

# A Militarized Horn and the Pursuit for Peace

Learn more about international military operations in East Africa

**02** The Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

*Dr. Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu (Ph.D.)*

**07** Ethiopia's Exposure to the Existing International Terrorism Law

*Dr. Shimels Sisay Belete (Ph.D.)*

**JUNE  
2022**

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA



## About us:

Founded in 2021, Horn Review is a premier research and publication think-tank dedicated to exploring and amplifying African voices with a goal of interlinking subject matter experts, practitioners, and academics from Ethiopia, the Horn Region, and the African continent with the broader public. With a stated mission of Africa for Africans, Horn Review aims to amplify and mainstream uniquely African ideas and perspectives on sociopolitical, economic, and geostrategic issues relevant to the continent. Horn Review aims to connect African thinkers, practitioners, and policymakers with their respective communities to create greater synergy and a people-centered discourse on African matters.



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# Editor's Note :

Dear readers,

In 2022, Africa is experiencing a surge in civil conflict. This month along, the M23 armed group seized an easter border town in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC has long accused the Rwandan government not only of backing participation in the occupation of the town of Bunagana. Similarly, the Sudanese Military leadership accuses Ethiopia of attacking its troops on the Sudanese territory. Rejecting the military's claims, Ethiopia accused Sudan's military junta of entering sovereign Ethiopian territory. Sudan's leadership has consequently recalled its ambassador from Addis — mere days before Ethiopia is set to commence with the third filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Amidst the contested skirmishes, both nations are, to a varying degree, embroiled in civil conflict and facing increasing public dissent. In addition to poor institutions, that result week central governments, the proliferation of armed groups [often organized along ideological or identitarian lines] has characterized modern state-making African countries.

With a long history of failed intervention and military operations and failure of state institutions, East Africa is more vulnerable than ever to disarray. This month's edition of Horn Review focuses on the challenges, and outcomes, of increased militarization in the Horn. This 8th edition also touches on past international military interventions, as well as great-power politics, in a delicately balanced region.



I would like to thank Dr. Shimels Sisay for his in-depth examination of Ethiopia's legal framework in specifically addressing terrorism. Dr. Shimels juxtaposes Ethiopia's past and current laws addressing terrorism through a lens of existing international mechanisms.

I would also like to thank Dr. Kaleab T. Sigatu, Researcher at the Research Department of International and Regional Security, Ethiopian Defence War College, for his discussion on the history of peacekeeping and support operations in East African countries.

Lastly, I thank Abenezer Dawit for his reflective piece on geopolitical considerations in western foreign policy decisions vis-a-vis Horn Countries. With an emphasis on the Horn as a socially and culturally interwoven block, Abenezer argues the dangers of foreign political and economic pressures in permanently destabilizing the region.

Bethlehem Mehari

# The Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

**Dr. Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu**

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## States of the Horn of Africa: an overview

The ideas of regional security and security complexes are essential as every state can put its security in relation to at least one complex. Ethiopia's security is tied up with its regional complex of the Horn of Africa and vice versa, and how it undoubtedly takes this into consideration when considering its national security. The Horn of Africa is located in the Northeastern part of the continent consisting of eight countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,

South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. The nine states are also members of the regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which make the member states to be considered the regional complex that reflects an interlinked regional security complex.<sup>1</sup> Except for Uganda, Ethiopia shares a border with all the member states.

The Horn of Africa region is the origin of humanity. Fossil remains of *Chororapithecus Abyssinicus*, which lived 12 to 7 million years ago, were found in the Afar Depression of Ethiopia, and the most famous of the discovery in the same area is Lucy 'Dinkeneshe', the complete skeleton of an early hominid yet found and dating back some 3.2 million years. The Aksumite Empire, in present-day Ethiopia and Eritrea, was a well-known empire in pre-colonial Africa. In the Middle Ages, the Ifat Sultanate of present-day Djibouti, Adal Sultanate of present-day Somalia, the Zagwe dynasty of Ethiopia, the Mahdist in Sudan, the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, and other sultanates and kingdoms existed in the region.

European powers became more interested in the region to occupy after the Suez Canal opened in 1869. The French colonized a small portion of the land at the Red Sea coast, which they named French Somaliland which later become

Djibouti in 1894. The British took over northern Somalia, which they named British Somaliland in 1887, the present-day autonomous region of Somaliland. Furthermore, in the south, the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, which later became Kenya, and in 1894 Uganda became a British protectorate, and the Anglo-Egyptian colony of Sudan was established in 1899. Italy took possession of Eritrea in 1890 as well as southern Somalia, Italian Somaliland, in 1889. However, Ethiopia did not fall under the colonial yoke because they could defeat the Italian Empire in 1896 except for Ethiopia's brief occupation (1936 – 1941).



**Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states globally, Eritrea and South Sudan.**

During the Cold War, both the USSR and the United States were involved in the region because of its strategic location. For example, in the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 – 78, USSR supported the Ethiopians and the United States aided Somalia. Most recently, the region has become one of the focuses of the global war on terror. Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states globally, Eritrea and South Sudan. Moreover, Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and conducting a peaceful government transition in the region by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.<sup>2</sup>

In Michael Sheehan's words, the Horn of Africa's security complex Africa is 'held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but

by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental.<sup>3</sup> Andras Hettyey and Viktor Marsai said the following about Ethiopia and the Horn of African security complex:

*Ethiopia is the region's leading political and military power; Ethiopia is involved in all three conflicts (Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia civil war, and Ethiopia – Eritrea). Addis Ababa commands enormous respect not only in Eastern Africa but on the entire continent. Except for Liberia – whose status remains unclear – Ethiopia, with its several thousand-year-old statehoods, was the only state on the entire continent that was able to withstand both Western and Eastern colonization attempts (save for a brief Italian occupation during World War II). What is more, the country's prestige extends beyond Africa: Ethiopia is the main ally of the United States in the region. Despite its economic difficulties and extremely low living standards, the country's leadership is able to maintain the strongest and most capable armies not only in the region but on the whole continent. Its armed force has extensive experience in both traditional and asymmetric warfare. Ethiopia uses its political and military power to contribute to the stability Eastern African proto-complex while it also serves as an insulator between the various regional conflicts – the two Sudan and Somalia.<sup>4</sup>*

However, regarding 'the question of whether the Horn of Africa forms, in Buzan's terminology, 'a security complex', based on the security dynamics in the region, and using Berouk Mesfin's terminology, 'the answer is a definite yes.' The Horn of Africa displays many of the features of a Regional Security Complex.

## The Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

In the words of Christopher Clapham, 'It will already be abundantly clear that the states of the Horn are deeply affected by their relationships with one another.'<sup>5</sup> According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever the interstate security dynamics in Africa are often simply spillovers of domestic dynamics, mainly refugee flows, expulsions of foreigners, and civil wars and intervention by neighbors in domestic turbulence.<sup>6</sup> In the Horn of Africa proto-regional security complex (proto-RSC), the usual interaction is cross-border interventions in which the government in each state supports insurgencies in the other: Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, Robert Kłosowicz considered the IGAD the regional bloc as the regional complex that reflects an interlinked regional security complex.<sup>8</sup> In the Horn of Africa, there are few incidents of states going to a conventional war with each other. However, it is more at the sub-state level and more about spillovers from domestic instabilities, which is typical almost for all states in the region. Particularly during the Somali and the South Sudanese civil wars, the spillover effects, became excruciating for the whole states in the region.

South Sudan and Somalia ranked first and second, respectively, as the most fragile states globally, and Djibouti has a relatively better-performing state in the region. Regarding UNDP Human Development Index, all Horn of Africa states perform under the last 30 states out of 188 Countries, Sudan and Uganda performing relatively better than other states and Eritrea becoming the last. On the Ibrahim Governance Index in Africa, Kenya and Uganda perform better than the rest, and Somalia ranked 54 out of the 54 African states.

Similarly, on Transparency International's Corruption index, Ethiopia performs relatively better than the others though all are under 100 out of 180 states, Somalia and South Sudan ranked 180th and 179th, respectively. Based on World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators first on Voice & Accountability, which is perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can select their government and freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. However, all Horn of Africa states are below 50% relatively Kenya is better, and Eritrea is the worst. Second, on Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Djibouti and Uganda are around 20%, and the rest is less than 10%.



**As of 2021, there are more than dozen peace support missions in the region**

Third, on Government Effectiveness, Somalia and South Sudan are both below 1%, and Kenya is relatively better though all the states are performing below 50%. Forth, Regulatory Quality is the perception of the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. However, all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, relatively Uganda and Kenya are better than the rest. Fifth, the Rule of Law in all Horn of Africa states is below 50%, and Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya ranked from first to third. Sixth, Control over Corruption; similarly, all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, but Ethiopia and Djibouti are better performing than the rest.



On the issues of peace and security, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since 1990, the Horn of African region has suffered from 32 state-based armed conflicts where a government is one of the belligerent parties. Moreover, 179 non-state armed conflicts were fought between non-governmental groups; and 22 campaigns of one-sided violence where civilians are massacred.<sup>9</sup>

## Trends of Peace Support Operations and Political Missions in the Horn of Africa

There is also a high presence of multinational military operations in the region. As of 2021, there are more than dozen peace support missions in the region, namely in Sudan; the Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia– Eritrea border, in the Uganda–Rwanda border, and Sudan. Also, there are thousands of foreign troops in Djibouti, which indicates the gravity of security challenges in the region. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 19 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN.

## Peace Support Operations in the Horn

As of September 2019, the UN has 14 peacekeeping operations across the world. Seven missions are in Africa, and out of it, three of them are in the Horn of Africa, in Darfur (hybrid with AU), in Abyei in South Sudan. AU has six operations, out of which, three are in the Horn of Africa, in Somalia, in Darfur (hybrid with UN), and in countries affected by LRA, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. The regional organization

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has one ceasefire monitoring operation in South Sudan. In addition to these, the EU, the UN Department of Political Affairs, and the UN Department of Field Support also have peace support operations in Somalia.



**Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping, most Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in both UN and AU peace support operations in the Horn of Africa are from immediate neighboring states.**

Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping, most Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in both UN and AU peace support operations in the Horn of Africa are from immediate neighboring states. Moreover, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are among the top ten most significant contributors of uniformed personnel for multilateral peace support operations globally, Ethiopia being first, Uganda fifth, and Kenya tenth.

Some scholars argue that the UN ‘breaks with a long-standing principle of not allowing a country to engage in a peace support operation in a neighboring country.<sup>10</sup> The reason being most next-door neighboring countries are already involved in the conflict, or they might not be impartial. However, all current peacekeeping operations of UN and AU in the Horn of Africa are mostly comprised from next-neighboring countries and resulting in remarkable conflict management outcomes.

## African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM):

AMISOM, created in January 2007 by AU's Peace and Security Council, is the longest and largest peace support mission run by AU. The mission's main strategic objectives are 'to enable the gradual handover of its security responsibility to Somali security forces, reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and assist Somali security forces in providing security for Somalia's political process and peacebuilding efforts.'<sup>11</sup> As of April 2022, AMISOM was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with a mandate to fully implement the Somali Transition Plan (STP).

## United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

UNSOM was established on 3 June 2013 in support of the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia.<sup>12</sup> Its mandates are to provide United Nations 'good offices' functions; support the Government's peace and reconciliation process by providing strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state-building; assist international donor support, particularly security sector assistance and maritime security; and help to monitor violations of human rights. Uganda contributed two experts on the mission and 530 contingent troops, which is 96% of the whole personnel in the mission.

## United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS):

UNSOS was established on 09 November 2015, replacing the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which was established in 2009 as a logistical field support operation to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) led by the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS).<sup>13</sup> UNSOS is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA), and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM.<sup>14</sup> Only Uganda contributed one expert on a mission for UNSOM from the Horn of Africa. The mission has 49 personnel, and the UK contributed the whole 42 contingent troops, and Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone all send one expert on the mission and Mauritania two.

*Part two of this article continues on page 13*

# Ethiopia's Exposure to the Existing International Terrorism Law

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The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian Constitution unequivocally underpins under Art. 9 (4) that '[a]ll international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.<sup>1</sup> This constitutional hospitality of international instruments into the domestic legal realm is an instant assenter of any methodological approach that aims to

assess the validity of the State's legislative and institutional setups, which are proclaimed in view of implementing its international obligations emanating from these instruments. Furthermore, as clearly stipulated under Arts 26, 27, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these domestic laws are required to be framed in good faith complementing the State's international binding obligations as no State can invoke its domestic law as an excuse for its non-compliance.<sup>2</sup>

It seems in view of this propensity that both of the current national terrorism-related legislation – the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation<sup>3</sup> and the Proclamation on the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism – reaffirmed in their respective preambles, of Ethiopia's duty of effectively complementing its international obligations in the prevention and combating of terrorism as one of the reasons necessitating the enactment of these laws. The preamble of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, while specifically rebranding terrorism as a serious threat to the world peace and security,<sup>4</sup> reverberated,

[WHEREAS], in order to adequately fight terrorism, it is necessary to cooperate with governments and peoples of our region, continent and other parts of the world that have anti-terrorism objectives and

particularly, to enforce agreements that have been entered into under the United Nations and the African Union

In a similar vein, the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation echoed the alike mission stating that this law is necessary given the fact that ‘the effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism is being undertaken internationally and Ethiopia is part thereof’.<sup>5</sup> What ought to be at stake behind the enactment of these legislation is, therefore, titivating the domestic legal and institutional framework and enhancing the State’s capacity of effectively enforcing those international obligations in a manner compatible with the scope, intent, purposes, and the objectives derived therefrom.



**Accordingly, it becomes apparent to question whether the aforementioned domestic laws serve the goals they are meant for. For this quarry to have a meaningful insight, it appears natural to recapture the main international terrorism-related legal backups to which Ethiopia has ratified and agreed to comply with.**

Accordingly, it becomes apparent to question whether the aforementioned domestic laws serve the goals they are meant for. For this quarry to have a meaningful insight, it appears natural to recapture the main international terrorism-related legal backups to which Ethiopia has ratified and agreed to comply with. This is mainly because the core definitional legal standard is inherently construed from the relevant extant international conventions – the application of which is destined only to States

Party to the instruments – and the binding Security Council Resolutions, and most notably, Resolution No. 1566.<sup>6</sup> As the Council’s binding Resolutions have universal application for all Member States to the UN, Ethiopia would not be an exception to this rule and its international obligations arising from these resolutions have to be properly implemented within its domestic jurisdiction.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, the same cannot be said when it comes to treaties relating to terrorism unless they are ratified by the State in concern, as no treaty creates either obligations or rights without a State consent unless and otherwise, it contains a customary norm of international law recognized as such.<sup>8</sup> At least at their current status, none of the conventions relating to terrorism are yet to reach that level. Hence, it becomes a must to identify the number of relevant terrorism-related international instruments to which Ethiopia is a party either through accession or ratification if their status as integral parts of the law of the land is supposed to have a constitutional recognition. Thus, so far Ethiopia has acceded to or ratified nine of the most influential international conventions on terrorism. Accordingly, Conventions relating to the safety of the aviation and maritime industry namely, the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft,<sup>9</sup> the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,<sup>10</sup> the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,<sup>11</sup> the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,<sup>12</sup> and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation<sup>13</sup> are all ratified by Ethiopia. Likewise, the State has also ratified or acceded to the conventions aimed at offering special protections to particular groups, that is, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,<sup>14</sup> the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of



Hostages,<sup>15</sup> as well as, the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which is basically devoted to minimizing the means and capacities of terrorist perpetrators is also engrained as an integral part of the law of the land through ratification.<sup>17</sup> From the African regional context, Ethiopia has also ratified the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of terrorism,<sup>18</sup> and Protocol to the Convention.<sup>19</sup>

1566(2004): a resolution that served as a backbone in the formulation of the definitional guide, which also included the international conventions as part of its definitional elements of the crime of terrorism. Third, on the other hand, Ethiopia is a party to the key conventions, from which the proposed definition is highly substantiated and informed from – principally, the Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and the Hostage Takings Convention.



Accordingly, it can be asserted that Ethiopia's obligation in the prevention and combating of terrorism is stemmed both from the conventions and the relevant Security Council resolutions, which imposed not only the obligation of preventing and combating of terrorism but also the mechanisms and standards on how to implement them. From these perspectives, there should not be a doubt that invoking the proposed definition as an international legal standard in ascertaining the legal elements of the crime of terrorism as treated in the national legislation is an irreplaceable approach if one has to critically examine the actual tenets of the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism laws.

## The Pre-2009 National Legislative Frameworks Addressing Terrorism

Before the issuance of the two substantial antiterrorism proclamations in the year 2009, there was no specific proscribing an act of terrorism as a separate and discrete criminal conduct – despite the Nation's acquaintance with the term, amidst the late-1970s deadly scenes of state-sponsored terror and counter-violence masterminded in every corner of the nation.<sup>20</sup> This doesn't entail, however, that the issue had been totally overlooked. At least, some particular provisions of the general criminal codes and pertinent proclamations had been in place circumscribing the act within the ambit of associated criminal conducts explicitly proscribed by these laws. In its earlier reports to the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC or 1373/2001 Committee), Ethiopia had been submitting that terrorism is addressed in the national penal codes by way of criminalizing acts committed to serving terrorist objectives.<sup>21</sup>

Of significant importance in this regard are the 1957 Penal Code, the 1981 Revised Special Penal Code, the 2004 Revised Criminal Code, and other financial administration and possession of weaponry regulatory proclamations of the State.

It has to be noted from the outset that in neither of these statutes was the term ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist act’ defined. Nor did the laws spotlight the core elements of the crime. The relevance of these norms goes, therefore, only to the extent of preventing or prosecuting some conducts the perpetration of which might have some terrorist element – either as a means or as a method – and one could notice such a link only by analogy through implied assessment of the potential value of the provisions lensing from the context of the prevention and punishment of terrorist crimes. Having this gap in mind, the specific provisions of the laws just enumerated are tinted as follows, only to the extent of the value they have had as normative frameworks in regulating the issue at hand during the pre-2009 periods.

## The 1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia

Since its inception in 1957 and up until its formal repeal in 2004,<sup>22</sup> the Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia had been the longest-serving domestic in the administration of the criminal justice system of the nation, amid minor amendments to some of its sections.<sup>23</sup> Generally, the relevant provisions contained in the Code to the topic at hand can be categorized into three themes.

Some of the provisions are very general in application – dictating the principles on criminal liability and legality, jurisdiction and issues of extradition, degrees and forms of participation in crimes, and the extent and type of criminal liabilities – in all criminal litigations, and hence to any alleged crime of terrorism as well.

The second pertinent categories of the provisions are those stipulated in the special part of the Code dealing with particular offences that could either roughly be perceived as manifestations to have some shared characters with the crime of

terrorism – mostly when it is used as a method in pursuing the goals of the stated crimes, or crimes within which an act of terrorism could be regarded as a subunit, or they proscribe conducts that are ejected as offences under the apposite international law, which Ethiopia is obliged to implement in its jurisdiction. Such category of offences include, inter alia, outrages against the constitution and constitutional authorities, armed rising and civil war, attacks on the political and territorial integrity of the state, the violation of the political or territorial sovereignty of the state, hostile acts and outrages against a foreign state and foreign heads of state, and violation of a foreign sovereignty. Although none of these offences would qualify as terrorist acts per se, their value in tracing and countering the ramifications of terrorist acts committed as a method in the course of achieving the goals of these proscribed conducts cannot be completely overlooked.

**Part two of this article will be published in subsequent editions.**

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- 4 The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, supra note 5, preambular para. 2.
- 5 The Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Procla-

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- 6 Security Council, Res 1566, UN SCOR, 5053rd Mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1566 (2004), para. 3.
- 7 Ethiopia was one of the Founding Members of the United Nations as one amongst the first signatory States to the Charter of the UN in 1945. It was also a State Member to the old League of Nations since 28 September 1923.
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- 20 See generally: Aneme, G. A., *Apology and Trials: The Case of the Red Terror Trials in Ethiopia*, African Human Rights Law Journal, 6 (2006), pp. 64–84. See also: Report of the State Department; 5 Ann. Hum. Rts. Rep. Submitted to Cong. by U.S. Department 52 1979.
- 21 See: *Report of the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)*, United Nations Security Council, S/2002/137, 31 January 2002, p. 3.
- 22 In fact, following the 1974 revolution that brought the military socialist junta, the penal code was amended, first in 1976 by introducing more political crimes and respective quasi-judiciary adjudicatory bodies. And then again in 1981, the Revised Special Penal Code Proclamation No. 214/82 replaced the first amendment by incorporating further crimes and re-institutionalization of courts.
- 23 The Penal Code of Ethiopia, Proclamation 158, Federal *Negarit Gazeta*, Extraordinary Issue no.1, 23 July 1957, entered into force on 5 May 1958.





Cartoon by: Wendwossen Kebede

# The Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

## Part II

### European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia):

The European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) was launched on 7 April 2010. It initially conducted training in Uganda; then, the headquarters was relocated to Mogadishu on 16 March 2015. Besides the training, EUTM has an advisory role in building the Somali Ministry of Defense (MoD) capacity and Somali National Army (SNA) General Staff focusing on three essential pillars, training, mentoring, and advising.<sup>15</sup>

### European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia):

The European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia) was started in December 2008 with the mandate of protecting vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and other vulnerable shipping, preventing piracy and armed robbery at sea, monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and supports other EU missions and international organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.<sup>16</sup> EU NAVFOR also established the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), which provides 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden.<sup>17</sup>

### EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia):

The EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia) was launched in July 2012. EUCAP is a civilian mission based in Mogadishu, aiming to support regional maritime capacity-building and enhance maritime security across the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). As of the end of 2015, it solely focused on Somalia also including Somaliland.<sup>18</sup>



**Ethiopia contributes a total of 984 personnel, 943 contingent troops, seven staff officers, five experts on mission, and 29 individual police;**



## African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNMID):

After civil war broke out between the Government of Sudan and militias and other armed rebels in Darfur in 2003, AU PSC authorized the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) deployment of an AU-mandated mission to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in 2004. Later, AMIS was merged with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in December 2007 to become the joint AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).<sup>19</sup> UNAMID's mandate is to protect civilians, monitor, verify the implementation of agreements, assist the political process, and monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. 14% out of the total personnel in the mission contributed from the states of the Horn of Africa. Djibouti contributes 137 formed police unit; Ethiopia contributes a total of 984 personnel, 943 contingent troops, seven staff officers, five experts on mission, and 29 individual police; Kenya contribute a total of 87 personnel, 11 staff officers, one expert on a mission, and 75 contingent troops.<sup>20</sup> UNAMID ended its activities on 31 December 2020.

## United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA):

A few weeks before South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011, clashes between Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM) over disputed, oil-rich border region Abyei drove more than 100,000 people from their homes. On 27 June 2011, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force to the Abyei Area, which both sides claimed. UNISFA's establishment came after both reached an agreement in Addis Ababa to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area.<sup>21</sup> UNISFA has the principal

mandate is monitoring the demilitarization of any forces other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service.

Also, de-mining assistance and technical advice, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, strengthen the Abyei Police Service's capacity by providing support, and provide security for oil infrastructure in the Abyei Area.<sup>22</sup>



**UNISFA is a unique type of peacekeeping operation since the beginning of UN peacekeeping in 1948 because 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia.**

UNISFA is a unique type of peacekeeping operation since the beginning of UN peacekeeping in 1948 because 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia. Holger Osterrieder et al. describe the deployment as follows:

*The deployment of troops for UNISFA took place 'significantly more quickly than is usually the case [with UN peacekeeping operations].' Only one month after its authorization, almost 500 troops had been deployed to the Abyei region. Operations started on 8 August 2011, while patrols began at the end of August 2011. The fact that UNISFA troops were drawn from one country, Ethiopia, helps to explain this prompt deployment. Indeed, the Ethiopian troops were ready to be deployed even before the UN Security Council authorized the mission. The land route from Ethiopia to Abyei was used to transfer troops within a week... The Ethiopian troops did not require the living standards normally necessary for UN missions. Temporary housing in tents was an efficient way to ensure the timely deployment of troops.*

*Only a few months after its authorization, the UN Secretary-General declared that the mission was 'in a position to secure the Abyei area' and thus able to fulfill its mandate.<sup>23</sup>*

Ethiopia is the only Horn of Africa state which contributes to this mission. It contributes a total of 4,453, 4,287 contingent troops, 78 experts on mission, 78 staff officers, and ten police personnel, which is 97% of the total personnel and 24% of the police personnel.<sup>24</sup>

However, according to Sudan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Maryam El Sadig El Mahdi, because of Ethiopia's unacceptable decision to fill the Renaissance Dam and 'intrusion' of the eastern borders in El Fashaga in El Gedaref, Sudan claim "it is not reasonable to have Ethiopian forces in the strategic depth of Sudan". Thus, the United Nations has agreed to a request from Khartoum to withdraw the Ethiopian contingent of a peacekeeping force, even though Ethiopia resisted stating that UNISFA was established following the joint agreement of Sudan and South Sudan, and its drawdown should be agreed upon by both parties because South Sudan was comfortable with the presence of Ethiopian troops in UNISFA.



**On the same date, South Sudan becomes the newest county in the world, and the UNMIS operation was ended;**

## United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS):

On the same date, South Sudan becomes the newest county in the world, and the UNMIS operation was ended; the Security Council established UNMISS on 9 July 2011 with the mandate 'to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, intending to strengthen the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively, democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.'<sup>358</sup> However, with the rise of the recent political and security crisis in December 2013, which resulted in an enormous humanitarian crisis, on 27 May 2014, the Security Council reprioritized the mandate to the protection of civilians, monitoring human rights, assisting the delivery of humanitarian and supporting the implementation of the cessation of Hostilities.<sup>25</sup> As of November 2018, Ethiopia has 2,106 military and 26 police personnel, and Kenya contributes 23 police personnel, which is 14% of the total UN military personnel in UNMISS.<sup>26</sup>

## Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM):

The IGAD established the CTSAMM following the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015 by warring parties in South Sudan. It is responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA) and the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (ACoH), which is signed in December 2017. CTSAMM led by Maj. Gen. Desta Abiche Ageno of Ethiopia and there are over 200 personnel from 17 different countries, the majority of whom

are former military officers. It is headquartered in Juba with 16 Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) in the most conflict-affected areas of South Sudan.<sup>361</sup> CTSAMM reports to the IGAD Council of Ministers and to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which includes the warring parties that signed the agreement, South Sudanese civil societies, members of IGAD, and international partners.<sup>27</sup>

## Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA):

The African Union PSC designated the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as a terrorist group and established Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) in November 2011. It has three organs, the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), in Addis Ababa, chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and comprises Ministers of Defense of the affected countries (Uganda, South Sudan, DRC, and CAR), the Regional Task Force (RTF), headquartered in Uganda, is the military component with a maximum of 5,000 troops to be contributed by the affected countries.<sup>363</sup> As of July 2017, there was 1031 uniformed personnel from DR Congo, South Sudan, and the Central Africa Republic.<sup>28</sup>

## Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa:

The UN has Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements, which are led by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Currently, the UN has 25 Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements; 12 in Africa, 2 in the Americas, 3 in Asia, 2 in Europe, and 6 in the Middle East. In the past, it completed 29 political missions in the world, one of which was in Somalia,

the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which was completed in 2013.<sup>29</sup>

## Concluding discussion

Today the Horn region consists of two of the nine newest states in the world, Eritrea and South Sudan. Furthermore, Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and conducting a peaceful government transition in the region by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.

In Michael Sheehan's words, the security complex in the Horn of Africa is held together not by the positive influences of shared interest but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors.

The Horn of Africa region is known for the high presence of UN and AU military support operations. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; Abyei Sudan– South Sudan border where 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, on the Uganda– Rwanda border, and in Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 19 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN.

The most common trends of conflict in the region are intrastate/ethnic conflicts, resulting from the existence of more than three hundred seventy linguistic groups or can be ethnic groups in the region. Interstate conflicts resulted from the misdrawn borders, which cut through ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups that sway states of the region to claim neighboring state territories. Religious fundamentalism and violence, resulting from the existence of failed states and their proximity to the Middle Eastern states. Conflicts caused



by a change in living space resulted from the environmental degradation and climate change that cause scarcity of pastoral lands and water, especially among pastoralist communities, and supporting neighboring state rebels, also has been a tradition of the regimes of the region.

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# The Delicate Geopolitical Balance of the Horn

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Geography has always been central to human affairs. It has shaped the identity, character, and history of nation-states; it helped or hindered their social, political, and economic evolution. It continues to be a consequential factor in international relations as geographic location and physical terrain determine a state's foreign policy options and its position in the hierarchy of states. The countries of the Horn of Africa (HoA) share cross-border natural resources and long-existing people groups sharing similar language, culture, and livelihood. The colonial experience, however, has led previously homogeneous people, who lived under the same political administration or affiliation, to be placed on different sides of arbitrary colonial borders.

The predominant economic activities in the region are agricultural and pastoral production; both are industries that face mounting challenges not only due to outdated methods and equipment but also due to the adverse

effects of climate change. Among the results, the region is unable to achieve food sufficiency—triggering multiple recurring droughts. The reasons for this shortage are predominantly the inability of regional governments to effectively mitigate deforestation, desertification, drought, population growth, and inter and intra-state conflicts, resulting in reduced agricultural productivity. Trade, manufacturing, and industry remain low as countries in the region produce similar primary goods and commodities.

There is also a disparity in physical size, resource base, and potential for military and economic power. Of the five countries of the Horn, Ethiopia and Sudan are the largest states. Ethiopia, as a growing regional economic and military power, possesses the potential to assert the state's interest—domestically and regionally. The prominence of military leadership in Sudan and Eritrea furthers complicates the security dilemma considerations in a deeply fragile region.

Mobility of communities is another distinct feature of the Horn of Africa. Nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists, beyond the confines of indigenous state formation, are a marked feature of the region. The Somali people groups at the tip of the Horn and the arid lowland areas were home to a Cushitic-speaking Muslim population who, far from the small coastal trading cities, lived a pastoral life. While the Somali people share common ancestry, religion, culture, and

language, they were also highly stratified by clan, sub-clan, and family structures. Similarly segmented were the pastoralists of the Upper Nile.



## **More often than not, the borders reflected Europeans' understanding of the ethnographic composition of nations in the region.**

Naturally, this mobility and fluid movement of people did not correspond to the borders later drawn by colonial powers. More often than not, the borders reflected Europeans' understanding of the ethnographic composition of nations in the region. The classic case in the region is that of ethnic Somalis who find themselves across state borders in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. The people and countries of the Horn also experienced external aggression and imperialist ambitions from the Ottoman Turkish Empire, and 19th-century colonial Europe, to modern-day superpowers that wield their economic strength to assert their interests. In addition to the multi-faceted structural and governance problems facing the region's states, I argue that foreign interests in the region pose a great risk of fragmentation and, eventually, state failure.

## **Geopolitical and Strategic Factors**

Being adjacent to the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa is found alongside one of the most crucial sea lanes in international trade. The Horn of Africa has the potential to play a crucial role in geopolitical and trade considerations, particularly due to its

proximity to the oil-producing nations of the Arabian Peninsula.

With some of Africa's largest concentration of foreign Military camps, and different world powers ranging from France, and China, to Saudi Arabia and the US, the region is no longer in the peripheries of the current international order. Since the post-Cold War period of America's "War on Terror," global attention shifted its strategic focus and partners in the region. In the case of Sudan, the United States imposed a three-decade-long sanction that further decimated the nation's economy and fortified the military leadership. Sudan, until 2021, has been designated as a terrorist-sponsoring state, having harbored Bin Laden before his departure to Afghanistan. After the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States reevaluated its interest in the region which led to further rift and antagonism between countries in the region.

Up until recently, there are relatively stable states like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti that work toward joining global partnerships to fight terrorism because they frequently experience acts of terrorism and violence. In particular, countries like Ethiopia are strategically important that the west, to effectively fight the growing threat of terrorism in the region. Since the onset of Ethiopia's war in the North, the state has faced international rebuke that has further destabilized its fragile federal structure. Ethiopia remains extremely polarized; fragmentation of the Ethiopian state would lead to the inevitable proliferation of extremist groups in the Region. This is, in part, why Ethiopia remained a critical ally in the US's counter-terrorism strategy in the region. Instability or a power vacuum in Ethiopia would result in a regional level societal and economic crisis, in one of the continent's worst drought-affected regions.

## External interests and parties

The Horn has historically been subject to intervention from both global and regional powers; largely on account of its geostrategic location. The Nile, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean have all played a role in exposing the region to outside actors and influence. The region has experienced the influence of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and later from the Arabian Peninsula with the spread of Islam. While some of these interactions amounted to influence, others amounted to conquest. The Horn region's past with prominent civilizations, movements, and modern states, attests to its geostrategic potential, and the risks therein.

Due to a lack of economic autonomy, in addition to the poor state of intra-African trade, the Horn is particularly susceptible to foreign political and economic pressures. Given the economic and political weakness of states in the region, their leaders often seek support from global hegemonies, like the United States and China. This results in a mechanism whereby African states are forced into economic, political, and military compliance from global actors with big demands.

Competing to establish positions of influence and military advantage in the strategically significant regions of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, superpowers often supported client states in the adjacent Horn of Africa primarily by injecting military aid and undermined inimical states by supporting rebel movements and weaving unfriendly alliances and counter-alliances. Conversely, emerging global powers aim at promoting their credibility as superpowers by influencing and over-arming the largest number of strategically placed client states, thus imperiling oil tankers bound for the West via the Suez Canal and reducing to nil the influence of the US in the above-mentioned regions.

Geopolitical logic also required the newly emerging powers to have maritime staging areas for their rapidly increasing navy, to control the arc running from South Asia to the Horn of Africa. As the West's role as the dominant external actor in the Horn of Africa is increasingly challenged, the jostling for influence among other states has led to the Red Sea region's militarization and further fractured an already fragmented political and security landscape. Finally, Middle Eastern nations need to be particularly judicious in their relations with the Horn States so that their alliances and interests do not harm the people, or destabilize the region. This has been especially evident when pursuing limited interests or competing policies, as in the case of Sudan after Bashir or the GCC conflict spreading to The Horn of Africa.



**This results in a mechanism whereby African states are forced into economic, political, and military compliance from global actors with big demands.**

## State failures: are they preventable?

State failure is generally regarded as the final process of a failing or collapsing state. Some states fail comprehensively in all areas, whereas others manage to achieve high performance in economic management while the bulk of their countryside is in the hands of rebels and



armed bandits. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, a political scientist at Oxford University, coined the term “successful failed states” to depict the paradox of failed states that nonetheless feature few, suspended, oases of competence and excellence. He used Angola, a vastly corrupt and ill-governed country, and its successful national oil company, Sonangol, as an example of a “successful failed state”. In Ethiopia, many of the ruling political and business elites are doing rather well; surrounded by an ocean of poverty, collapsing institutions, and decaying infrastructures.

There is no doubt that pockets of economic success exist, but such success is being recorded against a generalized backdrop of worsening insecurity, decaying civil service, and collapsing institutions. When states fail, citizens suffer. State collapse opens up opportunities for rival forces to contest for power and dominance, which further destroys stability and regional order. State collapse is closely associated with the phenomenon of political decay, defined by the eminent political scientist Samuel Huntington, as a chaotic and disorderly situation where the rate of social modernization is accelerating ahead of progress in political and institutional development. By modernization and political development, Huntington is referring to the process of fortifying political institutions, moving away from particularism to universalism; nationalism, and national integration and democratization. This, in turn, contributes to the erosion of political legitimacy, where the social contract is broken: citizens no longer deem the government worthy of their trust, obedience, or loyalty.

This is not to deny the role of individuals, but failed states are not the handiwork of wicked or ignorant men. They are outcomes of collective institutional failures which have often followed decade-long path-dependent trajectories. Failed states can bounce back through public reforms implemented with wisdom, courage, and vision.

Unfortunately, the prospect of recovery is often slim due to various causes or exacerbating factors like devastating conflicts, recurring droughts, and bad governance, to name a few.

## Fused nationalism and the threat of state failure

Cross-border close relations and affiliation among the culturally linked people are seemingly considered by some governments of the region as obstacles to creating separate and unique nationalism, and state-making. Taking Ethiopia as an example, Tigreans, Kunama, and Saho (Irob) are all people of distinct ethnic identities that have existed under the same administration- can be found both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Similarly, the Afar ethnic group in Ethiopia is also found in Djibouti and, to a lesser extent, in Eritrea. The Oromo, for instance, is a majority ethnic group in Ethiopia and also a minority in Kenya. The Rashaida, Menamir, and Tigre are in Eritrea and Sudan. The Nuer are South Sudan's second-largest ethnic group and also a minority in Ethiopia's western Gambella region. There are also Somalis in Ethiopia; they maintain strong traditional ties with their clansmen in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia proper.

State failure is also akin to a contagious disease. Refugees, terrorist groups, and illegal firearms tend to overflow into the neighborhood. In the words of one scholar, they are sinkholes that pose a “systemic risk to the liberal world order, of which the United States is the principal architect and beneficiary.” On the other hand, there is grave uncertainty as to the very survival and future of Ethiopia as a political community, with various ethnic nationalities demanding self-determination and even outright secession. The Greater Horn of Africa is engulfed by interrelated crises like fragile transitions; various inter-state wars; civil wars; inter-communal conflicts; an economic crisis manifested in widespread

debilitating poverty; chronic food insecurity and famines; and environmental degradation ravaging the region.

The history of the Horn of Africa has thus long involved the rise and fall of states, with the Ethiopian state, arguably, sustaining comparative longevity. In addition to the temporal factor, there has also been lateral movement. For example, Sudan has seen successive states rise and fall in different latitudes of the Nile, from Meroe in the north into Nubia, and later, from the sixteenth century to the Funj kingdom based at Sennar on the Blue Nile. Probably founded by people from the south, possibly Shilluk, the Funj became the first Islamic state in Sudan and spread its power widely in what is now central Sudan.

many would assert that Ethiopia is already on the road to failure. The basic question is whether the world can afford a failed Ethiopia or not. Keep in mind that a failing Ethiopian state practically means an East African sub-region that is entirely and thoroughly destabilized.

The first risk factor at play here, from a Western point of view, is the heightened risk of transnational terrorism. The second is the almost certain influx of irregular migrants from East Africa, via northern routes towards, North Africa and eventually Europe, the Southern route towards South Africa, the Easter route towards Yemen, and other as-yet-undiscovered migrant transit hotspots. The third risk factor is contagion from an Ethiopian state failure in an African neighborhood that is not renowned for its strong, stable, prosperous, functional, and well-defined states. The failure of Ethiopia could set off a domino effect of revolutions, coups, secessions, and civil conflicts across Eastern Africa. Further worsening the existing terrorism, human displacement, and trafficking problems, A fragmented Ethiopia would dramatically increase the region's food security and adversely affect regional and continental supply chains.

In the realm of regional trade and cooperation, and beyond, there is great potential for a positive and long-lasting relationship between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. However, some of the socioeconomic pitfalls that have plagued previous relations will need to find a resolution to achieve the stability they seek. Ultimately, countries in the Horn have to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs and forge their path in history.



## **A country can fail, regardless of what population or land mass, or economic heft it possesses**

The region has experienced an experiment on a failed state (Somalia), and there is also a potential threat of state failure. A country can fail, regardless of what population or land mass, or economic heft it possesses. Though many argue the contrary, Ethiopia absolutely can fail, and in fact, some argue that it is already significantly advanced in the long process of total state failure. In terms of internal stability, economic viability, and geopolitical factors,



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Published by Demera Media  
and Communications PLC  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia