This August, Americans celebrate the 80^th anniversary of their triumph over the Japanese Empire. Eighty years after Japan’s defeat, the Indo-Pacific region once again stands at the centre of great power rivalry. In 1941, Japan’s assault on Pearl Harbour brought the United States fully into the Second World War. Four years later, it was American industry, firepower, and ultimately the atomic bomb that broke Tokyo’s appetite for war and cleared the path for unconditional surrender. With the collapse of Japan’s empire, the United States filled the regional vacuum.

It inherited not only Japan’s defeated territories but also the strategic position of dominance in the Pacific. From that moment on, Washington’s attention to the Pacific effectively solidified, anchored in the region’s vast markets, unpredictable politics, and its role as the gateway to Asia.

The victory over Japan, more than over Nazi Germany, cemented America’s global position. In Europe, Washington was one among several allied victors. In Asia, it emerged singularly powerful. The Cold War reinforced this. The United States established a network of alliances spanning from Japan and Korea to Australia and the Philippines, forming a cordon of containment against the newly declared People’s Republic of China. Yet China in those decades was not the formidable power it is today. Washington could project power unilaterally across the Pacific, confident that Beijing posed no real threat.

Now, eight decades on, the Indo-Pacific hosts a different contest. The United States once again faces an adversary across the waters — not a militarist Japan but an ever-powerful China. And unlike before, the challenge is more dynamic and vastly consequential.

President Trump’s understanding of the rivalry is shaped less by military calculations and more by economics. For him, China’s threat lies not in naval supremacy or ideological confrontation but in manufacturing. He sees in Beijing’s ascent the erosion of America’s own industrial base, the hollowing out of the very capacity that once allowed the U.S. to outproduce its enemies. Tariffs, protectionist measures, and a call for economic self-reliance are thus cornerstones of his strategy.

In this, Trump signals what many in Washington have been reluctant to admit: that America no longer has the appetite for open-ended military commitments in the Pacific. Revitalizing domestic production, “defending the homeland,” and reshaping the terms of trade take precedence over strengthening alliance networks. Allies who have long relied on American guarantees are now told to arm themselves, to bear the burden of their own defence. For US allies like Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea, this shift raises difficult questions.

Tariffs are Trump’s principal weapon. Yet they do not spare allies. India, despite being a partner, finds itself targeted. Japan and South Korea, longstanding treaty allies, are caught in disputes over steel and technology exports. The Philippines, a historic ally, is pressured to carry more of its defence costs. Washington’s disengagement and trade polices alienate the very states that make up its containment ring.

Into this gap steps Beijing. For Chinese leaders, this moment is an opportunity. Its message is one of markets, infrastructure, and diplomatic reconciliation. When Trump imposed new tariffs on Indian goods, Beijing dispatched its foreign minister to New Delhi with a signal of cooperation. The two states, despite broader tensions, emphasize their shared membership in BRICS and their dissatisfaction with Washington’s unpredictability. The symbolism is not lost; as the U.S. punishes, China courts.

For Chinese leaders, the path to restored greatness runs through the Pacific. Military power, perhaps as much as economic might, is central to that ambition. Analysts in Washington increasingly warn of the year 2027, identified by Trump’s Secretary of Defence Hegseth as the year when the Chinese military is preparing for a takeover of Taiwan. Shipbuilding and missile production are being pursued at an industrial pace, while disputed islands in the South China Sea are fortified with bases and airfields. Beijing’s objective is clear: to break the encirclement, to project power unchallenged within its neighbourhood, and to set the terms of regional order.

Washington views this with unease. Its strategists recall that in 1945, American industry was the decisive factor. Today, manufacturing capacity has shifted eastward. Should conflict arise, the concern is not only about military strength but about industrial endurance. The question is whether the U.S. could sustain a protracted confrontation when so much of its supply chain is tied to Asia itself.

Caught between these two poles are America’s allies and partners. Taiwan, considered by Beijing as its own territory, remains the most volatile flashpoint. Japan, though more willing to expand its defence role, remains deeply tied to the U.S. alliance. The Philippines oscillates, sometimes leaning toward Beijing, at other times reaffirming its defence pact with Washington. India and Indonesia, neither treaty allies, continue to hedge — unwilling to choose but unable to ignore the pressures.

For these states, alignment is increasingly becoming challenging. China offers economic opportunity and the promise of inclusion in a regional framework less tied to Western ideals. The U.S., by contrast, offers security guarantees but now coupled with tariffs and demands for burden-sharing. The contradiction places governments in a difficult position where markets pull them toward Beijing, but security fears push them toward Washington.

The Indo-Pacific contest does not stop at Asia’s shores. Its reverberations reach into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. Djibouti hosts both American and Chinese bases, a symbol of the new multipolar competition. Across East Africa, Chinese-built ports and railways expand Beijing’s presence, while Washington’s influence depends on security cooperation and naval patrols. The rivalry continues to shape trade routes, investment patterns, and political alignments well beyond Asia.

The Indo-Pacific today is the decisive theatre of global politics, much as it was in 1945. Then, America’s victory over Japan secured decades of dominance. Now, China’s rise threatens to reshape that balance. Whether the contest is decided by tariffs, alliances, or force, its outcome will echo far beyond Asia, shaping the global order from the Pacific to Africa.

By Mahder Nesibu, Researcher, Horn Review

Further Reading

Bland, B. (2025). Trump’s tariffs will push Southeast Asia uncomfortably close to China. Chatham House.

Maull, H. W., Stanzel, A., & Thimm, J. (2023). United States and China on a collision course: The importance of domestic politics for the bilateral relationship. German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

National Ethnic Affairs Commission of China. (2012). Achieving rejuvenation is the dream of the Chinese people. National Ethnic Affairs Commission of China.

Roggeveen, S. (2024). Donald Trump and the relative decline of US power in Asia. Internationale Politik Quarterly.

Teixeira, V. (2019). The United States’ China containment strategy and the South China Sea dispute. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 13(3), 166–193.