. Even though there are existing fractures within the military, it also has a firm and coherent stance in maintaining the RSF.

this was a great cause of concern for the Darfur people who accused the Rapid Support Force of being the Janjaweed paramilitary forces in different clothing.

The Sudanese military has relatively well-articulated aspirations and they have no interest in dissolving the Rapid Support Force.In the past, the RSFwaspartially supported by the government which gave it some legitimacy. However, it is well known that members of the Janjaweed forces are responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in Darfur. One such member is Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council. This shows, at the very least, a fundamental lack of understanding —or political will— regarding the core issues of each respective group.

Any attempts at resolving Sudan’s political woes have to be cognizant of the Military’s power and role in the statehood of Sudan.

HornReview: Do you believe all the parties had realistic expectations of the process and outcome?

I believe the nation’s dependence on the military and its vast network: economically, for security and stability, or otherwise, has been severely underestimated. With that in mind, mitigating over expectation is an important consideration. Many of the parties, and the public at large, expected to see a democratically powerful and economically vibrant Sudan in one or two years; they expected the military to back of from the political sphere quickly. Which would predictably be impossible. Sudan’s political history has always been under the dominance of the political culture of the military. Any attempts at resolving Sudan’s political woes have to be cognizant of the Military’s power and role in the statehood of Sudan. Over-expectation also prevailed in the parties’ anticipation to be allowed significant cabinet appointments.
In political bargaining, one might have hundreds of expectations, however, only 25% might be fulfilled. While the Ethiopian mediators played an important role in bringing the parties together, they did not address the issue of over-ambition. The civilian wing expected a lot to be achieved within a short period.

HornReview: Are you saying that transitional justice issues can prevent an agreement when presented as preconditions for negotiations?

Transitional justice issues are very complex, sophisticated, and should be addressed in with depth and sophistication. Arriving at an arrangement to properly, perhaps gradually, address them would be one of the building blocks of elite consensus. Proper diagnosis is 50% to 90% of the solution
Expectations of immediate answers to historic grievances are another form of over-ambition that further weakened the parties. Most ethnic groups, at one point or another, might be recipients of grief and injustice. However, how far back will states go to address long-standing grievances, perhaps at the cost of current peace. One must also examine if the people’s grief is institutionalized, or being aggravated for political gains.
I think one of the biggest misdiagnoses, that we see in global media, is the apriori labeling of the military as— a priori— repressive. These assertions are founded on the presumption that peace and stability will prevail even in the absence of the military. Sudan’s political culture, its political history 90% is composed of the military on all levels; all parties need to be cognizant of that reality in their search for a new political dispensation.