Somalia’s row with Jubaland is no longer just a fight over text. What began as a legal dispute has become a fight over local authority and the security of the border. The dispute spilled into open fighting in Jubaland with heavy clashes around Balad Hawo and Doolow that displaced civilians and shifted local control. (UNOCHA, 2025; Somaliguardian, 2025).

As violence rose, Kenya moved to intervene. Nairobi offered to host talks and to broker a pause. Its stated aim is to close the security gap before the conflict deepens and draws in neighbors (Somali Magazine, 2025). This move is driven by urgent security imperatives that extend far beyond diplomatic goodwill. The dispute centers on contentious constitutional amendments and electoral reforms pushed by Mogadishu, which Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe views as a direct assault on the federal model and his region’s semi-autonomy (The Defense Post, 2025). This political infighting could not come at a worse time. As Somalia’s central government struggles to contain a resurgent Al-Shabaab, the fragmentation of its relationship with a key member state like Jubaland creates dangerous vulnerabilities that are felt immediately across the border in Kenya and also Ethiopia.

For Nairobi, Jubaland is not merely a neighboring region but a critical security buffer (Somali Magazine, 2025). Its territory, particularly areas like Kismayo and the Lower Juba valley, has historically been a launch pad for Al-Shabaab incursions into Kenyan counties such as Mandera, Garissa, and Lamu. The group’s escalating attack tempo in 2025 shows this direct threat (Reuters, 2025). A weakened Jubaland, embroiled in a political struggle with Mogadishu, would inevitably lead to a breakdown in security coordination and a more porous border. Thus, the stability of Jubaland, under a good relation with Ahmed Madobe, is perceived in Nairobi as a first line of defense.

This perspective, however, might clash with the view from Mogadishu. The Somali federal government has long accused Kenya of using Jubaland as a proxy to pursue its own interests, and undermining Somali sovereignty. From this angle, Nairobi’s mediation attempts can be interpreted as security-driven interference aimed at preserving a friendly and pliable buffer zone. This tension creates a delicate balancing act for Kenya, forcing it to navigate between its undeniable national security needs and the sensitivities of Somalia’s territorial integrity with HSM’s approach.

The core of the dispute, the electoral and constitutional reforms, is deeply intertwined with clan representation and resource sharing. Mogadishu’s effort to press through changes that change how power and election oversight work has collided with Jubaland’s insistence on preserving regional autonomy and local control of security forces (Hiiraan, 2025).

Those tensions spilled into combat around Balad Hawo and Beled Hawo in July and August 2025. Multiple local and humanitarian sources document days of heavy fighting as federal forces and Jubaland troops engaged over control of towns in Gedo. The skirmishes forced new displacement and complicated relief operations. By early August, control of parts of the district changed hands several times. These events are not peripheral. Gedo is the seam between Jubaland’s influence and federal footprints, and violence there has immediate cross border consequences into Ethiopia as well as Kenya (ReliefWeb, 2025; Hiiraan, 2025).

A prolonged stalemate between the federal government and Jubaland over these issues risks creating precisely the kind of political chaos that allows Al-Shabaab to further entrench itself and expand its operations. Moreover, this political disenfranchisement is a potent tool that terrorist organizations expertly exploits. The group thrives on governance failures and clan grievances, using them for recruitment and to legitimize its insurgency. 

Another important dimension is the role of Ethiopia, which shares Kenya’s deep-seated security concerns. Ethiopia acts as a second strategic buffer for Kenya, and both nations have a shared interest in preventing Somalia’s collapse into a terrorist safe haven. Ethiopia maintains its own influence within Somalia, including troop presence in various regions, and its security alignment with Kenya provides a broader regional counterweight to Al-Shabaab’s influence. A coordinated approach between Nairobi and Addis Ababa adds weight to the mediation efforts.

Even though it risks the fueling of Mogadishu’s apprehensions about external actors dictating its internal politics, HSM’s government must acknowledge that for Somalia’s stability, the role of these neighbors is essential. Their security interests are inseparably linked to Somalia’s own, where a secure Somalia directly translates to a more secure region.

For that reason, the security context makes mediation urgent. Far from being in permanent retreat, Al-Shabaab is gaining ground. It has rebuilt capacity in rural spaces and continues to launch lethal attacks inside Somalia and across the border. Attacks in Kenyan counties such as Garissa earlier in 2025 underline the cross border risk (Al Jazeera, 2025). Somalia itself has repeatedly warned against a hasty withdrawal of international stabilizing forces because it fears a security vacuum could let militants regain territory. These strategic facts shape what mediation should seek.  Not only has a political compromise over constitutional text, but also clear, immediate security guarantee that prevent new openings for extremist groups.

The final point is political psychology. Somalia in this moment cannot afford more fragmentation. The last thing the country needs is a narrative that external partners prefer regional strongmen to national unity. Mogadishu should welcome neighbors who offer verified, limited and accountable support to stabilizing tasks.

By Yonas Yizezew, Researcher, Horn Review

References

• Al Jazeera, (2025). Six personnel killed in attack on Somali border: Kenyan police.
• Hiiraan Online, (2025). Clash between Somali federal and regional forces kills two.
• ReliefWeb, (2025). Conflict displacement in Hiraan and Gedo Regions: Flash update no. 1
• Somali Magazine, (2025). Kenya steps in to mediate Somalia–Jubbaland dispute. Somali Magazine
• Somaliguardian, (2025). Somalia’s army retakes Balad Hawo town after days of clashes with Jubaland forces.
• The Defense Post, (2025). Clashes between Somali army and regional forces kill five.
• UNOCHA, (2025). Somalia: Conflict displacement in Hiraan and Gedo Regions (Flash update No. 2, 3 August 2025). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
• Reuters, (2025). Six police personnel killed in Kenya by suspected al-Shabaab fighters.