25

Nov

Is Ethiopia Geopolitically Prepared for the Regional Fallout of Sudan’s Civil War?

Sudan, prior to the secession of South Sudan in 2011, was the largest country by size in Africa, sprawling over an area of approximately 1.886 million square kilometers, featuring wide geographical and cultural diversity.  Its capital Khartoum lies at the strategic confluence of the White and Blue Nile, positioning Sudan as a historic gateway connecting Africa and the Arab Middle East. This grand area beheld the rise and fall of complex empires such as the ancient Kushite’s and medieval Christian Nubian states, blending rich African, Arab, and Mediterranean cultures. Yet, this layered historical legacy also sowed fragmented identities and political divides, creating deeply rooted fissures that erupted violently by the late 20th century, culminating in Sudan’s fragmentation and ongoing crises.

The capture of El Fashir by the RSF, a paramilitary group, can be a turning point in this fracture. The capture of the El fasher by the RSF have significant shift in the power dynamics between the two functions, that gives the RSF the control of Darfur path way to expand influence into other regions such as kordofan , not only that it can be strategic place to dissect Sudan into two states even it can be more than two as Darfur have the political and identity question. Darfur is a historically marginalized region, late to be integrated, despite having an ethnic challenge, it has actually become a theatre of conflict. RSF administers Darfur autonomously, which is an indication of not only internal conflict but the potential fracturing of Sudan into at least three contested zones: those under RSF Rule and SAF rule, such as Darfur under RSF, the heartland of the Nile, and the volatile borderlands. This portends a hazardous precedent of de facto partition impelled by ethnic and political fragmentation.

Following the RSF’s take over in El Fasher, they established a parallel administration called the “Government of Peace and Unity,” headquartered in the city, which administers Darfur and parts of West Kordofan. This rival government challenges the central authority in Khartoum by creating two competing centers of power, with the RSF controlling the western and southern regions and the Sudanese Armed Forces holding central and eastern Sudan. This bifurcation results in a de facto political, military, and administrative split,  with potential effectively dividing the country.

The implications of potential  Sudan’s fragmentation have far-reaching implications beyond its borders. For the region and Sudan’s potential disintegration portends grave instability. Africa’s colonial-era borders may have been imperfect, but at least they formed a framework for nationhood and sovereignty. When new, fragile states are created through violent splits, instability risks cascading more importantly it will be very challenging in the horn of Africa as most of the states are in internal instability and also some are not fully functioning like a full state.

Resource wealth in Sudan, including gold, oil, and Red Sea ports, adds a potent incentive for regional and global actors to intervene. With further exacerbation of conflict and the empowerment of additional proxy wars, extremist groups exploit the chaos to expand terror networks, imperiling East African security more broadly. The neighboring states such as Ethiopia and other states, themselves confronted with heightened challenges of border security, refugee influxes, and disrupted economic corridors.

Potential Sudan’s fragmentation presents a security and geopolitical challenge that risks destabilizing its western frontier and broader regional ambitions. Parts of western Sudan bordering Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, threaten to create porous borders susceptible to insurgent infiltration, arms smuggling, and the spillover of communal violence, which may exacerbate Ethiopia’s own internal challenges. The SPLM-N’s autonomy push in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile regions could inspire potential parallel secessionist demands, Yet this  Politically challenge can resist Egypt leading the previous Sudan-Egypt axis that counterbalanced Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ambitions on the Nile. Additionally, Sudan’s fragmentation invites intensified involvement by external actors. turning Sudanese territory into a proxy arena that could entangle Ethiopia inadvertently in wider competitions for Red Sea access and Nile dominance

Egypt’s approach to the Sudanese crisis is both strategic and opportunistic. The controversy over GERD has made the security of the Nile water existential to Cairo, making Sudan a geopolitical position-even more than in the past-influential for Cairo. Cairo allies with the SAF under Al-Burhan and uses paramilitary groups to politically and militarily encircle the rising influence of Ethiopia. The policy includes backing opposition movements within Ethiopia, the exploitation of Ethiopia’s internal instabilities-most recently, those in the northern border areas such as Al-Fashaga. Egyptian backing of these factions interlinks the Sudanese conflict with broader regional power struggles that complicate the security calculus of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s blended diplomacy engagement has been going on to Sudan’s war before this happened. Initially, it pursued wide diplomatic engagements, encouraging peace talks, regional cooperation, and mediation efforts through bodies such as the African Union and IGAD. High-level Ethiopian delegations have been working to maintain stable peace; even the PM Abiy Ahmed visited Albruhan in port Sudan last year to bring sustainable peace in Sudan and the border region.

Yet Ethiopia has to be realistically committed. Given the fact that diplomacy can fail amid the continuing fragmentation and external meddling in Sudan and its also notice in history diplomacy not work to bring lasting peace in this realist and multipolar world, Ethiopia as neighbor of this region and history of affected by the continuous civil war in Sudan has to prepare for other scenarios. This preparedness involves covert and calibrated support for the actions of those factions aligned with Ethiopia’s security interests, principally the military group that did not take advantage with Egypt and attack Ethiopia in time of challenging time, viewed less as a political endorsement and more as strategic safeguards against hostile groups backed by Egypt or Eritrea that could threaten Ethiopian sovereignty.

Ethiopia’s must prepared for strategic diplomacy, intelligence-sharing, and logistics support function as a “silent wind steering a ship,” enabling Ethiopia both to influence outcomes and maintain flexibility amid shifting alliances because now el fasher is the hand of RSF if there are no scenario where SAF push RSF militarily in this region there is high probability of disintegrating more than in two Sudan that further pressure Ethiopia, that is also need to take in mind Egypt containment strategy fully focusing in Africa to engulf Ethiopia. The strategy must reflect Ethiopia’s maxim: “A forewarned farmer cuts his losses early,” emphasizing anticipatory diplomacy to prevent spillover of violence into Ethiopia’s fragile border regions.

This dual track committed diplomatic engagement paired with readiness for realpolitik must be Ethiopia’s signature approach. It balances Ethiopia’s reputation as a peace mediator with a pragmatic defense of its core national interests that is territorial integrity, border security, and Nile water utilization. As Sudan’s fragmentation deepens, Ethiopia’s security architecture has adapted, reinforcing border controls, enhancing intelligence capacity, and countering support to opposition groups coordinated by Egypt and Sudan’s faction aimed at destabilizing Ethiopia internally.

If the fallout of Sudan’s conflict is tangible, Increased arms trafficking, refugee influxes and cross-border hostilities have worsened security in western Ethiopia, tightening the web of complexity for Ethiopia. Clashes involving Ethiopian forces and South Sudan militias have escalated, while insurgent reprisals and internal Ethiopian factionalism continue to pose risks. Sudan’s war spills like wildfire into Ethiopia’s porous borders, threatening to amplify conflicts and weaken government control.

Ethiopia’s calculated engagement exemplifies a sophisticated balance between principle and pragmatism. It remains committed to diplomatic channels and regional peace, reaffirming support for Sudan’s territorial integrity and stability. Simultaneously, it must be prepared to exert political influence if there is a scenario where Ethiopia’s sovereignty or security be compromised. This approach’s design can prevent hostile factions from gaining footholds that would threaten Ethiopia’s regional leadership or Nile water interests amid the intensifying geopolitical contest with Egypt and Eritrea.

Indeed, Ethiopia’s strategy is encapsulated by the Ethiopian proverb: “A smooth sea never makes a skilled sailor.” Diplomacy is the preferred tool deployed with skill, patience, and principled restraint but hard realism governs preparedness especially in every day changing arena that is horn of Africa which Egypt move beyond Ethiopia expectation that delay ethiopian national interest regarding the Nile in addition the quest of the red sea. Ethiopia’s national interests are non-negotiable, and its response will escalate accordingly if these interests are threatened. Its hybrid diplomatic-defense posture is crafted to maximize influence while mitigating risks in an increasingly volatile regional environment.

Sudan’s potential fragmentation is more than a domestic tragedy; it is also a pivotal regional crisis with layered implications for security, governance, and regional power dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s role is vital, straddling complex diplomatic and security challenges requiring a blend of engagement, restraint, and strategic foresight. By harnessing its legacy as a mediator and state with multifaceted security tools, Ethiopia seeks to navigate Sudan’s turbulent transformation advancing peace where possible and defending sovereignty where necessary. The fate of Sudan and Ethiopia’s role in the Horn are inextricably interwoven, demanding vigilance, wisdom, and resilience in equal measure to confront the challenges ahead for a stable, prosperous regional future.

By Rebecca Mulugeta and Makda Girma, Researchers, Horn Review

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

RELATED

Posts