



# HORN

REVIEW

IDEAS CONNECTIONS SYNERGY

## The Greater Horn: Strategic Briefing

Issue No. II | August 2025

By Horn Review



# The Horn in August: Assertiveness, Rivalries & Fragile Transitions

Issue No. 2 | August 2025



Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<https://hornreview.org/>

+251116393227

[info@hornreview.org](mailto:info@hornreview.org)



@HornReview

## Foreword

**“The Greater Horn”** Monthly Brief offers a monthly synthesis of key diplomatic and security trends in one of the world’s most volatile yet consequential geopolitical theatres. This inaugural edition, covering developments from August 2025, draws on open-source intelligence, strategic assessments, policy briefings, and regional commentary to deliver nuanced, non-partisan, and research-driven insights into strategic complexities, internal vulnerabilities, emerging partnerships, and geopolitical recalibrations shaping the region’s trajectory. Intended to inform regional policymakers, analysts, and stakeholders, the briefing is produced by independent experts committed to regional stability, cooperative security, and evidence-based policymaking.

Blen Mamo Diriba  
Executive Director & Editor-in-Chief  
Horn Review

## Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Section One: Domestic Development, Regional Tensions, and Strategic Realignment .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.1 Ethiopia: Hydro-Politics and Economic Reform .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.2 Eritrea: Proxy Maneuvers and Diplomatic Shifts .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1.3 Somalia and Somaliland: State Fragility and the Quest for Recognition .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.4 Djibouti: Railway Politics, Carbon Pricing and Regional Politics .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1.5 Sudan: Diplomatic Overture and Humanitarian Crises .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1.6 South Sudan: Stalled Transition, Rising Violence, and New Economic Gateways ....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1.7 Kenya: Industrial Credit, Currency Shifts, and Security Pressures .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Section Two: MENA Rgion, Gulf and Globa Engagement .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>2.1 Yemen: Humanitarian Tragedy, Maritime Risk, and Regional Fragility .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>2.2 MENA Region .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>2.2.1 Egypt .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>2.2.2 United Arab Emirates (UAE) .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>2.2.3 Saudi Arabia .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>2.2.4 Turkey .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Conclusion: Strategic Reframing of the Horn – August 2025 .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>16</b>

## The Horn in August: Assertiveness, Rivalries & Fragile Transitions

### Executive Summary

August reflected intensifying power plays, fragile governance, and expanding external entanglements across the Horn of Africa and its wider neighbourhood:

- **Ethiopia** deepened its reform agenda with civil service salary hikes, AfDB endorsement, and AfCFTA tariff concessions, bolstering international credibility but risking fiscal strain and competitiveness gaps.
- Tensions with **Somalia** escalated over Beled-Hawo, where Ethiopian backing of Jubaland militias clashed with Mogadishu's sovereignty claims - undermining fragile counter-Al-Shabaab cooperation.
- Ethiopia leveraged agricultural soft power, presenting its wheat revolution as a continental model, while simultaneously internationalizing sea access demands through the UN LLDC3 summit in Turkmenistan.
- **Eritrea** faced rising organized opposition as Afar groups established a presence in Ethiopia and declared readiness for armed struggle. Revelations of gold smuggling networks reinforced the regime's entanglement in shadow economies.
- Diplomatically, Asmara pursued new partnerships with **Italy** and outreach to **Washington** under Trump's second presidency, while hosting Sudanese delegations and amplifying its proxy influence along its borders.
- **Somalia** endured renewed Al-Shabaab offensives countered by AU and U.S. operations, while internal political fractures over constitutional amendments deepened fragility. Recognition momentum for **Somaliland** accelerated, with U.S. congressional backing and strategic port interests elevating Hargeisa's global profile.
- **Djibouti** consolidated its transport hub status through rail and port initiatives with Ethiopia, China, Saudi Arabia, and South Sudan, while France reinforced its security presence with upgraded Mirage aircraft.
- **Sudan's** fragmentation hardened as the RSF-aligned "Tasis" alliance declared a rival government, while the humanitarian catastrophe in El Fasher worsened under deliberate blockades and drone strikes. Khartoum internationalized the war narrative, blaming the UAE and Colombian mercenaries.
- **South Sudan** faced deteriorating security and political paralysis, even as it pursued new trade corridors via Djibouti and external partnerships with Japan, the UAE, and Israel. UN and AU appeals for ceasefire and dialogue underscored stalled transition risks ahead of 2026 elections.
- **Kenya** secured concessional financing from Japan and sought debt relief via yuan-denominated swaps with China, while grappling with elevated terrorism threats that risk undermining economic confidence.

- **Yemen's** humanitarian tragedy worsened with a deadly migrant shipwreck and escalating Houthi-Israeli clashes disrupting Red Sea security - exposing the Horn's vulnerability to broader regional wars.
- Across the **MENA neighbourhood**, Egypt intensified Nile and Red Sea diplomacy, opposing Ethiopia's assertiveness and aligning with Somalia and Eritrea; the UAE expanded economic influence in South Sudan while facing Sudanese accusations of arming proxies; Saudi Arabia broadened Red Sea and African port linkages; and Turkey's defense pact with Somalia drew Somaliland's ire and added new layers to regional rivalries.

## Section One: Domestic Development, Regional Tensions, and Strategic Realignments

### 1.1 Ethiopia: Hydro-Politics and Economic Reform

August was marked by Ethiopia's heightened regional assertiveness, expanded economic reform agenda, and evolving external partnerships. Key developments included escalating border tensions with Somalia, new measures to ease civil service burdens, and further integration into the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Ethiopia showcased its agricultural transformation as a continental model, while simultaneously pushing for global recognition of maritime rights for landlocked states. Diplomatic outreach intensified, spanning from East Africa to China and Central Asia, underscoring Ethiopia's drive to reposition itself as both a regional power and a voice for landlocked developing countries (LLDCs).

#### *Domestic Governance & Economic Reforms*

The Ministry of Finance and Civil Service Commission announced salary adjustments for government employees, effective September 2025. Finance Minister Ahmed Shide highlighted reforms that have bolstered foreign exchange earnings and economic growth, while subsidies on essential goods sought to cushion low-income earners. Civil Service Commissioner Mekuria Haile stressed that the reforms aim to modernize institutions, foster a skilled and ethical workforce, and raise living standards.

These measures reflect political responsiveness to inflationary pressures but risk exacerbating fiscal strain if not paired with productivity-driven reforms. While salary increases may ease short-term discontent, the government faces the challenge of balancing reform credibility with macroeconomic stability.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) commended Ethiopia's "model" reforms, praising its strong statistical systems that underpin policy-making. Chief Statistician Vincent Negendakumana stressed the country's relative progress in agriculture and data-driven governance, pledging AfDB support.

The endorsement enhances Ethiopia's international reform credibility, but sustaining momentum will depend on addressing persistent structural vulnerabilities: forex shortages, inflation, and the dominance of state-led approaches.

Ethiopia formally gazetted its Provisional Schedule of Tariff Concessions, confirming preferential treatment for eligible goods under AfCFTA. This milestone signals a cautious shift from historic protectionism toward continental integration.

While it promises to boost intra-African trade and investment, Ethiopian industries may face short-term competitiveness pressures. Effective implementation hinges on domestic reforms in logistics, customs, and manufacturing competitiveness.

#### *Regional Diplomacy & Security*

Ethiopian military officials demanded the withdrawal of Somali government troops from Beled-Hawo in Gedo, denouncing Mogadishu's actions as destabilizing border security. Addis

Ababa reaffirmed support for Jubaland-aligned militias, while rejecting allegations of attacking Somalia's NISA facility.

The dispute reflects deepening Ethiopia–Somalia friction, with Beled-Hawo as a flashpoint. Mogadishu's assertion of sovereignty directly challenges Ethiopia's buffer strategy through Jubaland, raising the risk of escalation. This undermines fragile joint efforts against Al-Shabaab and could destabilize wider Horn security dynamics.

Addis Ababa and Kampala reaffirmed commitments to equitable water use and pledged closer collaboration within IGAD, AfCFTA, and counter-terrorism efforts. This partnership strengthens Ethiopia's Nile Basin diplomacy by projecting African-led cooperation. By bolstering ties with Uganda, Ethiopia enhances its legitimacy in ongoing disputes with Egypt and Sudan over GERD operations, emphasizing regional solutions over external mediation.

Ethiopia hosted the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) Council of Ministers and senior officials' meetings (Aug 22–30), gathering over 1,150 participants. Director General of Financial Intelligence Service Muluken Amare stressed the importance of multilateral collaboration against illicit financial flows. Hosting the summit signals Ethiopia's aspiration to position itself as a regional financial governance hub.

### ***Agriculture, Food Security & South–South Cooperation***

At the UN Food Systems Summit in Addis Ababa, Zambia and Mozambique expressed strong interest in adopting Ethiopia's wheat production model. Zambia highlighted Ethiopia's success in mobilizing smallholders in drylands and proposed cooperation in seed and coffee production. Mozambique emphasized Ethiopia's substitution of USD 1 billion in wheat imports and pledged high-level delegations to study its approach.

Ethiopia's transformation from wheat importer to Africa's top producer is reshaping its regional influence, strengthening its soft power in food security. However, domestic sustainability amid climate volatility will determine whether Ethiopia can credibly export its model.

### ***Multilateral Advocacy & Global Partnerships***

At the Third United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (UN-LLDC3) in Turkmenistan, Ethiopia's Transport Minister Alemu Sime called for a "paradigm shift" recognizing equal maritime rights for LLDCs. He argued that rights must extend beyond transit access to participation in maritime economies, security, and environmental protection. Ethiopia linked its demands to the Awaza Programme of Action (2024–2034), calling for major infrastructure financing and digitalized border management.

This push reflects Ethiopia's growing frustration with reliance on Djibouti and tensions with Somalia. By internationalizing the LLDC agenda, Addis Ababa seeks to reframe sea access as a global justice issue, potentially reshaping legal and financial frameworks.

On the margins of LLDC3, Ethiopia and Turkmenistan agreed to collaborate on sea access challenges, high transport costs, and dependence on neighbours' ports. Both countries cast themselves as "gateways" to their respective continents. The agreement illustrates Ethiopia's



coalition-building strategy among LLDCs, enhancing its visibility as a global spokesperson for landlocked nations.

President Taye Atske Selassie inaugurated a Chinese medical volunteer program in Addis Ababa, offering specialized surgeries and screenings. Both sides stressed knowledge transfer and long-term cooperation. The initiative builds on last year's program that reached 4 million Ethiopians. This marks an expansion of Ethiopia–China ties into social services and human development, beyond trade and infrastructure. For Beijing, it deepens influence at the community level; for Addis, it alleviates strained health systems and demonstrates visible benefits from external partnerships.

Ethiopia's trajectory in August reflected a dual strategy: projecting itself as a continental and global voice - on agriculture, trade integration, and LLDC rights - while simultaneously managing domestic economic strains and volatile border tensions. Domestically, civil service reforms and AfDB endorsement highlight reform credibility but also inflationary risks. Regionally, Ethiopia asserts itself in security and water diplomacy while confronting heightened Somalia friction. Globally, Addis leveraged agriculture, LLDC advocacy, and deepened partnerships with China to consolidate soft power.

## **1.2 Eritrea: Proxy Maneuvers and Diplomatic Shifts**

Eritrea remained an active but contradictory player in the Horn of Africa this month, combining diplomatic outreach with covert destabilization and renewed opposition challenges. The Eritrean Afar National Congress (EANC), originally established in Sweden in 2014, announced a significant shift by opening an office in Semera and declaring readiness for armed struggle against President Isaias Afwerki's government. Coordinating with other Eritrean opposition forces, including the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO). This expansion of political activity from exile into Ethiopian territory underscores the growing role of organized opposition in contesting Asmara's authority, further reinforced by Eritrean National Congress initiatives in Addis Ababa and increasing engagement with the Afar region.

Parallel to these opposition gains, revelations of Eritrean military officers smuggling gold into Tigray - traded for commodities such as cement, solar panels, and foodstuffs - highlight the regime's entanglement in illicit cross-border networks. These routes reportedly serve as conduits not only for contraband but also for human trafficking, deepening Eritrea's reputation as a hub of shadow economies that erode state legitimacy while reinforcing military patronage structures.

Internationally, Asmara deepened its diplomatic engagements. At the end of July, Eritrea signed a wide-ranging cooperation agreement with Italy, covering energy, agriculture, infrastructure, tourism, and maritime security, symbolically sealed with ceremonies in Massawa and Dogali. The partnership reflects Eritrea's effort to leverage historic ties with Rome into new channels of economic and strategic support. Further underscoring a recalibration of its foreign relations, Eritrea welcomed correspondence from U.S. President Donald Trump, who promised to reverse the "harmful" policies of the Biden administration and rebuild a "respectful and productive" relationship. This overture followed Eritrean outreach to U.S. officials, including White House discussions led by Dawit Haile, signaling Asmara's

hope for a reset in relations with Washington under Trump's second presidency.

Regionally, Eritrea continued to assert itself as a political broker while facing suspicion over its role in ongoing conflicts. On August 3, President Isaias hosted a delegation from Eastern Sudan "aimed at finding solutions to the ongoing conflict in Sudan", further exemplifying Eritrea's deep entanglement in the war. While presented as a stabilizing effort, the meeting was widely interpreted as an attempt by Eritrea to expand and maintain its influence along its borders and in Sudan's east, particularly amid reports of drug trafficking and illicit trade networks flourishing in war-torn Sudan. Adding to this, the Beja tribal leadership in eastern Sudan issued statements pledging support for Eritrea in the event of renewed hostilities with Ethiopia, illustrating how cross-border alliances continue to anchor Asmara's proxy strategy.

President Isaias' latest interviews offered sharp attacks on regional and international actors. He accused the UAE and Israel of driving Ethiopia's port ambitions, questioned Emirati support, and portrayed Ethiopia's Red Sea issue as subject to a hierarchy of foreign dominance - "Israel first; UAE second; France third; and the U.S. fourth." These statements reinforced Eritrea's longstanding narrative of resistance to external interference, even as Asmara courts selective alliances abroad. Eritrea also took part in the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries in Turkmenistan, emphasizing the need for cooperative infrastructure and trade development, and issued rebuttals to Ethiopian diplomatic narratives, rejecting what it termed as attempts to undermine Eritrean sovereignty.

Meanwhile, People Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)-aligned social media accounts promoted efforts to replicate earlier reconciliation strategies with Tigray in the Afar region, seeking to weaken Ethiopia's federal cohesion.

In Europe, Eritrea was drawn into Britain's domestic political discourse when Nigel Farage proposed new repatriation agreements with Asmara as part of his broader anti-migration agenda. While peripheral to the Horn's dynamics, such references illustrate how Eritrea's notoriety continues to resonate globally as a symbol of authoritarian resilience and forced migration.

Domestically, little changed in the regime's entrenched authoritarian practices - marked by indefinite conscription, suppression of dissent, and economic hardship - conditions that continue to fuel refugee outflows. Yet, the rise of organized opposition movements, combined with Eritrea's intensifying entanglement in both licit and illicit regional networks, signals a mounting challenge to the durability of President Isaias' rule, even as he manoeuvres to reposition Eritrea as a critical, if contentious, regional actor.

### **1.3 Somalia and Somaliland: State Fragility and the Quest for Recognition**

The month of August was marked by political and security developments across the Horn of Africa, centring on Somalia and the contested region of Somaliland.

In Somalia, Al-Shabaab claimed a major assault near Mogadishu, stating it had killed over 20 Ugandan soldiers serving with the African Union Mission (AUSSOM). While the group boasted of inflicting heavy casualties, the AU mission later refuted these claims, instead announcing that joint operations with Somali forces had resulted in the death of more than 50

Al-Shabaab militants in the strategic town of Bariire. This back and forth highlighted the information war accompanying the military conflict. Subsequent operations, including targeted strikes by Somali intelligence and US airstrikes, successfully eliminated several senior Al-Shabaab commanders, dealing significant blows to the group's leadership and financing networks.

A major diplomatic shift occurred on August 4 when Ethiopia appointed a new ambassador to Somalia, Suleiman Dedefo Woshe, after nearly a year of frozen high-level relations. This move signalled a potential thaw following a deep rift caused by Ethiopia's controversial Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, which Somalia had viewed as a violation of its sovereignty. However, regional tensions persisted, as Ethiopian military officials later demanded the immediate withdrawal of Somali government troops from the border town of Beled-Hawo, warning that their presence threatened regional stability.

The most dominant theme of the month was the escalating campaign for international recognition of Somaliland. The new head of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), Lt. Gen. Dagvin Anderson, stated that deeper US engagement with Somaliland was in our interest, a potential policy shift. This was bolstered by a Congressional directive for the State Department to explore bilateral cooperation. Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro planned a high-profile visit to Washington for talks expected to cover security partnerships, port access in Berbera, and critical minerals. The momentum built further when prominent US Senator Ted Cruz sent a letter to President Trump formally urging the recognition of Somaliland, citing its strategic value and democratic credentials. In a symbolic gesture, Somaliland's president even publicly endorsed Donald Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize.

Somalia's federal government fiercely opposed these developments. The situation was further complicated when former Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble broke ranks and expressed support for reconsidering Somaliland's recognition, a move that was warmly welcomed by Somaliland's leader. Internally, Somalia faced its own political crises. Consultations on contentious constitutional amendments related to federalism began, but dialogue between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the opposition collapsed, raising fears of instability.

The Defence Minister issued a stern warning that opposition leaders would not be allowed to oppose the government militarily, a threat the opposition claimed originated from the president himself. The opposition suffered a setback as key figures resigned from its coalition, and the government faced international embarrassment after its foreign minister mistakenly attended a UN conference for landlocked countries, despite Somalia's extensive coastline.

Other than the high politics of recognition and conflict, other significant events occurred. The World Food Programme launched a major strategic logistics hub in Berbera, enhancing aid delivery capabilities across the Horn of Africa and highlighting the port city's growing economic importance. A UNDP report highlighted Berbera's remarkable transformation under strong local governance, with municipal revenue soaring from \$1.5 million to \$14 million over a decade. In a move with long-term strategic implications, Turkey announced plans to build a spaceport on Somalia's coast for satellite launches and missile testing. Finally, territorial disputes simmered as the newly formed North Eastern State of Somalia announced its intention

to reclaim lands from both Somaliland and Puntland, pointing to further potential conflict in the complex politics of the region.

#### **1.4 Djibouti: Railway Politics, Carbon Pricing and Regional Politics**

In early August, railway-related news dominated Djibouti's politics, and Ethiopia's Transport Minister hailed the 752-km electrified railway as a tangible example of effective transnational collaboration. In a related note, the World Bank approves USD 700 million for the Mieso-Dire Dawa Expressway, a high-speed road designed for long-distance travel. At the same time, Ethiopia and China are in talks over a proposal for major upgrades of the Ethio-Djibouti Railway, with officials looking to Beijing for financial backing. It is also reported that the Ethio-Djibouti Railway Share Company has officially commenced roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) vehicle transport service between Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. In Addition, Quarterhill Delivers Weigh-In-Motion Solutions has agreed with Djibouti to improve Roadway Safety and Efficiency in Djibouti, South Korea, and Thailand. On another point, the beginning of carbon pricing for shipping services draws attention to the global shipping rules.

On August 15th, the Ethiopian Embassy in Djibouti and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) facilitated the return of 233 irregular Ethiopian migrants from Djibouti due to stricter immigration laws and increased risks for migrants.

A new shipping service has been introduced between Jeddah, Sudan, Djibouti, and the UAE. The Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) has announced the launch of the new shipping service RSX1, operated by *GOODRICH*, at Jeddah Islamic Port (JIP), which further strengthens Djibouti's role in regional politics.

Djibouti was active on the Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9), where they held a bilateral meeting with the Japanese Foreign Affairs and Libya on the sidelines.

On August 21st, South Sudan and Djibouti sealed a deal to build ports in eight towns. South Sudan's Minister of Transport, Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, and the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) are key parts of the White Nile Corridor development plan, and they aim to establish two multimodal logistics routes to boost trade and foster economic growth for South Sudan.

France deploys two upgraded Mirage 2000D aircraft to Djibouti, a key component of France's airpower. It is stated that this makes France ready to support national and international missions, if required.

#### **1.5 Sudan: Diplomatic Overture and Humanitarian Crises**

A coalition of Sudanese civil society groups announced that it is launching a national campaign on September 1 to secure a two-year renewal of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission. The initiative reflects growing frustration with international inaction, and an attempt to ensure continued scrutiny of atrocities in a conflict that risks sliding into long-term normalization of impunity.

The political situation is shaped by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in the "Tasis" alliance, who have declared an opposition government against the army-backed

administration in Port Sudan. Although this entity has not been recognized by the UN, Arab League, or African Union, its emergence marks a dangerous institutionalization of the country's fragmentation. Sudan's Public Prosecution has indicted 17 Tasis leaders, including RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, on charges of war crimes and weakening the state. The indictments, however, appear more symbolic than enforceable, underscoring the limits of Port Sudan's judicial reach in the absence of territorial control.

Humanitarian conditions, particularly in El Fasher, remain catastrophic. Prime Minister Kamal Idris has condemned the international community's "silence" over the prolonged RSF blockade, framing it as a "major crime." His appeal highlights the tension between local political legitimacy and the inertia of external actors, who continue to issue statements without shifting the balance on the ground. International donors have echoed the call for a humanitarian ceasefire as famine deepens, yet relief remains hostage to both warring parties, with each accused of deliberately obstructing aid. Recent drone strikes that destroyed World Food Programme convoys in North Darfur have further entrenched mistrust and demonstrated how both sides are willing to weaponize humanitarian supply lines.

The conflict has also widened through foreign entanglements. The government has accused Colombia of failing to stop its nationals from serving as RSF mercenaries and blamed the United Arab Emirates for supplying weapons. These claims, regardless of verification, illustrate Khartoum's strategy of internationalizing the war narrative to portray the RSF as a proxy force undermining Sudanese sovereignty. Such framing not only seeks diplomatic support but also aims to shift responsibility for Sudan's disintegration onto external actors.

On the diplomatic front, Sudan has rejected a U.S.-backed initiative, Africa-led Peace and Security (ALPS), that sought to assign blame for the humanitarian crisis, insisting instead that the RSF alone bears responsibility. To reinforce this position, the Sudanese Embassy has engaged The Vogel Group, a lobbying firm in Washington, signalling that Khartoum still sees the U.S. as a pivotal actor despite public rhetoric. Regionally, Prime Minister Idris has coordinated with Egypt to present a united front against Ethiopia's "unilateral" management of the Nile, a move that reflects how Sudan's internal conflict is spilling into wider regional rivalries.

Economically, Khartoum has tightened restrictions on gold sales and imports in a bid to stabilize its collapsing economy. These measures, though indicative of state assertiveness, risk deepening the informal market and empowering the very networks - RSF financiers, smugglers, and war profiteers - that the government seeks to weaken. The economic front, therefore, mirrors the political one: an embattled central authority struggling to impose order on a fragmented landscape where both domestic rivals and external actors hold the decisive levers of power.

## **1.6 South Sudan: Stalled Transition, Rising Violence, and New Economic Gateways**

South Sudan's August developments reveal a fragile transition caught between deepening internal crises and a flurry of external engagements aimed at securing trade, investment, and political legitimacy.

The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Martha Pobe, told the Security Council that South Sudan is facing a deteriorating mix of political stalemate, escalating violence, and worsening humanitarian needs, with climate shocks and constrained funding compounding the crisis. The briefing emphasized the urgent need to protect civilians and restore credible political dialogue as humanitarian access and the 2026 transition timeline are under threat.

Amid this internal fragility, South Sudan and Djibouti signed a Memorandum of Understanding to develop a White Nile trade corridor that would build river and dry ports in Juba, Bor, Malakal, and Renk. It will use two logistic routes, one via Djibouti through Ethiopia to Nasir with river barges on the Sobat/White Nile, and another linking Port Sudan to Kosti and downstream. It signals a move intended to reduce South Sudan's landlocked trade friction and position Djibouti as an additional gateway.

At the Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-9) on 21 August 2025, Japan's foreign minister met South Sudan's foreign minister and reiterated Tokyo's support. It announced new assistance targeting food security while urging implementation of the peace agreement to improve security and attract Japanese private investment. Both sides are committed to cooperation on infrastructure and human resources to help stabilise South Sudan's transition.

Members of South Sudan's Transitional National Legislative Assembly argued that the UN arms embargo leaves the country militarily weakened and vulnerable to incursions or border pressure from neighbours. MPs are calling for the embargo's lifting and urging security and foreign affairs ministries to explain strategies for border protection amid recent clashes with Uganda in Central Equatoria State's Kajo-Keji County.

The African Union Peace and Security Council, after a field mission to Juba, renewed a call for a permanent ceasefire, protection of civilians and humanitarian workers, and an inclusive high-level political dialogue. The PSC paid a courtesy visit aimed at engaging the country's leadership in discussions on the ongoing implementation of the 2018 peace deal and the elections scheduled to take place in December 2026 to end the transition period.

In parallel, Vice-President Benjamin Bol Mel travelled to the United Arab Emirates to deepen economic ties, deliver a message from President Kiir, and court Emirati investment as Juba confronts cash shortages and regional pressure to resume stalled talks with First Vice-President Riek Machar. The trip fits a broader Gulf engagement strategy to mobilise investment and humanitarian assistance.

Beyond the Gulf, Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel completed a working visit to Juba and held talks with President Kiir and senior ministers on cooperation in energy, agriculture, health, security, and water. The two sides signed an MoU on coordination and pledged development and humanitarian assistance, while Juba publicly denied unconfirmed reports about possible Palestinian resettlement discussions.

In a UN Security Council statement, the UK urged South Sudan's leaders to halt violence, restore dialogue, and release political detainees (explicitly naming the house arrest of First Vice-President Machar). It condemned attacks on civilians and medical facilities, and

highlighted the link between climate shocks, conflict, and humanitarian deterioration while calling for unfettered humanitarian access.

Ultimately, August showcased that unless South Sudan addresses its internal stalemate and security fragility, external partnerships from regional corridors to Gulf and Asian investments will remain stopgap measures rather than catalysts for a sustainable transition.

### **1.7 Kenya: Industrial Credit, Currency Shifts, and Security Pressures**

August confirmed Kenya's tightrope act between securing cheaper long-term finance for industrial and infrastructure priorities and managing a persistent security threat that could undo those economic gains.

At TICAD-9, Nairobi converted diplomatic goodwill into a concrete credit line, securing a 25-billion-yen facility backed by Japan's NEXI, to support vehicle assembly and reduce electricity transmission and distribution losses that the government estimates at about 23 % of output. This instrument is strategic rather than transactional. It signals a deliberate shift in liability management toward borrowing that lowers coupon costs and complements a broader approach of tapping alternative currency markets and structured instruments to relieve expensive dollar-era debt.

Simultaneously, Nairobi is negotiating with Beijing to convert a U.S. dollar loan for its flagship railway into Yuan and extend repayment terms. Converting dollar liabilities into Chinese currency could lower interest expenses and reduce pressure on foreign exchange reserves as global rates and dollar strength amplify sovereign debt service. That logic is pragmatic, but it might carry political and operational tradeoffs.

These economic maneuvers sit alongside an intensifying security burden. The United States embassy in Nairobi issued an alert in August after intelligence signaled an elevated risk of attacks by extremist groups, including al-Shabaab, around major dates and crowded venues. The advisory crystallizes a recurrent reality: persistent attacks impose direct human costs and indirect fiscal costs by deterring tourism, raising security spending, and eroding investor confidence. Nairobi has responded with stepped-up operations, regional cooperation, and cross-border actions, yet the asymmetric nature of the threat means security risks can still undercut economic gains.

Concurrently, Kenya broadened defence and technology ties with partners such as South Korea, focusing on shipbuilding, maritime security, and the responsible military use of artificial intelligence. These partnerships shore up maritime domain awareness and protect trade routes that underpin port-dependent growth, while positioning Kenya as a hub for defence industry cooperation and technology transfer.

August, therefore, highlighted a strategic balancing act; Kenya is diversifying creditors and seeking lower-cost finance to sustain industrial and power sector reforms even as it must contain a resilient security threat and manage the geopolitical consequences of deeper creditor and defence partnerships so that external engagement strengthens rather than supplants Kenyan economic sovereignty.

## Section Two: MENA Region, Gulf and Global Engagement

### 2.1 Yemen: Humanitarian Tragedy, Maritime Risk, and Regional Fragility

In early August, a boat carrying approximately 154 migrants - predominantly Ethiopian - capsized off Yemen's southern Abyan coast, resulting in at least 68 confirmed deaths and dozens more missing; only 12 were rescued. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) underscores that this eastern migration corridor is among the most dangerous worldwide, with over 350 fatalities already recorded in 2025, adding to nearly 1,860 deaths over the past decade. Yemen remains a critical transit hub for migrants from the Horn, despite its ongoing civil strife, as smuggling networks exploit desperation amid limited legal migration avenues.

Yemen continues to face one of the world's most acute humanitarian emergencies, with more than 17 million people experiencing hunger and over one million children under five suffering from life-threatening malnutrition. With just 9% of the 2025 humanitarian funding appeal received, relief operations struggle to meet growing needs. Renewed hostilities - especially in the Red Sea - further strain aid delivery and exacerbate civilian suffering.

Meanwhile, escalating conflict between the Houthis and Israeli forces has heightened the risk of collateral disruption across the Red Sea corridor. Houthi-launched missiles, including recent cluster munitions targeting Israel, have prompted Israeli airstrikes on infrastructure in Sanaa and Hodeida, intensifying regional instability. Given Yemen's strategic position straddling vital shipping lanes and the Horn-Bab al-Mandab axis, continued confrontation threatens not only humanitarian access but the broader stability of maritime trade and regional dynamics.

### 2.2 MENA Region

#### 2.2.1 Egypt

In August 2025, Egypt intensified its diplomatic efforts, highlighted by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's visit to Neom, Saudi Arabia, on August 21, where he met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to strengthen bilateral ties in political, economic, and developmental areas. The discussions addressed regional crises, including the Gaza war, which has claimed over 62,000 Palestinian lives, and Red Sea security amid Houthi disruptions to global shipping. The talks also covered developments in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, reflecting Egypt's coordination with Saudi Arabia on shared Arab-Islamic interests. Concurrently, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty engaged with counterparts in Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya, and Somalia, presenting Egypt's positions on African unity, South-South cooperation, and development funding through the Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development (EAPD). While officially framed as efforts to foster economic ties, the initiatives also reflected Cairo's attempts to expand its influence in the Horn and steer regional states toward aligning with its security and developmental priorities.

A central focus of Egypt's diplomacy remained water security, which Cairo continues to frame as an existential issue, in response to Ethiopia's planned inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in September. Abdelatty reiterated Egypt's rejection of unilateral measures in the Eastern Nile Basin, insisting that transboundary resources must be managed



through consensus. Yet, this position reflects Cairo's longstanding effort to preserve colonial-era agreements that allocate the bulk of Nile waters to Egypt and Sudan, denying upstream states, particularly Ethiopia, equitable rights to utilize the river. Ethiopia, for its part, views the GERD as a sovereign developmental project and a symbol of African-led modernization, designed to provide electricity to tens of millions. Although the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) entered into force in October 2024, enshrining principles of equity and sustainability, Egypt continues to resist its legitimacy. By doing so, Cairo not only dismisses the collective will of several basin states but also risks undermining the very spirit of cooperation it claims to uphold.

Red Sea security was another critical concern, with Egypt expressing alarm over Israeli naval exercises announced on August 19, which it warned could fuel militarization. These maneuvers, alongside Houthi attacks on Israel-linked vessels tied to the Gaza conflict, contributed to a 60% drop in Suez Canal revenues, inflicting billions in economic losses for Egypt. Abdelatty's discussions with African partners emphasized intensified consultations to safeguard stability, warning of the wider impacts on global trade, tourism, and development.

Yet, Egypt's vocal opposition to Ethiopia's efforts to secure a Red Sea presence suggests a contradiction in its approach: while advocating for regional cooperation on navigation and security, Cairo resists acknowledging Ethiopia's legitimate interest in access to the sea. This resistance risks transforming the Red Sea into another arena of rivalry, rather than collective management.

These developments carry significant implications for the Horn of Africa, potentially escalating tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia while testing regional cooperation frameworks. Egypt's diplomatic push may indeed strengthen ties with countries like Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and bolster shared development and security platforms. Yet, its persistent opposition to the GERD and rejection of inclusive Nile governance frameworks threaten to entrench zero-sum narratives that complicate stability in Sudan and South Sudan.

### **2.2.2 United Arab Emirates (UAE)**

In August 2025, the Central Bank of the UAE and the Bank of South Sudan signed a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance financial cooperation. The agreement focuses on advancing payment systems, banknote security printing, and technical training, with UAE subsidiaries supporting the development of local payment card infrastructure and knowledge transfer programs for South Sudanese banking personnel. This move consolidates the UAE's economic footprint in the Horn and positions it as a key financial partner.

On August 7, Sudan's military claimed it destroyed a UAE aircraft at Nyala Airport in Darfur, alleging it carried Colombian mercenaries and military equipment intended for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), resulting in at least 40 deaths. The UAE denied the allegations, labeling them false and politically motivated, while the Colombian government launched an investigation into the involvement of its nationals. The incident highlights the UAE's contested role in Sudan's conflict and the risks tied to its military and paramilitary engagements.

On August 26, the UAE imposed a ban on port access for cargoes from Sudan, disrupting oil exports and idling at least one crude-laden tanker. The measure reflects the UAE's efforts to

exert economic and diplomatic pressure on Sudan in response to its alleged support for factions opposed to UAE's interests, demonstrating the use of trade leverage as a strategic tool in regional competition.

UAE's expanding financial engagement in South Sudan, paired with its contested military involvement and use of economic sanctions, underscores its dual role in the Horn of Africa: a growing economic actor and a polarizing force in regional conflict dynamics.

### **2.2.3 Saudi Arabia**

Recently, Gulf States have increased their economic and political influence in Africa, which has further complicated the region's political stability. The competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia to be the dominant power in Africa and the MENA region is another issue that requires due attention in the global political dynamics.

On the one hand, Saudi Arabia cultivates friendly relations with African countries through initiatives like the Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan, as well as through economic ties with countries like Morocco, Egypt, and South Africa, where Acwa Power has made investments.

On August 27, Ambassador of Zimbabwe to Saudi Arabia, Jonathan Wutawunashe, met with Saudi Irrigation Organization CEO Mohammed Abu Haid to discuss matters including possible collaboration. Zimbabwe showed interest in tapping into the Kingdom's experience in managing scarce water resources.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is trying to network and integrate its port services with Sudan, Djibouti, and the UAE. This month, the Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) announced the launch of the new shipping service RSX1, operated by GOODRICH, at Jeddah Islamic Port (JIP).

### **2.2.4 Turkey**

Somaliland Parliament condemned the action taken by Turkey, accusing Ankara of interfering in its own internal process and supporting Mogadishu's "demolition campaigns." This followed after Turkey had signed a defence pact with Somalia, in which there will be military and naval expansion in the region.

Turkey's support for Somalia's territorial integrity and its mediation efforts demonstrates a pragmatic approach to regional stability. However, Somaliland's condemnation indicates that Turkey's pro-Somalia stance risks escalating tensions with Ethiopia and Somaliland, potentially drawing Ankara into a complex web of regional rivalries. This could strain Turkey's diplomatic balancing act, as it seeks to maintain relations with Ethiopia while deepening ties with Somalia and Egypt.

## **Conclusion: Strategic Reframing of the Horn – August 2025**

August reaffirmed the Horn of Africa's status as a contested strategic theatre where domestic fragility and regional rivalries intersect with global power competition. The month's developments highlighted three converging dynamics: Ethiopia's assertive push for economic reform and maritime access, Eritrea's dual track of external diplomacy and internal contestation, and the hardening fragmentation of political orders in Sudan and Somalia.

Together, these currents deepened the region's exposure to both opportunity and systemic volatility.

Ethiopia's efforts to leverage reform and integration are reshaping its international standing but also sharpening sovereignty disputes with Somalia and rekindling hydro-political friction with Egypt. Eritrea, while amplifying its diplomatic presence, faces mounting diaspora opposition and exposure through illicit economies. Sudan's bifurcated statehood and Somalia's contested transitions illustrate how proxy alignments and insurgent resurgence continue to erode institutional coherence. Meanwhile, Djibouti, Kenya, and South Sudan sought to consolidate external partnerships as buffers against fiscal, security, and legitimacy crises.

Crucially, August underscored the Red Sea corridor as the Horn's strategic hinge - where Gulf activism, Israeli-Houthi escalation, and shifting naval deployments converge with African coastal ambitions. The Horn is no longer simply a recipient of external rivalries but an active arena shaping the wider geopolitical balance. The sustainability of this repositioning will depend on whether regional actors can balance assertive diplomacy with credible reforms, inclusive governance, and climate resilience. Absent such recalibration, external engagements risk entrenching fragmentation, leaving the Horn strategically pivotal yet structurally fragile.

## Bibliography

**Abdul, K. (2025, August 23).** *France deploys upgraded Mirage 2000D to Djibouti.* Military Africa. <https://www.military.africa/2025/08/france-deploys-upgraded-mirage-2000d-to-djibouti/>

**Addis Standard. (2025, July 30).** *Eritrean Afar National Congress says ready armed struggle from Ethiopia, opens office in Semera.* Addis Standard.

**Addis Standard. (2025, August 22).** *Egypt intensifies lobbying African states on 'water security', 'Red Sea stability' as counter to Ethiopia's stance.* Addis Standard. <https://addisstandard.com/egypt-intensifies-lobbying-african-states-on-water-security-red-sea-stability-as-counter-to-ethiopias-stance/>

**AgriTech Middle East & Africa. (2025, August 21).** *Ethiopia gazettes tariff concessions to activate AfCFTA trade benefits.* <https://www.agritechmea.com/ethiopia-gazettes-tariff-concessions-to-activate-afcfta-trade-benefits/>

**Ahmed, M. (2025, August 23).** *Libya and Djibouti sign MoU on political consultation.* The Libya Observer. <https://libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/libya-and-djibouti-sign-mou-political-consultation>

**AllAfrica. (2025, August 26).** *East Africa: Ethiopia's major diplomatic achievements on TICAD 9.* <https://allafrica.com/stories/202508260651.html>

**Al Jazeera. (2025).** *Sudan says army destroyed UAE aircraft, killing 40 Colombian mercenaries* <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/7/sudan-says-army-destroyed-uae-aircraft-killing-40-colombian-mercenaries>

**Arab News. (2025, August 27).** *Zimbabwe seeks to tap Saudi experience in water resource management.* <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2613189/saudi-arabia>

**Ashenafi, E. (2025, August 16).** *Changing tide: Shire emerges as hub for gold smuggled from Eritrea, Sudan.* The Reporter.

**BBC. (2025, August).** *Sudan's army denies bombing convoy taking aid to famine-hit area.* <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp3elnv5d91o>

**Birr Metrics. (2025, August 15).** *Ethiopia gazettes AfCFTA tariff concessions, clearing final hurdle to begin trade.* <https://birrmetrics.com/ethiopia-gazettes-afcfta-tariff-concessions-clearing-final-hurdle-to-begin-trade/>

**CGTN. (2025, August 15).** *Yemen's hunger crisis.* N@80.

**Daily News Egypt. (2025, August 15).** *Ethiopia, Uganda vow to boost cooperation amid Nile water dispute.* DNE Africa. <https://africa.dailynewsegypt.com/ethiopia-uganda-vow-to-boost-cooperation-amid-nile-water-dispute/>

**Daily News Egypt. (2025, August 24).** *Sakr, T. Egypt renews Nile dispute as Ethiopia prepares to inaugurate Africa's largest dam.* <https://africa.dailynewsegypt.com/egypt-renews-nile-dispute-as-ethiopia-prepares-to-inaugurate-africas-largest-dam/>

**defenceWeb. (2025, August 28).** *Kenya and South Korea evolve defence partnership.* <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/kenya-and-south-korea-evolve-defence-partnership/>

**Dawit, H. (2025, August 23).** *At the White House with NSC's Brandon McNamara...* [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/DawitHaile91/status/1959010757355749862>

**DNE Africa. (2025, August 15).** *Sakr, T. Ethiopia repatriates 233 migrants as Djibouti enforces*

stricter immigration rules. <https://africa.dailynewsegyp.com/ethiopia-repatriates-233-migrants-as-djibouti-enforces-stricter-immigration-rules/>

**EBC. (2025, August 7).** *Ethiopia reaffirms commitment to anti-money laundering efforts.* <https://www.ebc.et/english/Home/NewsDetails?NewsId=1041>

**Egypt Today. (2025, August 21).** *Saudi crown prince welcomes President Sisi in NEOM; Gaza war, Red Sea security on agenda.* <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/141842/Saudi-crown-prince-welcomes-President-Sisi-in-NEOM-Gaza-war>

**Emirates News Agency. (2025).** *Central Bank of UAE, Bank of South Sudan sign MoU to enhance cooperation in fields of payment, security printing.* Emirates News Agency. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bl6brkk-central-bank-uae-bank-south-sudan-sign-mou-enhance>

**Ethiopian News Agency. (2025a, August 12).** *AfDB ready to support Ethiopia's model economic reforms: Bank's chief statistician.* [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng\\_7120964](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7120964)

**Ethiopian News Agency. (2025b, August 18).** *Ethiopia's Federal Civil Service Commission announces salary increment for civil servants.* [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng\\_7157178](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7157178)

**Ethiopian News Agency. (2025c, August 26).** *Ethiopia, Colombia working to elevate ties to robust business partnership.* [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng\\_7206861](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7206861)

**Ethiopian News Agency. (2025d, August 27).** *ILO applauds Ethiopia's labour protection for workers abroad.* [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng\\_7212773](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7212773)

**Ethiopian Press Agency. (2025a, August 8).** *Access to the sea is not a luxury.* <https://press.et/herald/?p=120358>

**Ethiopian Press Agency. (2025b, August 10).** *Effective global partnership enables LLDCs to overcome access to sea challenges.* <https://press.et/herald/?p=120505>

**Fana Broadcasting Corporate. (2025a, August 2).** *Zambia, Mozambique look to emulate Ethiopia's agricultural transformation.* <https://www.fanamc.com/english/zambia-mozambique-look-to-emulate-ethiopias-agricultural-transformation/>

**Fana Broadcasting Corporate. (2025b, August 7).** *Ethiopia-China ties advance through health diplomacy and global solidarity, says President Taye.* <https://www.fanamc.com/english/ethiopia-china-ties-advance-through-health-diplomacy-and-global-solidarity-says-president-taye/>

**Fana Broadcasting Corporate. (2025c, August 7).** *Ethiopia, Turkmenistan pledge closer ties to advance equitable global development.* <https://www.fanamc.com/english/ethiopia-turkmenistan-pledge-closer-ties-to-advance-equitable-global-development/>

**Fana Broadcasting Corporate. (2025d, August 19).** *Government reaffirms commitment to easing financial burden on civil servants.* <https://www.fanamc.com/english/government-reaffirms-commitment-to-easing-financial-burden-on-civil-servants/>

**Fana Broadcasting Corporate. (2025e, August 22).** *Ethiopia to host ESAAMLG meeting on combating money laundering and terrorist financing.* <https://www.fanamc.com/english/ethiopia-to-host-esaamlg-meeting-on-combating-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/>

**Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, & Quinn, C. (2025, August 18).** *The UK calls on South Sudan's leaders to take urgent steps to end violence and restore dialogue: UK statement at the UN Security Council.* <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-calls-on-south-sudans-leaders-to-take-urgent-steps-to-end-violence-and-restore-dialogue-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

**Ghideon, M. (2025, August 3).** *President Isaias Afwerki held a meeting with high-level delegates from Eastern Sudan...* [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/GhideonMusa/status/1951978540313764137>

**Ghideon, M. (2025, August).** *Peaceful cooperation between Eritrea and Ethiopia's Afar region.* [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/GhideonMusa/status/1957828446291161239>

**Horndiplomat. (2025, August 8).** *AFRICOM chief says US engagement with Somaliland 'in our interest'.* <https://www.horndiplomat.com/2025/08/new-africom-chief-backs-deeper-u-s-ties-with-somaliland/>

**Horndiplomat. (2025, August 8).** *WFP launches strategic hub in Berbera to boost regional aid.* <https://www.horndiplomat.com/2025/08/wfp-launches-strategic-hub-in-berbera-to-boostregionalaid>

**Jones, R. (2025, August 16).** *Saudi's Red Sea tourism projected to create 100,000 jobs by 2030.* Construction Week. <https://www.constructionweekonline.com/gigaprojects/saudi-red-sea-tourism-2030>

**Middle East Monitor. (2025, August 21).** *Hebrew media claims Israeli military manoeuvres have provoked Egypt.* <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250821-hebrew-media-claims-israeli-military-manoevres-have-provoked-egypt/>

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2025, August 21).** *Japan–Djibouti foreign ministers' meeting.* [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_01582.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01582.html)

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2025, August 2025).** *Japan–South Sudan foreign ministers' meeting* [Press release]. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_01577.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01577.html)

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan. (2025, August 7).** *Turkmenistan and Ethiopia intend to expand bilateral ties.* <https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/news/5483>

**Naar, I., & Dahir, A. L. (2025, August 4).** *More than 140 migrants feared dead in boat disaster near Yemen.* The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/yemen-migrant-boat-capsized.html>

**Noll, A. (2025, August 27).** *Yemen: Hostilities escalate between Israel and the Houthis.* Deutsche Welle (DW). <https://www.dw.com/en/yemen-escalation-in-hostilities-between-israel-and-the-houthis/a-73774765>

**OceanScore. (2025, June 27).** *Djibouti carbon pricing for shipping: A regional scheme worth watching.* <https://oceanscore.com/insights/djibouti-carbon-pricing>

**Obulutsa, G., & Goko, C. (2025, August 21).** *Kenya gets \$169 million in Japan Samurai financing to boost industries.* Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenya-gets-169-million-japan-samurai-financing-boost-industries-2025-08-21/>

**Quarterhill Inc. (2025, August 5).** *Quarterhill delivers weigh-in-motion solutions to improve roadway safety and efficiency in Djibouti, South Korea, and Thailand.*

**Radio Tamazuj. (2025).** *South Sudan, Djibouti sign deal to develop trade corridor.* <https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-djibouti-sign-deal-to-develop-trade-corridor>

**Ratcliffe, V., & Lua, N. (2025, August 26).** *UAE ban on cargoes from Sudan in focus as crude tanker idles.* Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-26/uae-ban-on-cargoes-from-sudan-in-focus-as-crude-tanker-idles>

**Reuters. (2025, August 20).** *Kenya in talks with China to convert dollar rail loan into yuan.*

<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenya-talks-with-china-convert-dollar-rail-loan-into-yuan-2025-08-20/>

**Reuters.** (2025, July 31). *The two rival governments that could split Sudan.* <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/two-rival-governments-that-could-split-sudan-2025-07-31/>

**Sakr, T.** (2025, August 15). *Ethiopia repatriates 233 migrants as Djibouti enforces stricter immigration rules.* DNE Africa.

**Ship Management International.** (2025, August 14). *New shipping service introduced between Jeddah, Sudan, Djibouti and UAE.* SMI. <https://www.shipmanagementinternational.com/news/new-shipping-service-launched-between-jeddah-sudan-djibouti-anduae>

**Somaliland.com.** (2025). *Somaliland Parliament condemns Turkish Embassy's meeting with anti-Somaliland figure.* <https://www.somaliland.com/news/somaliland/somaliland-parliament-condemns-turkish-embassys-meeting-with-anti-somaliland-figure/>

**Somaliguadian.** (2025, August 9). *Somalia, Ethiopia on a collision course as tensions escalate in Gedo region.* <https://www.somaliguadian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-ethiopia-on-a-collision-course-as-tensions-escalate-in-gedo-region/>

**State Information Service.** (2025, August 21). *Egypt renews commitment to African unity, development.* SIS. <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/212579/Egypt-renews-commitment-to-African-unity%2C-development?lang=en-us>

**Sudan Tribune.** (2025, August). *Sudanese groups launch campaign to extend UN fact-finding mission.* <https://sudantribune.com/article304322/>

**Sudan Tribune.** (2025, August). *Sudan PM calls world's silence on El Fasher siege a 'major crime'.* <https://sudantribune.com/article304215/>

**Sudan Tribune.** (2025, August). *Sudan rejects coalition's criticism, blames RSF for humanitarian crisis.* <https://sudantribune.com/article304199/>

**Sudan Tribune.** (2025, August). *Sudan hires U.S. lobby firm for \$40,000 a month.* <https://sudantribune.com/article304099/>

**Sudan Tribune.** (2025, August). *Egypt, Sudan reject Ethiopia's 'unilateral' Nile policy.* <https://sudantribune.com/article303685/>

**Sudan Tribune.** (2025, August). *Sudanese groups urge U.S. to impose ceasefire, warn of genocide.* <https://sudantribune.com/article303981/>

**Sudans Post.** (2025). *Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister concludes working visit to South Sudan.* <https://www.sudanspost.com/israeli-deputy-foreign-minister-concludes-working-visit-to-south-sudan/>

**Sudans Post.** (2025). *African Union calls for permanent ceasefire in South Sudan conflict.* <https://www.sudanspost.com/african-union-calls-for-permanent-ceasefire-in-south-sudan-conflict>

**Swinford, S.** (2025, August 22). *Nigel Farage: This is a massive crisis. We need mass deportations.* The Times.

**Sylvester.** (2025, August 21). *South Sudan, Djibouti seal deal to build ports in eight towns.* The City Review. <https://www.cityreviewss.com/south-sudan-djibouti-seal-deal-to-build-ports-in-eight-towns/>

**Tesfanews.** (2025, August). *Sudan — General Dirar Mohamed Dirar, better known as 'Shiba' Dirar...* [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/tesfanews/status/1960816682709983364>



**United Nations. (2025, August 8).** *Closing press release | Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC3).* <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2025/08/closing-press-release-lldc3-2025/>

**United Nations. (2025, August).** *Security Council rejects creation of rival government in Sudan.* UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165645>

**United Nations. (2025, August).** *South Sudanese 'are counting on us', top UN official tells Security Council.* UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165673>

**U.S. Embassy Nairobi. (2025, August 19).** *Security alert: Exercise personal security and situational awareness.* <https://ke.usembassy.gov/security-alert-exercise-personal-security-and-situational-awareness/>

**Warya TV. (2025, August 6).** *Ethiopia demands immediate withdrawal of Somali government troops from Beled-Hawo.* <https://www.waryatv.com/2025/08/06/ethiopia-demands-somali-federal-troops-leave-beled-hawo/>

**Warya TV. (2025, August 7).** *Turkey plans spaceport in Somalia to boost missile testing and satellite launches.* <https://www.waryatv.com/2025/08/07/turkey-plans-spaceport-in-somalia-to-boost-missile-testing-and-satellite-launches/>

**Xinhua. (2025, August 3).** *Somalia – AU mission confirms killing of over 50 al-Shabab fighters in southern Somalia.*

<https://english.news.cn/africa/20250803/b88fc81ab43940ae82dab71fc3d3f306/c.html>





# **HORN** **REVIEW**

Ideas

|

Connections

|

Synergy