The fall of Jijiga on September 12, 1977, marked a critical moment in the Horn of Africa. Somali tanks and Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas had captured this strategic Ethiopian garrison town after weeks of intense combat, bringing Somalia’s dictator Siad Barre closer to his vision of a Greater Somalia. Despite heavy pressure and setbacks in the Ogaden region, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Marxist Derg regime remained firmly in control, demonstrating resilience and adaptability amid the conflict. Within six months, the tide of war decisively shifted – a turnaround achieved not only on the battlefield but through strategic diplomacy and logistics, notably in the skies over Anatolia, where Turkey quietly opened its airspace to a Soviet lifeline that strengthened Ethiopia’s position.

As Ethiopian forces faced strong Somali offensives in late 1977, the Soviet Union executed one of the Cold War’s most significant military support operations. Determined to bolster its Marxist ally, Moscow launched Operation Caucasus – a comprehensive air and sea bridge transporting thousands of Cuban combat veterans, Soviet advisors, and over $800 million in advanced weaponry to Ethiopia. The stakes were high: Somali forces threatened key urban centers such as Harar and Dire Dawa, vital to safeguarding Addis Ababa. Ethiopia’s leadership, fully aware of the strategic imperatives, worked swiftly to ensure that reinforcements would turn the tide.

Geography and diplomacy proved decisive. The most direct flight path from Soviet bases to Ethiopia crossed Turkish airspace, requiring Ankara’s explicit permission. Reflecting its 1973 precedent during the Arab-Israeli War, when it allowed Soviet overflights while denying similar access to the U.S., Turkey granted clearance. Throughout November and December 1977, Soviet An-22 transport planes – the world’s largest turboprops at the time – regularly crossed Turkish skies, establishing a vital logistical corridor.

In a discreet but highly coordinated operation, Turkey permitted Moscow to airlift a full Cuban expeditionary force of 1,000 soldiers from Havana, via the USSR, directly to Ethiopia in late November. By early December, U.S. intelligence observed at least 18 An-22 landings in Addis Ababa within a week, delivering Cuban troops, Soviet advisors, and advanced weaponry including MiG-21 fighters, T-62 tanks, and heavy artillery.

While Turkey was a NATO member, tensions with Washington following the 1974 Cyprus intervention and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo contributed to Ankara’s decision. This move demonstrated Turkey’s strategic autonomy and was in line with Ethiopia’s diplomatic efforts to secure critical support regardless of Cold War alignments.

Turkey’s historical ties with Ethiopia, dating back to Emperor Menelik II’s 1896 victory over Italy, further strengthened the partnership. Supporting Addis Ababa aligned with Ankara’s interest in countering Soviet influence in Somalia and Egypt – Turkey’s regional competitors.

Some analysts note a parallel between Ethiopia’s efforts against Somali irredentism and Turkey’s own internal challenges with Kurdish separatists. Such shared concerns fostered a pragmatic alliance rooted in stability and state integrity.

On the battlefield, Cuban officers brought vital command expertise, integrating closely with Ethiopian and Soviet commanders. They enhanced the effectiveness and discipline of Ethiopia’s military forces, which had undergone internal reforms to consolidate strength. Soviet MiGs quickly secured air superiority, targeting Somali armor and supply lines, while new T-62 tanks outmatched Somalia’s older T-55s. By January 1978, artillery barrages had successfully lifted the siege of Harar.

In February 1978, Ethiopian-Cuban forces launched Operation Lash. Combining Soviet armor, Cuban tactical leadership, and Ethiopian militia forces, they broke through Somali lines at the Kara Mardeh Pass and retook Jijiga on March 5 after a grueling, multiday battle. Overextended and outgunned, Somali forces were forced into retreat.

U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski famously remarked that the SALT II arms treaty lay buried in the sands of the Ogaden. Soviet intervention escalated Cold War tensions, and Somalia’s defeat ultimately undermined Barre’s regime, culminating in his overthrow in 1991 and years of instability – a power vacuum later exploited by Al-Shabaab.

While the conflict strained Ethiopia’s resources and exacerbated challenges like the 1984 famine, the Derg leadership’s pragmatic management and international alliances sustained the regime throughout the war and beyond. As Soviet support waned under Gorbachev, Ethiopia adapted to changing geopolitical dynamics. Turkey solidified its role as a key power broker in the Horn of Africa. Today, it maintains its largest embassy globally in Mogadishu and continues to train Somali troops, while pursuing economic ties with Ethiopia – a reflection of its pragmatic regional strategy.

The 1977–78 Ogaden War hinged on an invisible fulcrum: the flight paths over Turkish mountains and steppes. By securing passage for Moscow’s aircraft, Ethiopia’s leadership enabled a lifeline that altered the course of the conflict. The Cuban troops transported via Turkish skies became the anvil on which Somali ambitions were broken.

The Soviet tanks and MiGs delivered through Anatolia ensured a decisive Ethiopian victory, preserving the regime’s stability at a critical moment while profoundly impacting Somalia’s future. Turkey demonstrated that some of the most decisive battles are fought not with rifles or tanks, but with strategic diplomacy and control of airspace – a quiet gesture that reshaped the Horn, buried détente, and proved logistics to be the ultimate weapon in war. The sands of the Ogaden hold many graves, but Ethiopia’s true salvation flew silently above them, its passage secured by Ankara’s cooperation and Ethiopia’s astute statecraft.

By Samiya Mohammed,Researcher,Horn Review