Realism, Not Ideals

At the Alaska summit, President Putin may well have emerged as the victor. The Russians have held firm to their conditions for peace, which are tied to the very goals that drove them to confrontation in the first place. The possibility of ending the war rests on Russia’s satisfaction with its conditions. The issue of territory is important, but perhaps even less so than the question of NATO’s presence on Ukrainian soil and the long-term security pacts binding Kyiv to its European and Western allies. For Moscow, the war will not end with the conquest of particular pieces of land, but only when Russia secures its broader geopolitical aims.

Trump’s perspective has been clear: the end to the war lies with Putin, and with an agreement the two powerful men can strike. From the beginning of his campaign, when he promised to end the war in twenty-four hours, Trump has shifted his stance repeatedly. He initially spoke in detached and pragmatic terms, placing much of the blame for prolonging—or even causing—the conflict on Ukraine itself. Yet with Putin, he has been repeatedly frustrated. He would rather work with the Russian President than dismiss him as an enemy, but Putin has shown no sign of altering his pursuit of goals in Ukraine. Trump has approached Putin, and even Xi Jinping, with a degree of respect rooted in their authority and stature, but that respect has yielded little progress.

According to The New York Times, President Putin seeks to exclude Ukraine from NATO, limit its military capabilities, and lay the groundwork for a government in Kyiv more favourable to Moscow. Russia has carefully navigated the shifts in Trump’s policies and approaches to the war, showing little willingness to bend despite the American president’s overtures.

Trump himself, after much oscillation, eventually settled on a strategy of threatening sanctions on Russia and targeting its oil exports. These measures preceded the Alaska summit and the subsequent high-level meetings. Yet for the Americans, the summit carried with it a sense of possibility, for Trump’s envoy Steve Witikoff claimed that Russia had agreed to allow the United States and the Europeans to “effectively offer Article 5-like language to cover a security guarantee”, the same type of arrangement that underpins NATO.

The meeting involving Zelensky, Trump, and the Europeans revealed another layer of this fragile diplomacy. European leaders emphasized the importance of “security guarantees” and “Article 5-like” arrangements. Zelensky, who seemed eager to appease Trump, found himself in a peculiar position. For Ukraine, the weight behind its demands rests almost entirely in the hands of the Europeans and the United States. Zelensky has repeatedly insisted that Ukraine cannot cede its territory, but ultimately, the decision falls not on him alone but on the pragmatic calculations made between Trump and European leaders.

What then is the plan, and what does President Putin truly have in mind? Many Western think tanks argue that the Russian president seeks the elimination of Ukraine as a state, though such a view may be an exaggeration given the Kremlin’s pragmatism in pursuing its interests. For Russia, NATO expansion has always been more than a military question. It represents the encroachment of Western power, which is political, cultural, and strategic, at the expense of Russia’s ability to project influence beyond its immediate borders. In this sense, Putin’s perspective is both historical and grander than the war itself, stretching beyond the battlefield to the very architecture of global order.

Russia’s allies have their own concerns. For India, China, and Iran, the conflict is burdensome, and their patience with Russia’s confrontation with the West is limited. The BRICS states face challenges with Trump in their own bilateral relations, and for Xi Jinping in particular, the message to Putin will likely be to reach some form of satisfactory agreement that secures Russia’s interests, but one that allows a return to peacetime policy.

Still, the possibility of a deal remains slim. As John Mearsheimer has repeatedly argued, the issue will ultimately be decided on the battlefield. For Russia, a pro-Western Ukraine is intolerable. Western troops on Ukrainian soil are unacceptable. Ukraine, in Moscow’s eyes, must become a neutral state. Unless this fundamental difference is resolved, which most analysts deem unlikely, the conflict cannot truly end. At best, a temporary solution might be reached, but any enduring settlement remains far off. Trump’s peace-making efforts in both Gaza and Ukraine face similar challenges, and in the case of Ukraine, the gulf between Russian and Ukrainian priorities only widens the rift.

Beyond the Logic of Alignment

For diplomats and foreign policy experts in the Horn of Africa, Trump’s push for an end to the war is an issue of great interest. The shift in U.S. policy, evident since Trump’s return, is now clearer than ever. The President’s approach to diplomacy, grounded not in liberal agendas but in respect for power and authority, signals to world leaders that negotiations with Washington will hinge on strength rather than ideals. That message carries weight far beyond Europe, resonating in regions like the Horn, where governments have long navigated their survival through careful alignment with competing global powers.

Here, the prospect of a U.S.–Russia opening takes on direct significance. The Horn of Africa has historically been a Cold War battleground. Its once again caught in the pull of great power rivalry, with Russia positioning itself as an alternative to the West and China deepening its economic presence. Sudan’s civil war, Somalia’s terrorist threat, and Ethiopia’s internal insecurities all exist in a context where external powers compete rather than cooperate. A genuine détente between Washington and Moscow, especially one joined by Beijing, could mark a turning point.

The implications would be immediate. Global food security, strained by the war in Ukraine, has left the Horn particularly vulnerable, with disrupted grain supplies deepening humanitarian crises already compounded by drought and displacement. A resolution to the war that stabilizes markets would ease pressure on millions in the region. Beyond food, consensus among the major powers could revive multilateral engagement in conflicts long neglected.

Sudan might finally receive coordinated attention, Somalia could benefit from unified counterterrorism commitments, and the destructive cycle of side-picking, where Horn states align with one power against another, might begin to ease.

The possibility remains uncertain, yet the stakes are profound. If Washington and Moscow can reconcile their contradictions, and if China is drawn into the same framework, then conflicts in the Horn might no longer be shaped primarily by external rivalries. Instead, they could become arenas of consensus, where global powers agree, however uneasily, on the urgency of halting wars and addressing humanitarian needs.

With a trilateral meeting set to take place between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, the prospect of a peace agreement faces its most decisive moment. The outcome of this meeting will be consequential not only for the future of the war but for international relations more broadly, touching the very norms that have governed the relationships of states since the Second World War. And if it proves possible to bridge the divide in Ukraine, then regions like the Horn of Africa may yet feel the ripple effects. An end to rivalry, and perhaps the beginning of a fragile but unprecedented consensus could emerge.

The consequences of these events may be profound. The U.S. split from Europe and the broader Western security complex is already visible. A Russian victory, greenlighted, tacitly or otherwise, by the United States, would mark a decisive power shift. The rebalance of the world order, long anticipated and described alike by Western and Russian analysts as the central ideological struggle of our time, would move one step closer to realization. For Africa, and the Horn in particular, that shift could mean the difference between endless proxy wars and the first serious chance at peace in a generation.

By Mahder Nesibu, Researcher, Horn Review

References

Adler, N., Osgood, B., & Rowlands, L. (2025). Trump-Zelenskyy meeting updates: US to arrange Russia-Ukraine summit. Al Jazeera.

Bisset, V. (2025). A timeline of Trump’s quotes, shifts and U-turns on Russia and Ukraine. The Washington Post.

CNN. (2025). Witkoff on what Trump and Putin said to each other in meeting [Video]. YouTube.

Kremlin. (2021). Article by Vladimir Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”.

Lacher, W. (2022). African Conflicts amid Multipolarity: Implications of a Changing Actor Landscape. Megatrends Africa.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2023). The Darkness Ahead: Where the Ukraine War Is Headed. Substack.

Sonne, P., & Troianovski, A. (2025). For Putin, Trump summit is key to securing Ukraine goals. The New York Times.