



Weekly Geopolitical Report

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Horn Review: Weekly Report

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1. Ethiopia

Ethiopia's high-level engagement with the BRICS dominated diplomatic activity this week, beginning on September 11, with participation in the Second BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Mumbai. National Bank of Ethiopia Governor Eyob Tekalign underscored ongoing fiscal, monetary, financial and foreign-exchange reforms aimed at strengthening macroeconomic stability and resilience to global shocks. He welcomed progress on amendments to the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and called for inclusive onboarding of new members according to their development stages and capacities, reaffirming Ethiopia's commitment to the bloc's shared financial agenda.

Building upon financial sector dialogue, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, during his first official visit to India to elevate bilateral strategic cooperation. Their discussions focused on expanding defense ties, technology transfer, capacity building, mining sector investments, and joint climate advocacy leading up to COP32 in Addis Ababa. Both leaders emphasized transforming historical diplomatic bonds into actionable economic partnerships that unlock mutual development potential. This bilateral dialogue reinforces India's role as a primary partner in Ethiopia's industrial modernization and technological development agenda. The strategic alignment also highlights growing South-South cooperation ahead of major international climate governance forums.

Expanding diplomatic engagements during the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed conferred with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian regarding regional security dynamics in the Red Sea corridor. The leaders highlighted the imperative of sustained dialogue and peaceful diplomatic mechanisms to preserve stability in critical maritime trade lanes. Their consultation reflects Ethiopia's proactive diplomatic posture on maritime security issues affecting its immediate neighborhood and broader geopolitical surroundings.

On the margins of the same summit on September 12, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim held bilateral discussions focused on expanding economic cooperation across investment, renewable energy, and industrial development. Building on momentum from Prime Minister Anwar's landmark 2025 Addis Ababa visit, the leaders explored leveraging Malaysia's technical expertise in manufacturing and industrial park management to accelerate Ethiopia's ongoing economic transformation.

Addressing the plenary session of the 18th BRICS Summit on September 12, 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed articulated Ethiopia's vision for combining BRICS capital, technology, and market access with African resource capabilities to maximize local value addition. He highlighted national achievements in food security and wheat production, positioning Ethiopia as a key contributor to the proposed BRICS grain exchange, while calling for ethical governance of artificial intelligence tailored to African languages and context through Ethiopia's specialized AI University.

Continuing high-level summit meetings on September 12, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss deepening strategic cooperation across defense, security, trade, technology, and higher education. Their constructive dialogue included plans for expanded cultural exchanges, joint development initiatives, and coordinated action on global climate priorities heading toward COP32.

Strengthening Middle Eastern diplomatic linkages at the summit on September 12, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed held talks with Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to align on core BRICS priorities and expand bilateral cooperation. The meeting reaffirmed the strong economic and financial ties between Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates, focusing on joint investments and sustainable development projects.

Diversifying Asian partnerships on September 12, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Lê Minh Hung on the sidelines of the summit to explore expanded bilateral cooperation in trade and economic development. The discussions centered on exchanging insights on rapid economic growth, industrialization, and agricultural trade opportunities to bolster mutual market access.

Broader summit deliberations culminated on September 12, 2026, when the 18th BRICS Summit formally endorsed Ethiopia's bid for accession to the World Trade Organization in the New Delhi Declaration. The declaration affirmed support for a fair, rules-based multilateral trading system and welcomed Ethiopia's candidacy for an expanded seat on the International Civil Aviation Organization Council as the African Union's endorsed representative.

Further expanding Central Asian diplomatic horizons on September 13, 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to discuss new frontiers of bilateral cooperation in digitalization, investment, and defense. The two leaders emphasized practical steps to enhance trade exchanges, technical capabilities, and business partnerships between East Africa and Central Asia.

Addressing the BRICS Plus Session on September 13, 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed advocated for stronger African representation, expanded access to development finance, and formal adoption of local currency cross-border payment mechanisms. To support

these objectives, he officially announced Ethiopia's readiness to host a New Development Bank regional office in Addis Ababa to facilitate infrastructure financing across the continent while aligning future climate goals with COP32.

The 18th BRICS Leaders' Summit officially concluded on September 13, 2026, with the adoption of the comprehensive New Delhi Declaration under the theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability." The declaration reasserts the principles of sovereign equality, inclusive multilateralism, global financial architecture reform, and equitable representation for developing nations in international institutions.

In a separate domestic development, Ethiopian authorities released approximately 300 individuals previously detained in connection with the Amhara regional conflict after they completed government-administered rehabilitation programs focused on security coordination, conflict resolution and peace initiatives, and signed formal pardon documents acknowledging past damages and committing to state security. A smaller number who declined to participate or sign the pledges remain in custody pending standard judicial processes, illustrating ongoing efforts to address security-related detentions through structured pathways.

2. Sudan

Sudan's war entered another consequential phase this week as fighting intensified around the strategic Blue Nile region, international efforts to restrict the flow of weapons gained momentum, and competing visions for the country's post-war political order became increasingly explicit. At the same time, the international Quintet called for an inclusive civilian-led political process and rejected parallel governing structures, even as senior Sudanese military figures increasingly signaled that the army intends to retain a central role in the state after the war.

The military situation remained particularly volatile in Blue Nile. The alliance between the RSF and a faction of the SPLM-N claimed further territorial gains in Kurmuk locality, including several military posts and villages, while advancing toward Ed Damazin. The SAF, meanwhile, reinforced positions in the region and reviewed defensive deployments around the southern approaches to the state capital. The claims of territorial control could not be independently verified, but the developments underscore the continuation of the emergence of Blue Nile as one of the war's most strategically important fronts. Its proximity to Ethiopia and South Sudan, combined with the presence of the Roseires Dam, gives the fighting implications extending well beyond the immediate battlefield.

The escalation became even more pronounced at the beginning of the following week, when explosive-laden drones struck several locations across Ed Damazin. Witnesses reported multiple detonations near the military hospital and airport, while Sudanese air defenses were reportedly engaged against incoming drones. The attacks illustrate the

growing sophistication and geographic reach of drone warfare in Sudan, particularly as both sides increasingly use unmanned systems to strike positions deep behind the front lines. Sudanese authorities again accused Ethiopia of facilitating RSF activity and hosting training facilities, while Ethiopian authorities have denied such accusations. The allegations remain contested and should not be treated as evidence of Ethiopian state involvement, but the continued exchange of accusations demonstrates how the Blue Nile conflict is becoming increasingly entangled with Sudan's wider regional security environment.

unanimous decision to extend the existing Darfur arms embargo for one month while negotiations continue over a US proposal to impose a nationwide embargo. Washington argues that the existing regime is outdated and insufficient for a war that has spread far beyond Darfur, proposing restrictions covering the entire country as well as additional sanctions related to sexual violence, kidnapping and attacks on humanitarian personnel. Russia has opposed any expansion, while Sudan's UN ambassador argued that a comprehensive embargo would undermine the country's right to self-defense. The temporary extension therefore postpones rather than resolves a major disagreement over how international pressure should be applied to the belligerents.

The debate over arms supplies is occurring alongside growing evidence that the war has become sustained by extensive external networks. The UN-backed investigation released earlier this month documented foreign fighters, weapons, logistics and drone capabilities supporting the warring parties. This week's diplomatic discussions consequently increasingly focused not only on stopping the fighting but also on constraining the external networks that enable both sides to continue fighting. The seizure of a smuggled weapons shipment on the Red Sea coast, including a Russian-made Kornet anti-tank missile system, rifle magazines and foreign-made pistols, further highlighted the persistence of illicit weapons flows into Sudan.

The political contest over Sudan's future meanwhile sharpened considerably. The international Quintet comprising the UN, African Union, European Union, Arab League and IGAD concluded consultations in Khartoum by rejecting parallel governing structures and stressing that there is no military solution to the war. It called for an inclusive, credible and Sudanese-led political process leading toward democratic civilian government. The position directly intersects with the controversy surrounding the army-backed "Sudanese-Sudanese" dialogue initiative. Civil society coalitions have rejected the process, arguing that a dialogue organized under military authority cannot provide a neutral basis for a political settlement and risks becoming a mechanism for legitimizing wartime power structures.

The disagreement became more consequential after Abdel Fattah al-Burhan explicitly stated that the RSF would have no role in the Sudanese state after the war and that

military forces were excluded from the national dialogue. While his position reflects the SAF's rejection of the RSF as a legitimate political actor, it also raises a larger question over who will participate in determining Sudan's post-war political architecture. That question was underscored by Lieutenant General Yasir al-Atta, who said the army would push for Burhan to remain head of state for several electoral cycles while political parties are rebuilt. Although Burhan himself has publicly rejected suggestions that he intends to seek office, Atta's remarks indicate that sections of the military leadership are contemplating a prolonged political role for the armed forces rather than a rapid return to civilian rule.

The humanitarian and economic situation continued to deteriorate beneath these political and military developments. Aid workers in West Kordofan warned of an imminent famine across six localities, citing poor rainfall, failed harvests, soaring food prices, damaged livelihoods and the effects of continued fighting. Reports that some residents in Al-Odaya have resorted to consuming food normally reserved for livestock illustrate the severity of the crisis. Cholera and shortages of medicines and transport are compounding the effects of hunger, while famine risks are also being reported in other parts of the country.

Sudan's economic crisis is also increasingly intertwined with the war economy. Fuel shortages and rising prices returned to Khartoum and other states this week, driven by currency depreciation, higher import costs and distribution problems. At the same time, gold mining continues to provide a critical source of income in areas under different forms of wartime control. Reporting from Abu Hamad in River Nile State highlighted the longer-term consequences of the gold economy, where intensive artisanal mining has contaminated soil and water, reduced agricultural productivity and generated serious public-health concerns. The case illustrates the paradox of Sudan's wartime economy: resources such as gold continue to generate substantial revenues, while the environmental and social costs are increasingly undermining the productive foundations needed for post-war recovery. Internationally, the BRICS summit added another layer to the diplomatic picture. Leaders called for an immediate and permanent ceasefire, warned of the risk of extremism and terrorism spreading through the conflict, and called for greater humanitarian access. The emphasis on African-led solutions was particularly significant given that several BRICS members maintain close relations with the Sudanese military authorities. Egypt, meanwhile, reiterated that Sudan's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity constitute a "red line," reinforcing Cairo's longstanding concern that fragmentation of Sudan could generate direct security consequences for Egypt.

Taken together, this week's developments suggest that Sudan's conflict is entering a phase in which the struggle over the post-war state is becoming almost as consequential as the struggle over territory. Unless military escalation and the competing visions of Sudan's future are addressed simultaneously, international pressure for negotiations is likely to continue running into the same fundamental problem: the principal actors are not

yet competing merely over who wins the war, but over what Sudan itself will look like when it ends.

3. Egypt

Egyptian authorities framed Houthi missile and drone strikes against southern Saudi population centers as a direct threat to regional sovereignty and maritime stability, calculating that sustained disruption along the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb would further erode Suez Canal transit revenues already under pressure from broader shipping insecurity.

Cyprus and Greece publicly aligned with Egyptian positions on Nile water security and the need for Ethiopian adherence to international norms regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam during a trilateral leaders' meeting in which Ethiopia has been doing all along, simultaneously advancing the GREGY electricity interconnector as a pillar of Eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation.

Egypt's foreign minister pressed his Somali counterpart for accelerated release of eight Egyptian sailors detained aboard a hijacked tanker off the Somali coast while reiterating unconditional support for Somalia's territorial integrity and rejection of unilateral fragmentation.

Consular teams maintained continuous assistance for Egyptian crew members among hundreds of vessels immobilized in the Strait of Hormuz by the wider Iran conflict, operating in parallel with efforts to resolve the separate Somali-coast hostage case.

Cairo sustained diplomatic pressure against additional Ethiopian dam construction on the Blue Nile, coupling its rejection of unilateral water measures to broader concerns over Addis Ababa's pursuit of Red Sea access arrangements that could compound strategic encirclement.

On the sidelines of BRICS gatherings, President Sisi told South African President Ramaphosa that Sudan's sovereignty, unity and stability constitute a non-negotiable red line, while calling for peaceful African conflict resolution and elevated bilateral strategic coordination.

President Sisi reiterated the Sudan red-line position in discussions with United Nations Secretary-General Guterres, pressing for progress on the second phase of a Gaza ceasefire arrangement and adequate humanitarian access while addressing United Nations institutional reform.

Bilateral talks with Russian President Putin reviewed progress on the El Dabaa nuclear plant, the Suez industrial zone and roughly ten billion dollars in trade volume, alongside coordination on Gaza implementation, Iran de-escalation and the Sudan sovereignty red

line, with explicit emphasis on securing Red Sea and Suez shipping lanes. The agenda illustrated Egypt's pursuit of diversified great-power economic partnerships to offset regional instability costs.

President Sisi urged Iranian President Pezeshkian to halt attacks on Arab states, respect national sovereignty and pursue a durable settlement of the regional conflict, positioning Egypt as an interlocutor capable of conveying Arab concerns directly.

Foreign Minister Abdelatty coordinated with his French counterpart on the necessity of returning the United States and Iran to negotiations while managing parallel crises in Gaza, Sudan, Libya and Lebanon.

Egyptian strategic assessments registered heightened alarm over Houthi consolidation of territorial control along Yemen's western coastline, including the Mocha port, viewing the gains as elevating risks of Bab al-Mandeb closure.

Cairo maintained high-level engagement affirming Somalia's territorial integrity and rejecting non-coastal attempts to reshape Red Sea security arrangements, implicitly targeting Ethiopian ambitions for alternative maritime outlets. The posture reinforced Egypt's long-standing objective of preserving a coastal-state monopoly on Red Sea governance to safeguard its own strategic depth.

President Sisi used BRICS interactions to align African partners around common positions on Sudan and wider Horn of Africa stability while reinforcing Egypt's mediation credentials on both Gaza and the Iran conflict.

Egyptian military and diplomatic activity continued to back Somali federal institutions against fragmentation, including resistance to Somaliland-related initiatives, while tightly coupling Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam red lines to the prevention of any Ethiopian Red Sea foothold that would complete a strategic encirclement.

4. Eritrea

Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh gave a rare interview to Middle East Eye, a Qatar-linked outlet that has been critical of Israel and the UAE, in which he articulated Asmara's growing antagonism toward Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. Saleh accused the UAE of pursuing "port imperialism" in East Africa and rejected the establishment of foreign military hubs or external management of Eritrean ports, while also expressing concern over what Asmara perceives as an emerging UAE-Israel-Ethiopia strategic alignment around the Red Sea. On Yemen, Saleh stated that there is "no military solution" to the conflict and argued that the country's political fragmentation complicates efforts by littoral states to establish maritime security. His remarks implicitly questioned the ability of any single authority to exercise effective control over Yemen, including the internationally recognized government.

The comments are notable because they expose a degree of divergence between Eritrea and Saudi Arabia despite their stated cooperation on Red Sea security. While Riyadh has supported efforts to contain the Houthis and has maintained close relations with Yemen's internationally recognized authorities, Saleh's rejection of a military solution and emphasis on Yemen's fragmented political order are more accommodating toward the Houthi position. This divergence becomes more significant when considered alongside reports of an arms-supply network running from Houthi-controlled Yemen through Eritrea and onward toward Sudan, although the available evidence does not by itself establish a formal Eritrean alignment with Iran or the so-called Axis of Resistance. Taken together, however, Eritrea's increasingly explicit hostility toward the UAE and Israel, combined with its position on Yemen and reported activity around Houthi-linked supply routes, raises questions about whether Asmara is gradually positioning itself at greater distance from the Saudi-led regional camp.

Reports emerged primarily through Dimtsi Weyane, a TPLF-affiliated media outlet, showing TPLF officials and a delegation of more than 400 people visiting Eritrea's Senafe Sub-Zone on September 13 for the annual Abune Ambes festival. The delegation reportedly included Fisseha Haile, Chief Administrator of Eastern Tigray Zone, and was received by Eritrean residents and local authorities. Dimtsi Weyane framed the visit as part of continuing "people-to-people" engagement between communities on either side of the Eritrea-Tigray border, while footage also showed images of Isaias Afwerki and TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael displayed during the gathering. The event follows the Tsimdo initiative, which has facilitated similar cross-border engagements over the past two years.

The emphasis on people-to-people relations is politically significant because it provides a social and cultural frame for an increasingly visible alignment between the TPLF and Eritrea's regime. This framing is particularly important given the hostility that persists among sections of both populations toward the opposing political establishment, following Eritrean forces' conduct during the 2020–22 Tigray war and the TPLF's longstanding antagonism toward the PFDJ. The reported gathering therefore appears less indicative of broad popular reconciliation than of an effort to publicly normalize and legitimize an alignment that remains politically contentious. At the strategic level, the relationship is better understood as a tactical alignment between the TPLF and the Eritrean regime, with TPLF officials having publicly described their objective in terms of "toppling" the Ethiopian government, rather than as an organic reconciliation between the two societies.

The Bank of Eritrea has introduced new restrictions on cash holdings, limiting individuals to 25,000 Nakfa and private institutions to between 50,000 and 150,000 Nakfa, depending on their classification, for periods exceeding 15 days. According to Shabait, the regulation was issued through Legal Notice No. 134/2026 on September 9 and requires excess cash

to be moved through banks and other financial institutions, with violations potentially subject to legal action. The measure follows the regime's broader currency-control effort earlier this year, when it ordered the recall of Nakfa cash holdings and required citizens to deposit their currency in banks. The latest restrictions therefore appear to extend the regime's effort to bring cash circulation more firmly under institutional control.

The immediate rationale is likely to be the suppression of informal and black-market circulation of the Nakfa, particularly given evidence that the currency has increasingly been used in cross-border informal trade in northern Ethiopia and Sudan beyond Asmara's direct supervision. The 2015 currency recall provides a precedent for the regime responding to the accumulation and circulation of Nakfa outside its controlled financial channels, although the precise reasons behind the current measures remain unclear. The tightening may also reflect broader economic pressures within Eritrea, where the opaque and highly controlled financial system gives the regime strong incentives to monitor cash and conserve scarce resources, although there is insufficient information to establish a specific economic trigger. Rather than indicating preparations for renewed war, the sequence of a comprehensive currency recall followed by restrictions on cash retention is more plausibly understood as an effort to reassert monetary control and constrain an informal economy that has expanded across Eritrea's increasingly important border-trade networks.

The Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on September 12 accusing Ethiopia's state-affiliated media and policy institutions of conducting a coordinated campaign against Eritrea. The statement specifically targeted outlets and institutions including the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopian News Agency, Fana Broadcasting Corporation, and Horn Review, rejecting recent reporting on conditions in Asmara, Eritrea's regional relationships, alleged human-trafficking networks, and its maritime posture. The ministry also rejected accusations that Eritrea is seeking alliances against Ethiopia, while reiterating Asmara's opposition to what it characterized as Ethiopian efforts to obtain Red Sea access through coercive means. The statement further asserted that Eritrea remains willing to pursue commercial port access through bilateral agreements but rejects arrangements it considers threatening to its sovereignty.

The statement reflects the increasingly adversarial information environment surrounding Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, with Asmara explicitly treating Ethiopian reporting on Eritrea's domestic and regional affairs as part of a broader campaign linked to Addis Ababa's Red Sea ambitions. Its extensive focus on Ethiopia's domestic political, economic, and humanitarian problems also indicates that the regime is seeking to contest the legitimacy of Ethiopian criticism by redirecting attention toward the shortcomings of the Prosperity Party administration. More significantly, the ministry's repeated linkage of media criticism to Ethiopia's pursuit of maritime access reinforces Asmara's perception that the issue represents a strategic challenge to Eritrean sovereignty rather than simply a

question of commercial connectivity. The statement therefore adds to the broader pattern of increasingly hostile political messaging between the two sides, although its allegations regarding Ethiopian intentions and Eritrea's own record should be treated as the Eritrean regime's position rather than independently established facts.

5. Djibouti

More than 2,000 Yemenis arrived in Djibouti within a matter of days as fighting intensified in western Yemen, according to Al Jazeera, citing the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and AFP. Djibouti's Economy and Finance Minister Ilyas M. Dawaleh initially reported 1,400 arrivals within 24 hours, while IOM subsequently put the number above 2,000; the arrivals included women and children reaching the coastal city of Obock after crossing the Bab el-Mandeb. The influx comes amid a broader displacement crisis in Yemen, with IOM reporting 85,818 people displaced since the renewed conflict began, including about 82,000 since the start of September. The speed of the movement illustrates how quickly renewed fighting around Yemen's western coastline can translate into direct humanitarian pressures on Djibouti.

For Djibouti, the development demonstrates that instability on the opposite shore of the Bab el-Mandeb is not simply a maritime-security problem but can generate immediate population movements across the strait. Obock's proximity to Yemen makes Djibouti a natural reception point for people fleeing the conflict, while the country already hosts a substantial refugee and asylum-seeker population, increasing the pressure on its limited humanitarian infrastructure. The development also highlights the dual role of the Bab el-Mandeb as both a major commercial chokepoint and a migration corridor connecting Yemen with the Horn of Africa. If the Houthi offensive continues to consolidate control along Yemen's western coast, Djibouti could face sustained arrivals at precisely the time that heightened insecurity is already placing greater strategic and economic importance on its position at the strait.

Djibouti President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh visited Paris in early September and met French President Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace on the margins of the first International Space Summit, held on September 9–10. According to Djiboutian reporting, the discussions covered implementation of the France–Djibouti defence cooperation agreement signed in July 2024, alongside security in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, maritime security, freedom of navigation, and regional stability. Guelleh also participated in the summit, where he presented Djibouti's emerging space programme, including its use of nanosatellites for environmental and climate monitoring and plans for a National Geospatial Centre with French support. The visit thus combined Djibouti's longstanding defence relationship with France with efforts to expand bilateral cooperation into scientific and technological fields.

The Macron–Guelleh meeting is particularly significant against the deteriorating security environment around the Bab el-Mandeb, where Djibouti's geographic position has increased its value to France as a military and maritime-security partner. The focus on implementing the 2024 defence agreement suggests that the relationship remains anchored in security cooperation, while the space agenda offers Djibouti an additional avenue for developing state capabilities and reinforcing its strategic partnership with France. Djibouti's presentation of space technology in terms of sovereignty, environmental monitoring and national development also reflects its broader effort to derive strategic value from its position at the intersection of African, Red Sea and Indo-Pacific security interests. For France, maintaining close ties with Djibouti provides an established platform from which to monitor and respond to instability along one of the world's principal maritime corridors.

6. South Sudan

South Sudan's planned December elections came under renewed scrutiny this week as the United Nations warned that persistent violence, political tensions, shrinking civic space and entrenched impunity could undermine the country's fragile democratic transition. The warning came after the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan concluded its fourteenth visit to the country, finding that many of the conditions required for peaceful and credible elections remain absent. With roughly 100 days remaining before the scheduled vote, the central question is increasingly shifting from whether South Sudan will proceed with elections to whether the political environment surrounding them can prevent the ballot from becoming another trigger for confrontation.

The Commission's assessment was particularly critical of the continued deterioration of the security and political environment. It pointed to renewed violence, displacement, attacks against civilians, restrictions on civic space, corruption and persistent impunity, while stressing that implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement has stalled. Commissioner Barney Afako argued that South Sudanese have a legitimate right to vote after years of delayed elections, but that this right must be protected through conditions allowing citizens to participate freely, compete fairly and challenge electoral disputes through credible institutions. The Commission therefore called for a genuine cessation of hostilities, adequate political and civic space, an independent and sufficiently funded electoral institution, and safeguards against hate speech and incitement.

The Commission also placed particular emphasis on political inclusion. It called for dialogue involving political opponents, including supporters of detained First Vice President Riek Machar, as well as holdout groups, civil society, women and youth. The recommendation is significant because the question of Machar's participation has become inseparable from the credibility of the transition. The Commission argued that elections alone cannot resolve South Sudan's political crisis and that disagreements between

political adversaries should be addressed through dialogue rather than military action or purely judicial mechanisms.

Juba, however, rejected the UN assessment. The government described the Commission's warnings as unfounded and maintained that it remains committed to the 2018 peace agreement and the December elections. The Foreign Ministry argued that South Sudan's future should be determined through nationally owned political processes and pointed to the government's inter-party dialogue initiative as an appropriate mechanism for addressing political differences. The disagreement illustrates an increasingly important divide: while the government presents the electoral timetable as evidence of progress toward democratic transition, international investigators are increasingly focused on whether the political and security conditions are sufficient for that transition to be credible.

Concerns surrounding Machar's security further complicated this environment. Members of his defense team raised allegations of threats against Machar, his co-accused and their lawyers, including claims of a possible planned road accident and the alleged use of a poisonous substance inside the courtroom. The allegations have not been independently verified, and the government has rejected claims of an assassination plot. Nevertheless, the fact that such allegations have emerged while Machar remains detained and on trial adds another layer of political tension around the peace process. The court subsequently adjourned proceedings to allow further investigation into the security concerns.

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Electoral preparations themselves remain another source of concern. The UN Commission described the electoral process as "grossly underfunded" and the timetable as highly ambitious, with only around 100 days remaining to complete the necessary preparations. The challenge is therefore not simply logistical. The country must simultaneously address insecurity, political participation, electoral institutions, dispute-resolution mechanisms and the question of whether communities affected by conflict will be able to participate at all. These constraints make the December timetable increasingly difficult to separate from the broader question of whether South Sudan's political transition is being compressed faster than its institutions can sustain.

Meanwhile, insecurity continued to affect communities far beyond Juba. In Eastern Equatoria, drought and insecurity have compounded existing humanitarian pressures, with communities facing deteriorating access to food and livelihoods. The combination of environmental stress and insecurity is particularly significant in a country where local competition over land, cattle and resources can rapidly acquire political and communal dimensions. Rather than representing separate crises, these pressures increasingly reinforce the conditions under which localized violence and displacement persist.

South Sudan's regional economic relationships also came into sharper focus through the continuing dispute over the Ilemi Triangle with Kenya. Nairobi and Juba have moved to protect their trade corridor and accelerate work on the Nadapal-Juba route despite the unresolved territorial dispute. The two countries agreed to address 29 non-tariff barriers and advance the transport corridor, while bilateral trade has reportedly fallen from \$246 million to \$168 million. The development demonstrates how territorial disputes can intersect directly with regional integration and economic recovery. For landlocked South Sudan, maintaining reliable access through Kenya to the port of Mombasa remains strategically important, making the protection of the corridor a matter of both economic and security policy.

Taken together, the week exposed a widening gap between the formal architecture of South Sudan's transition and the realities on the ground. The government continues to defend the December elections as a necessary step toward ending prolonged transitional rule, while the UN is warning that elections conducted without adequate political inclusion, security and institutional safeguards could instead intensify confrontation. The dispute over Machar, continuing localized violence, weak civic space and inadequate electoral financing all point to the same underlying problem: South Sudan is attempting to move from a fragile peace arrangement toward electoral politics before the foundations of that peace have been fully consolidated. The coming weeks will therefore be decisive. Unless political dialogue expands and credible safeguards are established, the December elections risk becoming not the culmination of the peace process, but a new arena in which unresolved political and security conflicts are contested.

7. Somalia and Somaliland

Somalia

Federal authorities continued preparations to deploy additional Somali National Army troops to Baidoa, the capital of Southwest State for an operation aimed at pushing back opposition forces loyal to ousted regional president Abdiasis Mohamed Hassan Laftagareen, who remained on the outskirts of the town and had launched repeated attacks including one the previous week that killed multiple people, among them a regional commander. The deployment decision followed a phone call between President Hassan

Sheikh Mohamud and Southwest State leader Adan Mohamed Nur with the stated aim of stabilizing Baidoa and moving the battle zone away from the town amid ongoing political and security tensions.

In a related political development, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud endorsed Hirshabelle State leader Ali Gudlawe to become the next president of Hirshabelle State, signaling federal support amid ongoing regional electoral and leaderships.

In Mogadishu security forces and the Gubadley district administration conducted a security and weapons collection operation across neighborhoods of the district on 11 September. District police commander Osman Afrah Mahmoud stated the operation ran from early morning until evening with no incidents and that all individuals sought were located. The operation involved police, military, the Galayr unit, and district intelligence, focusing on checks to prevent the unlawful circulation of weapons or materials that could disturb security. Authorities said such operations would continue and urged residents to report risks.

In Puntland, authorities defended a plan to clear government owned land and facilities in Bosaso, describing it as part of an urban development plan distinct from other interpretations. Separately, Information Minister Abdulfatah Kasim Mohamud proposed making the fight against disinformation a new pillar of the Somalia and Türkiye partnership suggesting structured cooperation between relevant institutions.

Somalia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned Houthi strikes on civilian and economic targets in southern Saudi Arabia on or around 9 September which wounded dozens, including women and children and caused fires at oil facilities. The ministry called the deliberate targeting a grave violation of international law and a dangerous escalation threatening Red Sea and Horn of Africa security. Somalia expressed concern over attacks on commercial vessels and threats to freedom of navigation, urged an immediate cessation of attacks and called for a renewed political settlement in Yemen while affirming full solidarity with Saudi Arabia.

Former Minister of Planning Abdirahman Aynte stated that Mogadishu "cannot be defended" if African Union troops (AUSSOM) withdraw from the country by December highlighting risks to the capital's security amid the ongoing transition. Somalia's business community was reported to be exploring alternative shipping routes in response to disruptions and security concerns linked to Houthi activity around the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Red Sea shipping lanes, reflecting broader regional impacts on trade and maritime security affecting the Horn of Africa.

Mass protests against Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were widely reported on 8 September in major Jubaland towns including Afmadow, Kismayo, and Dolow. Demonstrators burned Turkish flags and displayed placards opposing Turkish

involvement. The protests followed Jubaland authorities' accusation that Turkey was responsible for or involved in an airstrike in Dolow, Gedo region, that wounded former Custodial Corps commander Gen. Mahad Abdirahman ("Shub"), his wife, and several civilians. The federal government denied an airstrike had occurred, attributing the blast to explosives inside the house, while Turkey issued no immediate public comment in the available coverage. The demonstrations highlighted growing public and regional tensions over foreign military roles in Somali political disputes.

In Gedo region, security reporting on 10 September continued to detail the previous day's Al-Shabaab mortar and ground attack on Somali National Army positions in Baardheere district. Local accounts indicated government forces later secured the sites with eight SNA soldiers killed and seven wounded, while an anonymous officer claimed approximately 20 Al-Shabaab bodies were observed. Fighters approached from the Saakow road.

A related terrorism tracking update noted an IED ambush and raid on a militia barracks that killed nine and involved the looting of weapons, including seven AK-47s and a PK machine gun. In Mudug region, government and Galmudug forces were placed on heightened alert in Xarardheere after reported Al-Shabaab movement on connecting roads, though no confirmed assault was recorded that day.

On 7 September, the Somali National Army's Danab commandos in cooperation with international partners conducted a planned operation on the outskirts of Harbole in Afmadow district, Lower Juba region. The operation targeted a group of Al-Shabaab militants involved in preparing and planting landmines and explosives on roads used by civilians. Officials stated the cell was eliminated as part of efforts to curb the group's influence, improve security and stability, and ensure freedom of movement. This followed a related operation days earlier around 5 September, in Buulo Fulaay, Bay region, that the Defence Ministry said killed about 14 Al-Shabaab members and destroyed a hideout.

Reporting dated 7 September also described planned Danab operations in the Madax-Maroodi area of Lower Shabelle targeting suspected Al-Shabaab movements and potential bases, aimed at disrupting the group and improving local security, though no specific casualty figures were immediately available in the initial military statement. On 8 September 2026, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, conducted an airstrike against Al-Shabaab in the vicinity of Quumbi, approximately 80 km northwest of Kismayo in Lower Juba region. AFRICOM released no details on units, aircraft, weapons, battle damage assessment, or casualties, citing operational security. The action formed part of ongoing joint efforts to degrade the group's capacity to threaten U.S. forces and citizens abroad.

A UN linked assessment published around 10 September estimated Islamic State fighters in Somalia at 150–250, including leadership, with more than 900 reported killed since

early 2025 in Puntland and U.S. operations in the Cal-Miskaad range. Leadership structures were described as intact despite the losses

Somaliland

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro, speaking on the sidelines of the MEAD conference in Washington stated that Somaliland was prepared to contribute up to 2,000 soldiers to a planned U.S.-led International Stabilization Force for Gaza if formally requested by the United States or Israel. He emphasized that Somaliland was not volunteering but would respond if asked, stating “If they ask, we can provide... If they ask me, I am ready.” Somaliland has an army of approximately 25,000 and a coast guard of about 1,500, and it has not previously contributed troops to African Union missions.

Yemen’s Tariq Saleh reportedly fled to Somaliland after a Houthi takeover of Al Mukha. Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, a member of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council and commander of the National Resistance on the country’s western coast, reportedly fled Yemen by sea for Somaliland after his forces withdrew from Al Mukha on Thursday, allowing Houthi militants to seize control of the area. The Daily Somalia reported on Saturday that Saleh is reportedly in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, according to information that has yet to be independently confirmed by either Somaliland authorities or Yemen’s government. Regional notes included ongoing attention to Red Sea and Gulf of Aden dynamics.

An ACLED report highlighted around September 13 that Al-Shabaab remained the most powerful non-state armed group in Somalia and the most violent Al-Qaeda affiliate globally, with significant political violence recorded in 2026. Reports around this period, including ACLED data, underscored Al-Shabaab’s strength in Somalia proper, with limited direct operational reach into core Somaliland areas, though remote eastern zones such as parts of Sanaag have historically seen some militant presence.

8. Yemen

On 7 September, fighting continued in southwest Yemen following the Houthi offensive that began days earlier. Government forces carried out airstrikes on Houthi positions in areas including south of Hodeidah, western Marib, and al-Jawf. Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi drones. Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of striking a prison in al-Hazm in al-Jawf. Government forces reported advances toward Al-Hazm and control of a military camp in al-Jawf. Families continued fleeing parts of Taiz.

On 8 September, government forces launched counterattacks in Taiz, al-Bayda, and al-Jawf, with statements that they aimed to retake Sanaa. Fighting intensified on those fronts. Houthis reported Saudi airstrikes in several provinces and claimed to have repelled attacks. Houthis launched missiles and drones at southern Saudi cities including Abha,

Khamis Mushait, Jizan, and Najran, as well as Aramco energy facilities. Saudi Arabia reported civilian injuries and vowed retaliation.

Between 9 and 10 September, fighting spread across Taiz, Hodeidah, Marib, al-Jawf, and al-Bayda. Houthis captured the port city of Mokha in Taiz and advanced on islands and coastal areas near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, including movement toward the Hanish Islands and Dhubab. Government sources described the loss of Mokha as painful. Both sides conducted airstrikes. Displacement increased sharply as people left coastal and western areas. On 11 and 12 September, Houthis consolidated control along large parts of the Red Sea coast, including reports of taking Mayyun Island (Perim). This gave them positions overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Government forces struck Houthi targets near Mokha and on the road toward Dhubab, reporting destruction of vehicles and weapons. Houthis claimed extensive Saudi airstrikes on areas under their control.

Tens of thousands of people were displaced, with many fleeing toward safer areas or across the sea. On 13 September, government forces attacked Houthi positions along the Red Sea coast and in Taiz, including airstrikes on Mokha, Dhubab, and other sites. They claimed advances in parts of Taiz. Houthis reported further strikes into Saudi territory, including a projectile that hit a mosque in Jizan province. Government officials stated that forces withdrawn from the west coast were regrouping and would return to the fighting. Clashes continued in Marib and other areas. On 14 September, government forces continued airstrikes and operations in Taiz and coastal zones, claiming to retake some positions. Houthis held the coastal gains including Mokha and island positions near Bab el-Mandeb. Fighting persisted on multiple fronts involving Houthis, government forces, and Saudi involvement through airstrikes and cross-border exchanges. Throughout the period, the main focus remained the Red Sea coast, Mokha port, and approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with secondary fighting inland in Taiz, Hodeidah, Marib, al-Jawf, and al-Bayda. Displacement rose significantly as people left the fighting zones.

9. Kenya

Kenya's developments between September 7 and 13, 2026 showed the country strengthening its position as a regional diplomatic and economic hub while also facing tensions between domestic political pressures and its wider East African ambitions. The main issues of the week were closer cooperation with the United States, competition over critical minerals, energy security, regional integration, and Kenya's diplomatic role in Somalia and Sudan.

One of the most important developments was the continued strengthening of Kenya's relationship with the United States. On September 7, Prime Cabinet Secretary and Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi met U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Frank Garcia. Discussions covered trade, investment, defence, health,

critical minerals and regional security. The two countries are also preparing for another Kenya United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in Nairobi.

Critical minerals were especially important. The United States expressed interest in helping Kenya develop local mineral processing, particularly around the Mrima Hill deposits in Kwale County. The area contains rare earth minerals and niobium, which are important for advanced manufacturing and aerospace industries. This places Kenya within the wider strategic competition between the United States and China over access to critical mineral supply chains. Nairobi could benefit by attracting investment and technology while avoiding overdependence on either Washington or Beijing.

Energy security was another major issue. Plans for a large petroleum refinery in Lamu continued to attract attention during the week. The proposed project could strengthen Kenya's position as an energy and logistics hub for East Africa and could also increase the strategic importance of the wider LAPSET corridor. However, the project faces challenges related to financing, crude oil supply and supporting infrastructure. At the same time, Kenya remains exposed to global energy shocks, showing why energy security is becoming increasingly connected to the country's foreign policy.

Kenya also faced a regional diplomatic problem over restrictions affecting foreign small scale traders. The measures created anxiety among Burundians and other East African nationals living in Kenya, with some seeking documents to leave the country. The government later offered a period for undocumented East Africans to regularise their status and clarified that there was no complete ban on foreign traders.

This issue exposed a contradiction in Kenya's regional policy. Nairobi strongly supports the East African Community and the free movement of people, goods and services, yet domestic economic pressure is encouraging more protectionist policies. Kenya therefore has to balance the interests of local traders with its ambition to remain a leader in East African integration.

Regional security also remained important. Kenya continued to call for stronger international support for the African Union mission in Somalia, where instability and terrorism remain direct security concerns for Nairobi. Kenya also reiterated that the conflict in Sudan requires negotiation rather than a military solution and called for stronger mediation and humanitarian efforts. These positions reflect Kenya's broader effort to maintain Nairobi's status as a major centre for African diplomacy.

Domestic politics were less important than the geopolitical developments, but the approaching 2027 election is increasingly influencing government policy. President William Ruto and opposition figures are already strengthening alliances and expanding political activity around the country. The government has also sought to reassure international partners that the 2027 election will be peaceful and credible.

Overall, the week showed Kenya trying to increase its geopolitical importance through stronger partnerships, energy projects, critical minerals and regional diplomacy. At the same time, domestic economic pressures and political competition are creating challenges for its image as a leader of regional integration. Kenya's main strategic task will be to maintain strong relations with major powers, protect its regional influence and manage internal political pressures as the 2027 election approaches.

10. The Gulf Countries

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia faced a sharp escalation in its security environment during the week as attacks linked to Iran-aligned actors and the Houthis affected both its critical energy infrastructure and southern border areas. Saudi Arabia temporarily shut down its East-West crude oil pipeline after drone strikes linked to Iran-aligned militias operating from Iraqi territory, while Houthi forces launched drone and missile attacks against southern Saudi areas including Sharurah military base, Jazan, and Najran. Repeated emergency sirens were activated across Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, and Najran, reflecting the widening security pressure on the Kingdom.

The escalation also produced a direct Saudi military response in Yemen. Following the loss of Mocha and the advancing Houthi presence along Yemen's Red Sea coast, Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a counter-offensive supported by intensive Saudi air operations. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out more than 100 airstrikes across Yemen within a 48-hour period, while the Saudi campaign was presented as a response to the changing military balance and attacks against Saudi territory.

Diplomatically, Riyadh continued to emphasize that the escalation had reached a point where Saudi sovereignty and territorial security could not be treated as negotiable issues. Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan used his September 13 address at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi to warn that continued regional escalation was widening the conflict and to reaffirm the Kingdom's territorial integrity and security. Saudi Arabia had already raised the issue at the UN Security Council on September 10, where its representative condemned Houthi attacks on civilian targets and reaffirmed the Kingdom's right to self-defense. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also spoke with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on September 13, with Islamabad strongly condemning the attacks and the two sides discussing regional de-escalation.

The broader diplomatic picture remained focused on preventing the conflict from expanding further across the Gulf. A planned September 14 meeting in Oman between Iran and Gulf states on the security of the Strait of Hormuz was postponed, while Saudi and Qatar continued coordination. On September 11, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani held an emergency call with Saudi Foreign

Minister Faisal bin Farhan, during which Doha reaffirmed support for joint Gulf coordination, diplomatic efforts to reduce escalation, and the protection of freedom of navigation.

UAE

The United Arab Emirates experienced a week marked by simultaneous diplomatic tension and attempts to preserve channels for regional de-escalation. The most serious diplomatic development came from Algeria's decision to sever relations with Abu Dhabi on September 10–11, accusing the UAE of hostile and provocative actions connected to its regional policies in North and West Africa. Algeria ordered the Emirati ambassador to leave within 48 hours and closed its airspace to UAE-registered aircraft, although commercial passenger flights to Algiers remained exempt until the end of 2026. Abu Dhabi responded by expressing hope that the rupture would be temporary and reaffirming its preference for constructive international relations.

At the same time, the UAE continued to expand its economic partnerships outside the immediate regional crisis. During President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan's September 10 visit to Germany, Abu Dhabi pledged a 40-billion-euro investment package, approximately \$46.5 billion, focused largely on artificial intelligence and data-center infrastructure. The agreement demonstrated the UAE's continued effort to strengthen its position as a global investment and technology hub despite the deterioration of its diplomatic environment in parts of the region.

Relations with Iran also showed signs of cautious movement toward diplomatic engagement. On September 7, UAE diplomatic adviser Anwar Gargash described rebuilding functional trust with Iran as difficult and potentially long term, but argued that geographic realities made such a relationship necessary. This position was followed by a higher-level encounter at the BRICS Summit on September 13–14, where Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The two sides signaled a willingness to move beyond previous conflicts and supported a BRICS declaration calling for maximum regional restraint.

The UAE also remained directly affected by the wider regional security situation, with airports and regional carriers managing delays and disruptions connected to instability across the Gulf and Red Sea. At the bilateral level, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed in New Delhi on September 12 on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. The two sides prioritized expanded cooperation in renewable energy, technology, infrastructure, and trade and agreed to accelerate implementation through the UAE-Ethiopia Joint Ministerial Commission.

Qatar

Qatar's position during the week was centered on preventing the normalization of prolonged regional instability and securing the reopening of vital maritime routes. Doha warned against allowing the Middle East to settle into a prolonged "no war, no peace" condition, arguing that continued instability would damage international supply chains and economies. The government consequently identified the immediate and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a major regional priority as maritime security remained under pressure.

Qatar also maintained a strong diplomatic response to attacks affecting regional states. Doha condemned renewed Iranian attacks against Jordan on September 9 as violations of Jordanian sovereignty, while Qatari representatives at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna on September 12 condemned Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia and Iranian actions against Arab states. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani also held discussions with the foreign ministers of Jordan and Kuwait to coordinate positions on regional security and freedom of maritime navigation. Uzbekistan subsequently expressed support for Qatar's diplomatic efforts to reduce regional tensions.

Qatar's security policy continued to reflect the difficult balance between strengthening regional defense partnerships and maintaining its established external security relationships. September 9 marked one year since the 2025 Israeli airstrike in Doha, an episode that continued to shape discussion about Qatar's security requirements. Against this background, Qatar has pursued broader regional defense partnerships, including with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, while maintaining its core military relationship with the United States. Continuing airspace and travel restrictions linked to regional instability also affected aviation operations during the week, reinforcing the wider economic and logistical consequences of the security crisis.

11. Africa and The Sahel Region

Mali

Mali's security situation deteriorated further during the week as jihadist violence demonstrated its ability to expand deeper into the country, while the military administration maintained tight political control and the information environment became an increasingly important component of the conflict. The reported capture of the Dioura military position by JNIM on September 13 represented a significant development because of the location of the fighting and the continued pressure it places on the Malian Armed Forces.

The al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin claimed control of the military position at Dioura in the Mopti Region on September 13. The development demonstrated the continued expansion of the jihadist threat toward central and southern areas beyond Mali's traditional northern conflict zones and highlighted the pressure on FAMa to maintain control across an increasingly broad operational environment. The security situation was also affected by regional developments following the failed mutiny in Niger, with Russian Africa Corps assets that normally support the Malian junta reportedly being diverted to help secure Niger's airspace and state infrastructure.

The information environment also became an increasingly important part of Mali's political and security struggle. A regional security study released on September 9 reported that both Russia's Africa Corps and rebel and jihadist factions, including JNIM's Az-Zallaqa media wing and the Tuareg separatist Azawad Liberation Front, have incorporated generative artificial intelligence into propaganda activities. These campaigns reportedly seek to influence public morale and deepen ethnic divisions. Politically, the military government under General Assimi Goïta and Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga continued to maintain extensive internal control, with political parties remaining banned and civilian opposition heavily restricted.

Niger

Niger's political and security environment remained dominated by the aftermath of the failed August 29 mutiny, which exposed internal fractures within the armed forces while simultaneously demonstrating the junta's growing reliance on Russian security assistance. The authorities continued investigations and security operations around Air Base 101 in Niamey, while the episode generated broader concerns over the cohesion of the military government and the stability of its security institutions.

Security forces continued cleanup operations and investigations at Air Base 101 following the assault by renegade soldiers. The military also publicized the recovery of significant quantities of weapons abandoned by the mutineers, including armed pickup trucks, armored vehicles, and hundreds of assault rifles. More importantly, reports indicated that General Abdourahamane Tchiani's forces relied heavily on Russian Africa Corps personnel and drone support to retake the airbase during the initial stages of the mutiny. The episode therefore reinforced the importance of Russia to the junta's immediate security survival.

The failed power grab also exposed internal grievances within Niger's armed forces, particularly among junior officers concerned about frontline casualties and perceived favoritism toward the Presidential Guard. At the regional level, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso continued evaluating security coordination within the Alliance of Sahel States to prevent further destabilization attempts from within their militaries.

DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo experienced simultaneous political efforts toward national dialogue and continued military pressure in the east during the week. President Félix Tshisekedi moved to formalize the political consultation process by establishing a National Dialogue Committee, while opposition groups continued mobilizing against potential constitutional changes. At the same time, M23 continued consolidating its territorial position in North Kivu and clashes persisted between government-aligned forces and M23-associated fighters in South Kivu.

On September 13, Tshisekedi signed a decree establishing the National Dialogue Committee for Peace, Cohesion, and State Refoundation. The decree moved the national consultation process announced in late August into an operational phase. Opposition coalitions, including the C64 group, continued organizing protests and opposing potential constitutional changes and referendum plans ahead of parliamentary sessions. Meanwhile, diplomatic alignment with Israel also progressed following earlier announcements concerning the planned relocation of the DRC embassy to Jerusalem.

The security situation in eastern Congo remained unsettled. M23 consolidated control in southern Masisi in North Kivu and pushed westward toward areas near the Walikale district border. In South Kivu, pro-government forces engaged M23-allied Twirwaneho fighters moving toward Minembwe. The situation was further complicated by reports that private military contractors working for the Congolese government arrested two Burundian army officers in South Kivu and transferred them to Kinshasa. These developments demonstrate that the eastern conflict continues to involve multiple armed actors and increasingly affects relations between neighboring states as well as the Congolese government's internal political environment.

Chad

Chad's security and diplomatic environment remained under pressure during the week as relations with neighboring Niger deteriorated following allegations surrounding the failed mutiny in Niamey, while security along the eastern frontier with Sudan remained at its highest alert level. The combination of accusations involving Chadian officials, continuing tensions over the Sudanese conflict, and international scrutiny of cross-border arms networks placed N'Djamena in an increasingly difficult regional position.

Tensions between Chad and Niger intensified following allegations that Chadian actors were involved in the late-August mutiny against Niger's military junta. A Nigerien army captain alleged on state television that a Chadian colonel, Hassan Adou, together with intelligence actors from France, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire, had orchestrated the attempted coup. Chadian authorities strongly rejected the accusations as false. President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno called for truth and calm while implicitly rejecting claims of state

involvement. The dispute further aggravated existing mistrust between N'Djamena and Niamey over armed groups operating across their shared regional environment.

Security along Chad's eastern frontier also remained at its highest alert level following the late-August cross-border drone strikes attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Chadian forces maintained heavy deployments of armored vehicles and signal-jamming equipment near Tine to guard against further airspace violations. The border situation was further complicated on September 11 when the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2828, extending the targeted arms embargo on Sudan's Darfur region. The decision increased international scrutiny of Chad because of allegations that border corridors are being used to facilitate the movement of UAE-supplied weapons toward the RSF.

12. North Africa

Libya

Khalifa Haftar received United Nations Special Representative Hanna Tetteh in Benghazi for discussions on unifying national institutions, advancing structured dialogue, and establishing conditions necessary for presidential and parliamentary elections. Haftar expressed continued support for United Nations efforts aimed at resolving the country's institutional divisions.

Sources close to forces aligned with Haftar indicated that a state of emergency had been declared together with elevated levels of military readiness across relevant units. The measures reflected internal security preparations amid the broader political process.

The United Nations Security Council welcomed the 30 August 4+4 agreement reached between rival political and military blocs, which reconstitutes the High National Elections Commission board and amends the electoral legal framework. The Council called for rapid implementation leading toward elections under a unified government.

Reporting examined ongoing United States engagement supporting a unified national budget, military unification training programs, and mediation between the Dbeibah and Haftar factions, while raising questions about the depth of Washington's practical backing for the United Nations roadmap beyond public statements.

Presidential Council President Mohamed Menfi rejected any political arrangements that risked extending Libya's transitional period during a meeting with community elders. The position underscored resistance to frameworks perceived as delaying permanent institutional solutions.

Military leaders from eastern and western Libya convened meetings in Sirte and Tripoli and agreed on a four-track joint action plan encompassing joint exercises, armament

cooperation, logistics, and military training and education. A subsequent joint statement endorsed national reconciliation, the return of displaced persons, a joint committee on detainees and missing persons, realistic steps toward military unification, rejection of violence, and support for a civil state, while praising the 5+5 Joint Military Committee.

Eastern and western chiefs of staff, including Abdul Razzaq Al-Nadouri representing Haftar's side and Mohamed Al-Haddad, concluded two days of talks in Tripoli following Al-Nadouri's arrival at Mitiga Airport. The discussions formed part of the ongoing military coordination track.

Attention remained focused on a United States-backed power-sharing initiative associated with Massad Boulos that involves figures including Saddam Haftar and Ibrahim Dbeibah and aims at institutional reunification, a dual-executive structure, energy investment, and higher oil production targeting two to three million barrels per day. Critics highlighted concerns over opacity and the risk of elite-family dominance.

Statements from the Petroleum Facilities Guard and related reporting continued to address control of oil fields, force majeure declarations, and the requirement for unified economic institutions against the background of political deadlock, with energy investment incentives featuring in foreign mediation efforts.

The Russian Foreign Ministry restated its support for a comprehensive settlement of the Libyan crisis based on national consensus. The position aligned with Moscow's longstanding diplomatic engagement on the file.

Multiple mediation tracks, including the United Nations 4+4 roadmap, the United States Boulos initiative, and regional contacts involving prior engagement by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey, continued to operate in parallel or competition, with deadlines for House of Representatives and High State Council endorsement of the 4+4 agreement approaching at the end of September.

Localized reports of heightened readiness and earlier convoy movements illustrated persistent rivalries among armed groups, particularly in western areas, even as high-level military dialogue advanced. The dynamics underscored the incomplete nature of security-sector progress.

Algeria

Algeria deployed military support to Niger's junta following a failed coup attempt, including four Sukhoi Su-30MKA fighter jets together with tanker and transport aircraft provided at Niamey's request, building on earlier donations of Mi-24 and Mi-171 helicopters. The assistance formed part of efforts to stabilize the shared border region.

Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, citing provocative or

hostile actions that had exceeded acceptable limits, and ordered the UAE ambassador to depart within 48 hours. The decision followed accumulated disputes spanning Western Sahara, Morocco, Sahel influence, and other regional issues including Libya.

Algerian authorities and prosecutors identified Morocco as a primary source of hashish and cannabis resin trafficking, citing multiple seizures that included quantities exceeding one tonne and separate cases involving more than 300 kilograms, while linking the flows to rising drug-related violence, weapons proliferation, and migrant movements toward Ceuta.

At the United Nations Security Council Algeria called for concrete measures to end the use of starvation as a weapon of war, referencing catastrophic famine phases, severe child malnutrition, and attacks on food and water infrastructure, and proposed early-warning mechanisms together with reconstruction support.

Authorities conducted an inspection of the Algerian vessel El Moutassadi in preparation for the Seaborder-26 exercise organized under the 5+5 Defense Initiative and scheduled for 18 to 25 September in Libya. The activity formed part of regional maritime security cooperation.

Algeria and Niger reaffirmed joint determination to preserve bilateral relations, reject foreign interference, and confront shared threats from terrorism and organized crime, while advancing energy cooperation covering hydrocarbons, renewables, and rural electrification alongside border-zone development.

European interest, particularly from Italy and Spain, in Algerian gas supplies intensified against the background of Gulf market disruptions linked to the Iran conflict, with Algeria sustaining an active energy diplomacy posture toward those partners.

Algeria maintained established positions supporting Western Sahara self-determination, linking Sahel security to development initiatives, and upholding non-interference principles in African affairs. These stances continued to guide its regional posture.

13. Middle East

Iran-Israel Conflict

United States forces intensified economic pressure by targeting Iranian crude oil tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, disabling multiple vessels near key loading points and in adjacent waters as part of a broader blockade campaign aimed at constraining Tehran's revenue streams and naval projection capabilities amid the ongoing confrontation. This action reflected Washington's strategic interest in disrupting Iran's oil exports to compel behavioral change without committing to full-scale ground operations.

Iran responded with ballistic missile launches incorporating cluster munitions directed at a United States airbase in Jordan, most of which were intercepted by host-nation defenses, resulting in limited equipment damage and no reported American fatalities, underscoring Tehran's intent to impose costs on regional basing arrangements supporting the naval effort. The choice of munitions signaled a calculated escalation designed to test alliance cohesion and raise the operational burden on partners.

Tehran claimed responsibility for strikes against numerous commercial and military vessels operating near the Strait of Hormuz in what constituted the most extensive shipping engagement of the conflict to date, with independent accounts confirming damage to several tankers and at least one seafarer casualty, driving oil prices sharply higher and highlighting Iran's leverage over global energy routes. This episode illustrated the regime's reliance on asymmetric maritime disruption to counter superior naval forces.

Revolutionary Guard statements issued explicit evacuation warnings to crews of vessels docked at ports hosting United States forces in Kuwait and Bahrain, threatening attacks against ships at anchor or within port facilities as direct retaliation for the tanker campaign and seeking to deter regional logistical support for the American presence. Such rhetoric aimed to fragment Gulf cooperation by elevating the perceived risk to commercial operators.

The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors referred Iran to the United Nations Security Council over persistent non-compliance with non-proliferation safeguards, limited verification access, and unresolved questions surrounding highly enriched uranium holdings and facilities affected by earlier strikes, marking a rare formal escalation after two decades of stalled diplomacy. Iran dismissed the measure as politically driven while continuing to restrict inspector activities.

Iranian forces expanded ballistic missile attempts against United States naval assets, including aircraft carriers and destroyers, employing more sophisticated variants intended to degrade the effectiveness of the maritime blockade and challenge American sea control in the Gulf of Oman and adjacent waters. These operations reflected Tehran's prioritization of denying freedom of navigation as a core security objective.

Statements from the United States leadership projected a potential conflict endpoint shortly after midterm elections while threatening further action against specific nuclear-related sites near Natanz and indicating openness to talks without active pursuit of an immediate agreement, revealing domestic political calculations intertwined with military pressure. The messaging sought to maintain leverage while managing domestic expectations.

Technical and diplomatic discussions advanced a limited understanding between Iran and Oman on temporary shipping corridors through the Strait of Hormuz, establishing

provisional entry and exit routes subject to further coordination with Gulf states and international maritime authorities, though Iran continued to press for toll arrangements opposed by other parties. The framework represented a pragmatic attempt to ease extreme traffic restrictions without conceding full control.

Iranian-backed Houthi forces seized the strategic Mocha Port along Yemen's Red Sea coast, consolidating control over a key coastal node and enhancing Tehran's ability to project influence across the Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint amid broader regional maritime tensions. This development strengthened Iran's proxy network and complicated coalition efforts to secure Red Sea shipping lanes.

Washington imposed additional terrorism-related sanctions targeting financial and logistical networks supporting Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned groups across the Middle East, aiming to interdict funding streams that sustain proxy operations and raise the cost of Tehran's regional influence campaigns. The measures reinforced the economic dimension of the broader pressure strategy.

Israeli forces completed the destruction of an extensive Hezbollah tunnel network beneath a southern Lebanese ridge after a prolonged siege involving substantial explosive ordnance, subsequently declaring a security buffer and signaling readiness for further strikes while senior officials reiterated objectives of degrading Iranian-supported capabilities and potential energy infrastructure responses. The operation underscored Israel's determination to reshape the northern border security environment.

United States officials alleged that Chinese entities supplied satellite imagery of a Jordanian base to Iran in advance of a strike that resulted in American casualties, though Beijing denied the claims and demanded supporting evidence, introducing questions about external intelligence support for Iranian targeting decisions. The episode highlighted potential great-power dimensions intersecting with the regional conflict.

Explosions occurred on Iran's Qeshm Island while an Iranian commercial vessel sustained projectile damage near the Strait of Hormuz, producing the first reported Iranian merchant marine fatalities in the recent tanker phase and illustrating the expanding risks to civilian maritime traffic operating in contested coastal waters. Attribution remained unclear, yet the incidents reinforced mutual vulnerability along critical energy routes.

Houthi projectiles caused reported damage in Saudi Arabia's Jizan province, consistent with a pattern of escalation against energy infrastructure and bases, with United States leadership attributing related pipeline attacks to Iranian direction and further complicating Riyadh's security calculus. These actions demonstrated Tehran's continued use of proxies to distribute pressure across multiple fronts.

Reporting indicated that Iranian hardliners previously conducted unauthorized attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz without coordination from the president, Revolutionary

Guard leadership, or the Supreme National Security Council, contributing to internal rifts and derailing earlier diplomatic understandings amid uncertainty at the highest levels of authority. The episode exposed factional competition over the conduct of the conflict.

Iranian and Emirati leaders held their first high-level discussions since the intensification of hostilities, focusing on oil supply stability and measures to reduce regional tensions following strikes affecting United States partners, reflecting pragmatic economic interests in containing energy market disruption. The contact suggested limited space for bilateral de-escalation amid broader confrontation.

On the margins of BRICS gatherings, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian engaged regional counterparts including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to seek expanded cooperation against the backdrop of Middle East tensions, while publicly accusing the United States of war crimes and urging collective resistance to Iranian forces, leveraging the forum to counter isolation and advance multipolar diplomatic outreach. These interactions underscored Tehran's effort to build alternative international support.

A planned meeting of Iranian and Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers plus Iraq in Salalah, Oman, intended to brief participants on the Hormuz routes framework and discuss regional security, was postponed in the interest of consensus following requests from certain states, with Bahrain having already declined participation, delaying potential multilateral coordination. The deferral highlighted persistent divergences among Gulf actors.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at historically low levels under continued United States blockade enforcement and Iranian restricted-zone declarations, with vessels redirected and non-compliant shipping subject to declared sanctions, while ballistic launches against host states paused for consecutive days, indicating a temporary tactical adjustment amid sustained economic and naval pressure. Oil supply risks continued to dominate strategic calculations.

Diplomatic commentary and security posture adjustments included Israeli elevation of naval readiness in response to Houthi territorial gains near the Bab al-Mandeb, restrictions preventing Iran's nuclear chief from attending an International Atomic Energy Agency conference due to a United Nations travel ban, and statements limiting further agency cooperation, while Israeli leadership reiterated warnings of forceful responses against energy targets and the imperative of preventing Iranian nuclear weaponization alongside regime-change considerations. These positions reinforced the protracted nature of the confrontation.

Turkey

United States authorities-imposed sanctions on three companies based in Turkey for allegedly assisting Iran's Mahan Air in obtaining American-origin aircraft and facilitating the transport of drone components and related cargo. The measures targeted entities accused of enabling sanctions evasion networks connected to Iranian aviation and unmanned systems procurement.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan conducted a series of meetings in Ankara with the Syrian foreign minister, the prime minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Iraqi parliament speaker, the secretary-general of the Organization of Turkic States, and a United States special envoy accompanied by a congressman. Discussions addressed bilateral relations, security coordination, and developments concerning Syria and Iraq.

Officials from Turkey, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional Government held discussions in Erbil on a plan involving approximately 4,200 Kurdistan Workers' Party members laying down arms and vacating 18 sites in northern Iraq, with the initial stage excluding the Qandil area. A joint coordination group comprising Turkish intelligence, Iraqi, and Kurdistan Regional Government security elements managed the process.

Israel appointed Joel Lion as chargé d'affaires heading its mission to Turkey even as the embassy remained effectively closed due to ongoing security concerns. The designation maintained a limited diplomatic channel despite the absence of full embassy operations.

Turkish statements condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and expressed support for measures opposing illegal settlements in the West Bank, while Ankara participated in joint declarations issued by Arab and Muslim foreign ministers on related regional issues. The positions aligned with broader multilateral messaging on those fronts.

Turkey maintained an expanded naval and maritime security presence in Somalia through the deployment of the frigate TCG Gökusu and associated task group elements focused on protecting oil exploration activities and sustaining Red Sea and Horn of Africa operations. Training programs and support at the TURKSOM facility continued to deepen.

Official messaging reaffirmed Turkey's prioritization of Somalia's unity and sovereignty in the face of external recognition initiatives concerning Somaliland, with highlighted cooperation in satellite and spaceport projects alongside defense support positioned as elements of the bilateral relationship. These efforts formed part of Ankara's sustained engagement in the Horn.

Reporting noted intensified Turkish political and defense engagement with authorities in Port Sudan aligned with the Burhan government, covering Red Sea security, reconstruction assistance, and opposition to parallel administrative structures. The contacts contributed to Turkey's wider approach toward Horn of Africa stability.

Foreign Minister Fidan traveled to Damascus for high-level discussions with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and anticipated meetings with the Syrian president and interior minister. Talks centered on institutionalizing bilateral ties through a joint high committee, targeting ten billion dollars in trade, energy cooperation, refugee returns, and security arrangements.

During a joint press conference in Damascus, Fidan stated that integrating all armed groups, including steps by the Syrian Democratic Forces toward dissolution, under the authority of the central Syrian state remained essential for achieving sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social cohesion, and called for rapid implementation of the process.

Fidan announced that President Erdoğan intended to visit Syria in the near future and reviewed preparations by a high-level planning group during the course of the Damascus meetings. The planned visit formed part of efforts to advance bilateral institutional frameworks.

Fidan accused Israel of undermining Syrian stability through military attacks and of providing support to groups including the Islamic State, while positioning Turkey as a backer of Damascus's efforts to restore full sovereignty across its territory. The remarks formed part of the public messaging during the Damascus engagement.

Turkish security forces continued domestic operations resulting in detentions linked to FETÖ and Daesh networks during the period, conducted in parallel with the country's active foreign policy engagements across multiple regional theaters. These internal measures addressed ongoing counterterrorism priorities.

Ankara maintained monitoring and contingency planning in response to deepening Greece–Israel defense cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and emerging risks to Black Sea shipping arising from Russia–Ukraine drone activity, while emphasizing an independent regional posture. The approach reflected sustained attention to multiple maritime and security domains.

Official and media commentary underscored Turkey's dual-track approach in the Horn of Africa, combining robust military, maritime, and energy presence with political support for federal Somalia's territorial integrity, while preserving engagement channels with Ethiopia and advancing ties with Sudanese authorities for Red Sea stability. The strategy integrated multiple bilateral tracks.

14. Global Powers

The United States continued its military and economic campaign against Iran during the week, with CENTCOM reporting that U.S. forces had destroyed five Iranian crude-oil tankers following Iranian attacks on U.S. naval assets, extending Washington's effort to

impose direct economic costs on Tehran and restrict its oil exports. The confrontation increasingly centred on the Strait of Hormuz, where attacks on commercial shipping and threats to energy infrastructure pushed oil prices toward or above \$100 a barrel, raising concerns over global supply and inflation. Washington simultaneously expanded its economic campaign against Tehran, with the Treasury Department imposing 36 new Iran-related sanctions on September 8, targeting the aviation sector, followed on September 9 by sanctions against networks in Iraq, Lebanon, the UAE and Türkiye accused of supporting Iranian-backed militant organizations, including Kata'ib Hezbollah and Lebanese Hezbollah.

The regional consequences widened when Iran-aligned Houthi forces accelerated their offensive in Yemen, taking strategically important territory and moving toward positions that could give them greater leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb, prompting Washington to confront the possibility that the Iran conflict could simultaneously destabilize both Hormuz and the Red Sea.

On September 13, Trump indicated that the United States had been asked by Saudi Arabia to intervene against the Houthis but that Washington had not committed to doing so, while fighting and attacks on Saudi infrastructure continued. At the same time, the Iran crisis increasingly affected the global energy market, with a Saudi East-West pipeline temporarily shut after a drone attack and Brent crude reaching roughly \$107 per barrel, increasing pressure on Washington to bring the conflict to an end. Trump meanwhile gave an unusually expansive indication of his thinking about the war's end-state, saying the United States could potentially maintain a presence in Iran and retain access to its oil, comparing such an arrangement to the administration's approach in Venezuela, while also suggesting that the war could continue until or beyond the November midterm elections.

In Ukraine, Washington's diplomatic effort continued after Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner's Moscow and Kyiv meetings, but Trump simultaneously became more directly involved in the economic consequences of the war. On September 13, he publicly urged President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to stop Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries and diesel infrastructure, arguing that the strikes were contributing to a global diesel shortage and noting that U.S. diesel prices had exceeded \$6 per gallon.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio travelled to Colombia, Ecuador and Peru from September 8–10, signalling continued U.S. attention to the Western Hemisphere even as Washington remained heavily absorbed by the Middle East and Ukraine. Domestically, the administration used the Republican convention in Dallas to mobilize support ahead of the November midterms, while the economic effects of the Iran conflict became increasingly visible through surging fuel prices and inflationary pressure.

At the same time, China and the United States moved toward the September summit with some improvement in economic relations, with Washington saying Beijing was on track to increase purchases of U.S. agricultural products, although disputes over tariffs, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and technology remained unresolved. The relationship nevertheless acquired a new point of friction after Beijing warned that a planned Trump–Xi summit could be cancelled if Washington approved additional arms sales to Taiwan, underscoring that Taiwan remains a fundamental constraint on the broader bilateral rapprochement. Trump, for his part, said on September 13 that he was not concerned about the possibility of Xi cancelling the summit, indicating that Washington was unwilling to publicly concede leverage over the Taiwan issue.

At the 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi, President Xi Jinping called for deeper cooperation among the expanded BRICS grouping in artificial intelligence, trade, finance and political coordination, including a China-backed BRICS AI Open Source Zone and a proposed service-trade platform, while leaders issued a joint call for de-escalation amid the U.S.–Iran conflict.

The week's major diplomatic event regarding Russia was Putin's participation in the BRICS summit in New Delhi, where he met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese and Iranian leaders, promoting stronger BRICS economic cooperation and presenting the grouping as an alternative centre of global governance. Putin and Modi agreed to deepen bilateral trade and defence cooperation, while Russia pushed for greater use of national currencies and expanded economic links with BRICS partners. Moscow also used the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok to reinforce its pivot toward Asian markets and investment, demonstrating that Russia's economic strategy increasingly depends on China, India and other non-Western partners despite Western sanctions.

15. European Countries

On September 8, London published legislation introducing tougher sanctions on Iran, expanding trade restrictions and giving authorities additional powers to target vessels connected to Tehran, as the government sought to increase pressure on Iran amid the escalating confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran crisis also featured prominently in Prime Minister Andy Burnham's September 3 meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, where the two discussed the conflict, the Strait of Hormuz, European security, migration and the future of UK–EU relations.

On September 8, Britain announced a ban on imports from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, alongside France and Canada, marking a significant escalation in London's policy toward Israel and prompting Israel to announce the closure of Britain's consulate in East Jerusalem. Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband described the measure as a broader reset of British policy toward Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Burnham also spoke with U.S. President Donald Trump on September 7 about the Middle

East and Ukraine, stressing the need to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and pursue a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. The Iran crisis was simultaneously becoming an increasingly serious British economic and security concern, with disruption around Hormuz driving oil and gas prices higher and increasing pressure on the government's fiscal position. Britain continued to advocate freedom of navigation and maritime security as commercial shipping through the Strait remained severely disrupted, while the wider crisis increasingly connected Gulf security to the Red Sea and European energy security.

Germany's biggest political development was the historic AfD victory in Saxony-Anhalt on September 6–7, where the far-right party won about 44% of the vote. Chancellor Friedrich Merz ruled out cooperation with the AfD, but the result has intensified pressure on his government and raised questions about the future direction of German domestic and European policy. The result is particularly significant for Berlin's approach to Russia, Ukraine, migration and the EU, because the AfD has advocated a substantially different foreign-policy orientation.

16. International and Regional Organizations

United Nation

The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan completed its 14th visit to the country (7–10 September 2026) and on 10 September issued a statement expressing deep concern that renewed violence, political tensions, shrinking civic space, entrenched corruption and persistent impunity continue to place civilians and the political transition at risk. Commission Chair Yasmin Sooka visited Bor and met survivors of recent fighting in northern Jonglei who described sexual violence, killings, displacement and lack of support. The Commission highlighted the earlier ambush on a UNMISS patrol in Jonglei that killed two Ethiopian peacekeepers called for a prompt independent investigation and accountability and warned that planned December elections without essential safeguards, inclusive political dialogue, open civic space and civilian protection could fuel renewed conflict and atrocity risks. It urged genuine dialogue involving all actors including SPLM-IO and detained First Vice-President Riek Machar's supporter's establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, operationalization of transitional justice mechanisms and intensified preventive diplomacy by the AU, IGAD and UN. South Sudan's government later rejected the Commission's allegations regarding election risks as unfounded while reaffirming commitment to the 2018 peace agreement and elections.

On 7–8 September, UNMISS supported the deployment of a mobile court in the Bentiu internally displaced persons camp in collaboration with Unity State authorities and national judicial bodies. Consistent with Security Council resolution 2820 (2026) the court operating through 26 September addresses cases of sexual and gender-based

violence, drugs and gang violence to strengthen rule of- law access for camp residents, particularly children and youth.

Around 11–12 September the UN Security Council extended the existing Darfur arms embargo by one month while continuing discussions on a US proposal to expand it nationwide. Russia and China opposed a full-country expansion African members also expressed reservations. Sudan’s representative argued a total embargo would conflict with the right to self-defense.

Africa Union

As a core member of the Quintet alongside IGAD, the League of Arab States, the European Union and the United, the African Union took part in a first wartime good offices mission to Khartoum from 8–10 September 2026. AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas joined the delegation, which held consultations with Transitional Sovereignty Council President and Sudanese Armed Forces Commander Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, Prime Minister Kamel Idris, the Democratic Bloc Alliance and the Sudanese-Sudanese Dialogue Preparation Committee. The Quintet stressed that there is no military solution to the conflict called for an inclusive Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned political track toward a democratic civilian-led government, urged concrete steps to protect civilians and end hostilities and reaffirmed respect for Sudan’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity while rejecting parallel governing structures. The visit aimed to link external mediation efforts with internal Sudanese initiatives and remained coordinated with the Quad, United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD participated fully in the Quintet’s 8–10 September good offices mission to Khartoum. IGAD Special Envoy for Sudan Lawrence Korbandy was part of the delegation that met senior Sudanese officials and stakeholders. The group emphasized an inclusive Sudanese owned political process, rejection of a military solution, civilian protection measures and coordination with other international partners.

Throughout the week IGAD publicized preparations for the 74th Extraordinary Session of its Council of Ministers, scheduled for 15 September 2026 in Djibouti. The session under the chairmanship of Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Abdoukader Houssein Omar is expected to address regional peace and security priorities among member states.



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