At the UN’s Third Conference for Landlocked Developing Countries in Awaza, a clear thread ran through the speeches – access to the sea is not charity, it is a strategic right and an economic necessity. Delegations met under the rubric of practical solidarity and infrastructure cooperation, but the conference also exposed the raw strategic stakes that lie beneath the technical agenda.

In the conference, Awaza Political Declaration and its accompanying program of action sets a normative baseline for predictable corridors, institutional cooperation and investment in transport services for landlocked economies. If states treat Awaza as a platform for binding, operational commitments rather than rhetorical exercise, landlocked countries will gain new legal and diplomatic leverage to get maritime access. The declaration converts a moral argument about access into a practical instrument that can be used in negotiation with transit partners.

Among the ideas aired at Awaza, Tanzania’s public pledge to guarantee sea access for its landlocked neighbors was the most consequential for the East African nations. Tanzania’s offer in that light reads as both compliance with Awaza’s logic and a unilateral strategic move. Tanzania used the forum to stake a public claim. Dodoma also pledged to expand Dar es Salaam’s capacity to receive larger transit volumes. That pledge alters the arithmetic of regional trade and turns what many in the region had regarded as a fixed geography into a contestable political choice.

Tanzania’s announcement is both a political signal and market invitation. It follows heavy commercial moves into Dar es Salaam, including multi-decadal concessions to global terminal operators and a stepped-up push to modernize berths and hinterland links. Those actions tell a story that Dar is being prepared to accept higher throughput and to court hinterland trade that once seemed the exclusive preserve of Djibouti and the Red Sea littoral.

The significance of Tanzania’s gesture is best understood through two linked prisms, leverage and redundancy. For a landlocked economy, guaranteed alternatives change bargaining power. They allow the hinterland state to press for lower tariffs, more predictable services and reciprocal logistics commitments from transit neighbours. They also create redundancy, reducing the catastrophic risk that attaches to single-corridor dependence.

That risk, for instance, is not abstract for Ethiopia. Decades of policy and investment have converged on one dominant artery to the sea, Djibouti’s port. Ethiopia also framed it as a structural right tied to development, resilience and competitive trade. That framing opened space for bold offers and fresh bargaining across regions.  

Moreover, Ethiopia entered Awaza not as a passive actor but as a claimant. Its delegation framed sea access as an economic and sovereign imperative. Addis insisted that landlocked status should not translate into structural disadvantage and emphasised the need for secure, reliable and legally guaranteed routes to the sea. Those statements are neither novelty nor rhetorical flourish. They are rooted in a long-running national strategy to reduce vulnerability and to nurture an economy with secured external connectivity. 

Should Ethiopia decide to take part in Tanzania’s offer, a rigorous analysis of its practical feasibility becomes imperative. Assessing the offer’s logistical, economic, and diplomatic dimensions is essential to determine whether it can serve as a sustainable complement to Ethiopia’s existing maritime arrangements. For a country that has long sought to diversify its maritime options, Tanzania’s offer would be a practical opening and a political lever. For Addis, a credible alternative corridor changes bargaining power, logistics options and the cost of strategic dependence.

For Ethiopia the immediate value is leverage. The credible possibility of routing some cargoes via Dar strengthens Ethiopia’s incumbent transit partners. The presence of an alternative also attracts a different mix of financiers and terminal operators into regional infrastructure talks, which can reduce on any single investor or lender. 

Yet the offer is not plug and play substitute for nearer ports. The technical geometry of corridors matters. The Djibouti corridor benefits from a compact land route, a dedicated rail connection and concentrated logistics know-how built over decades. For Dar to carry significant Ethiopian volumes, rapid upgrades to inland connectivity and customs interoperability would be required. Without those upgrades, diversion will remain marginal and more expensive than political statements imply. 

Distance converts into cost in predictable ways. For Ethiopia, logistics has been the most profound challenge. Any meaningful use of Dar es Salaam by Ethiopian trade must cross Kenya. That fact transforms Tanzania’s generous pledge from a simple bilateral offer into a multi-state project. Tanzania’s modern ports and the emergence of a standard gauge railway inside Tanzania do not, on their own, create a continuous, competitive corridor to Ethiopia. The rail and road geometry between Mombasa, Lamu or Dar and Addis remains incomplete.

Kenya’s standard gauge works link Mombasa to Nairobi and beyond, and Kenya and Ethiopia long proposed Lamu and LAPSSET as corridors, but the continental ambition has repeatedly stalled on financing, security and implementation questions. These gaps make the practical crossing of Kenya the decisive constraint on any Dar–Addis logistics pathway. Addis cannot make Dar a routine port without Kenyan cooperation on a sustained programme of infrastructure and customs integration. 

These are real constraints. They make Dar a poor fit for time-sensitive, high-value manufacturing inputs or perishable exports that need just-in-time delivery. At the same time, port economics and modern logistics offer pragmatic workarounds that Ethiopia can adopt, despite the obstacles.

Dar can serve as a storage and buffer hub for non-urgent, slow-moving and bulk consignments. Ports routinely operate bonded warehouses where goods can be stored without immediate duty payment. Importers use bonded space to manage cash flow, consolidate shipments and time market releases. UNCTAD and major logistics operators document how bonded facilities and port storage are standard tools to smooth supply chains and reduce immediate pressure on customs clearance capacity. In practice, Ethiopia could route non-time-sensitive commodities, strategic reserves and certain consumer goods through Dar, holding them in bonded warehouses or private yards until inland transport slots are available or until price and demand conditions justify release. This reduces the premium paid for urgent handling while expanding overall throughput options. 

Ethiopia should treat Tanzania’s pledge as a negotiating asset and a partial operational opportunity. The state should fund rigorous corridor studies that produce transparent landed-cost models, identify cargo categories best suited to Dar, and map the sequence of investments required to make those uses competitive. At the same time, Addis should not abandon efforts to secure closer access where feasible.

Access to nearby littoral ports such as Assab would deliver greater cost savings but will require delicate diplomacy and credible security guarantees. The two tracks are complementary, pursue proximate access where politically possible, and use distant alternatives selectively and strategically while building the institutional architecture that turns political pledges into reliable logistics.

Besides its significance, Tanzania’s pledge exposes a deeper failure of regional integration. Many Horn states have been reluctant to turn coastal infrastructure into open, low-friction corridors for their neighbours, at times they have actively opposed Ethiopia’s moves to secure maritime access. Djibouti’s leadership has pushed back against proposals that would host Ethiopian naval or sovereign facilities, framing such plans as threats to its territorial sovereignty and strategic role. Somalia has likewise taken a firm stance.

It formally rejected Ethiopia’s request to join a recent multinational naval exercise and lodged objections to Ethiopia’s maritime arrangements with Somaliland, highlighting how sensitive maritime deals can fracture cooperation. Eritrea’s posture is no less consequential. Persistent mistrust and periodic military mobilisations along the Eritrea–Ethiopia border reflect fears in Asmara over any Ethiopian designs on ports, making bilateral agreements with Eritrea politically fraught. 

These reactions illustrate why Tanzania’s offer matters beyond the immediate logistics. It signals a willingness, so far lacking among several coastal states, to treat transit as a shared regional good rather than a source of exclusive leverage. Even if Dar remains farther and more costly for Addis in the short term, the political gesture interrupts a pattern of guarded unilateralism and opens space for negotiation.

By Yonas Yizezew, Researcher, Horn Review