The suspension of US–Iran nuclear talks in August 2025, after Iran declared that “the moment for effective dialogue with the US has not arrived,” marked a pivotal shift in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Fragile back-channel efforts in Oman and Rome faltered after Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June and subsequent US operations further poisoned the atmosphere. Negotiations that briefly showed promise between Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi and US envoy Steve Witkoff collapsed as Tehran escalated uranium enrichment, curtailed International Atomic Energy Agency access, and shifted oversight to its Supreme National Security Council. Inspectors warned that verification was being restricted precisely when transparency mattered most.

What began as a narrowly technical negotiation has now spilled into the wider regional order. The breakdown of diplomacy is reshaping the Horn of Africa’s fragile security environment, where the Red Sea has become a hinge connecting Middle Eastern rivalries with African vulnerabilities. This is not a marginal spillover but a direct reconfiguration of geopolitical competition in a region already strained by climate shocks, economic fragility, and post-conflict recovery.

At its core, the standoff remains locked between irreconcilable positions. Washington insists on verifiable caps on enrichment and leans heavily on sanctions as its main tool. Tehran asserts that its nuclear program is a sovereign right, rejecting concessions under pressure. The European trio of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom continue to press for mediation, warning of potential UN snapback sanctions but lacking the leverage to compel either side. Since the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018, erosion of trust has narrowed diplomatic options, expanding the conflict geography to the Red Sea.

The ripple effects are visible in trade and maritime security. Nearly 10 percent of global seaborne trade passed through the Bab el-Mandeb strait in 2023, but by late 2024 traffic had decreased due to missile attacks, rerouting through the Cape of Good Hope, and soaring insurance premiums. Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, all net importers of grain and fuel saw freight costs spike, compounding inflation and food insecurity. Partial recovery emerged in 2025, but volatility remains the new normal.

Iran has responded to Western isolation by deepening its southern pivot. In May 2025, Tehran signed a security pact with Ethiopia covering policing, intelligence, and counter-crime collaboration, while offering healthcare partnerships, renewable energy investment, and BRICS-related finance. For Addis Ababa, eager to rebuild after years of civil conflict and diversify beyond the West and Gulf, these overtures are enticing. Iranian drones, once linked to the Tigray conflict, are now supplemented with promises of hospital projects, solar farms, and preferential trade with BRICS markets.

Yet Ethiopia’s calculus is complicated. It has cultivated ties with Israel in agriculture, cyber-security, and irrigation, and Israel views any Iranian presence along the Red Sea as a direct threat. Somaliland’s overtures to Israel for recognition further complicate matters. Recognition could bolster Ethiopia’s access to Berbera port, a vital trade outlet as Djibouti nears capacity, but risks antagonizing Tehran. Thus, Ethiopia’s diversification strategy risks transforming its geography into a stage for external confrontation.

For Tehran, expanding influence in the Horn is both symbolic and practical: a proof that containment has failed and access to sea lanes remains open. For Israel and the United States, Iranian inroads in Ethiopia, Eritrea, or Sudan are perceived as extensions of the nuclear challenge itself. Israel has accelerated efforts to promote Ethiopia’s reintegration into the African Union and expand security cooperation, while Washington increasingly frames Horn stability in terms of maritime security and nuclear nonproliferation.

The danger is that Horn states become ensnared in proxy alignments. Military presence, security agreements, and financial packages may appear attractive but risk embedding external agendas in domestic governance. Eritrea’s history of leveraging partnerships for regime survival is a cautionary tale: short-term benefits may mask long-term costs in sovereignty and autonomy.

Two futures are plausible. In one trajectory, the deadlock deepens. Iran expands its presence into Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia, widening its strategic depth and securing access to ports. Israel and the United States respond with expanded naval deployments and security guarantees, while Gulf states inject funding and weapons to counterbalance Tehran.

The Horn is left militarized, divided, and increasingly dependent on outside patrons, with domestic development subordinated to external rivalries. In another trajectory, modest diplomatic openings emerge. European mediation and calibrated US flexibility yield partial sanctions relief in return for verifiable enrichment caps and restored inspections. The Red Sea stabilizes, shipping routes normalize, and Horn states are able to direct partnerships toward infrastructure, trade, and climate resilience rather than being consumed by militarization. Iran would remain active in the region, but more as a commercial and technological partner than a security actor.

Avoiding the first trajectory requires agency from within the Horn itself. Regional organizations must step forward. IGAD could operationalize a Red Sea security framework building on the Djibouti Code of Conduct by standardizing coast-guard training, instituting joint patrols, and creating a real-time maritime threat-sharing platform.

The African Union could convene structured Red Sea dialogues that bring Horn states together with Gulf and Middle Eastern stakeholders, modeled on its mediation mechanisms in Sudan and South Sudan. At the national level, Ethiopia and its neighbors should channel foreign partnerships into productive sectors such as infrastructure, renewable energy, and agriculture, ensuring that competition yields developmental dividends rather than deepening militarization. A joint neutrality declaration on the US–Iran confrontation would send a strong collective signal: that the Horn will not be reduced to an arena of proxy conflict but instead insists on shaping its own trajectory.

The suspension of nuclear talks is therefore more than a stalled negotiation. It has recast the Horn of Africa as a frontline of global rivalries, with Iran’s outreach, Israel’s counter-moves, and Washington’s sanctions converging in a region already vulnerable to instability. Yet the Horn is not destined to be a pawn. Geography makes it central, but leadership will determine whether that centrality becomes a liability or a source of leverage.

By asserting neutrality, strengthening regional cooperation, and directing foreign partnerships toward development, Horn governments can transform exposure into agency. Whether the region emerges weakened or empowered will depend less on choices made in Washington or Tehran than on the decisions taken in Addis Ababa, Asmara, Mogadishu, and Khartoum in the critical years ahead.

By Bezawit Eshetu, Researcher, Horn Review

References

Chatham House. (2025). Israel’s strike against Iran: Chatham House experts offer early analysis. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/israels-strike-against-iran-chatham-house-experts-offer-early-analysis

Reuters. (2025, August 20). Iran says moment for ‘effective’ nuclear talks with U.S. not yet reached. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-moment-effective-nuclear-talks-with-us-not-reached-2025-08-20/

Reuters. (2025, August 24). Iran’s Khamenei calls US issue ‘unsolvable’ amid nuclear standoff. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-calls-us-issue-unsolvable-amid-nuclear-standoff-2025-08-24/

Wikipedia. (2025). 2025 United States–Iran negotiations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_United_States%E2%80%93Iran_negotiations

Wikipedia. (2025). Iranian intervention in Sudan (2023–present). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_intervention_in_Sudan_(2023%E2%80%93present)#:~:text=As%20of%20April%202025%2C%20Iran,Red%20Sea%20region%20and%20Africa.