አምባሳደር ሞሃሙድ ድሪር ግህዲ ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ የምክር ቤት አባል ሆነው ከተመረጡበት ከ1990ዎቹ ጀምሮ ኢትዮጵያን በብዙ የፖለቲካ ኃላፊነቶች አገልግለዋል። በመቀጠልም በሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት ውስጥ ለአራት ተከታታይ ጊዜያት የአምባሳደርነት እና የሚኒስትርነት ቦታዎችን አገልግለዋል። ከዋና ዋናዎቹ የዲፕሎማሲ ስራዎቹ መካከል በግብፅ የስድስት አመት አምባሳደርነት፣ በኢትዮጵያ፣ ግብፅ እና ሱዳን መካከል በተካሄደው የሶስትዮሽ GERD ድርድር ውስጥ ያበረከቱት የአማካሪነት ሚና እንዲሁም በ2019 የሽግግር ወታደራዊ ምክር ቤት እና የሃይል አምባሳደር መሀሙድ ድሪር ጋህዲ የሰላም ስምምነትን ለማስፈን ያደረጉት ጥረት ይጠቀሳል። በአሁኑ ወቅት በኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ውይይት ኮሚሽን ኮሚሽነር ሆነው በማገልገል ላይ ይገኛሉ። አምባሳደር ሞሃሙድ ድሪር ግህዲ በአሁኑ ግዜ በኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ውይይት ኮሚሽን ውስጥ ኮሚሽነር ሆነው በማገልገል ላይ ይገኛሉ።

በሕወሃት በኩል ያገረሸው ትንኮሳና ጥቃት በንጹሃን ዜጎች ላይ ተፅዕኖ እያሳደረ እና ኑሯቸውን እያወከ ነው። መንግስት ለእርዳታ የሚሆን ገንዘብ ቢመድብም ጠላት ቡድኑ ለትግራይ ብቻ ሳይሆን በግጭት ለተጎዱት የአፋር እና የአማራ ክልል ዞኖችም እንዳይደርስ ማደናቀፉን ቀጥሏል። ለእነዚህ ክልሎች ከተመደበው ገንዘብና ሀብት በተጨማሪ ተደራሽነቱ እንዲረጋገጥ የተቻለንን ሁሉ እያደረግን ነው። ይህን ጉዳይ የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ከሁሉም በላይ ቅድሚያ የሚሰጠው  ሲሆን የአለም አቀፉ ማህበረሰብም የሚያተኩርበትና የሚከታተለው ነው።

ኢትዮጵያዊያን እንደመሆናችን ህዝቡ ዕርዳታ ማግኘት አለበት ብለን እናምናለን፡፡ በዋነኛነት የሚያሳስበን የህዝባችን ህልውናና ደህንነት ነው። እንደ አለመታደል ሆኖ ይህ ቡድን ጥረታችንን እያደናቀፈ እና እያገደ ነው። የዕርዳታው መድረስ የሚረጋገጠው በግጭት ወደተጎዱ አካባቢዎች መሄድ ሲቻል ብቻ ነው። በተጨባጭ የሚታዩትን እውነታዎች በሙሉ ከግምት ውስጥ በማስገባት ሀቁን ግን መካድ የለብንም፡፡ አካፋን አካፋ ማለት ያስፈልጋል ማለት ነው፡፡ ይሄ ሀቅ በደንብ መታወቅ ብቻ ሳይሆን በጥብቅ መወገዝም  ያለበት ነው።

እንደ የዓለም የምግብ ፕሮግራም/ WFP ካሉ አለም አቀፍ አጋሮች ጋር እየሠራን ነው። ነገር ግን የአማራና የአፋር ክልሎች በሕወሃት ወረራ ክፉኛ የተጠቁ በመሆናቸው አጋሮቻችን እና ሌሎች ባለድርሻ አካላት በነዚህ ክልሎች በሚገኙ መዳረሻዎች ላይ የሚደረገውን የዕርዳታ አቅርቦት የበለጠ ትኩረት እንዲያደርጉ እንጠይቃለን። ምንም እንኳን በዕርዳታ መገኘትና እና በአቅርቦት ላይ አንዳንድ ክፍተቶች ባይታጡም፣ በተጨባጭ ባለው አስቸኳይ ፍላጎት እና አሁን እየተደረጉ ባሉት ጥረቶች መካከል የጎላ ክፍተት ይታያል።

እንደኔ ግምት በሱዳን ውስጥ የነበረውን ሁኔታ በማጤን አልበሽርን በጽኑ የደገፈ አገዛዝን በመቃወም የነበረውን መጠነ ሰፊ ሕዝባዊ የእምቢተኝነት ሁኔታ ለመረዳት በዚያን ጊዜ በሱዳን የነበረውን ሁኔታ አጽንዖት መስጠቱ ጠቃሚ ነው። በነጻነትና በለውጥ ኃይሎች የሚመራው በሕዝባዊ ንቅናቄ ከስልጣናቸው እንዲለቁ በመጠየቅ ከፍተኛ ተቃውሞ አድርገዋል። ተቃውሞው በዋና ከተማይቱ ካርቱም ብቻ ሳያበቃ ኤፕሪል 11 ቀን 2019 እ.ኤ.አ ከስልጣን እስኪወገድ ድረስ ሰልፎቹ ከዲሴምበር 2018 እ.ኤ.አ ጀምሮ ተቀባይነት አግኝተዋል።

የሱዳንን ስልጣን ለሶስት አስርት አመታት ተቆጣጥሮት የነበረውን ወታደራዊ ተቋም አልበሽር ሙሉ ኃይሉንና ስልጣኑን ተረክቧል። በዚህም የኢትዮጵያና የአፍሪካ ሕብረት ሚና በሽግግር ወታደራዊ ምክር ቤት የነጻነትና የለውጥ ኃይሎች መካከል የስልጣን ክፍፍል ስምምነትን መፍጠር ነበር ይህም ተጨማሪ ደም እንዳይፈስና ሱዳን ማለቂያ ወደሌለው የደም መፋሰስ እንዲሁም ወደ ስርዓት አልበኝነት አዘቅት ውስጥ እንዳትገባ ማድረግ ነበር።

ኢትዮጵያ በሱዳን ያለውን ትርምስ ለማስቆምና ሰላምን ለማስፈን የተሳተፈችበት ምክንያት ኢትዮጵያ በአፍሪካ ቀንድ ላይ ያላት የውጭ ጉዳይ ፖሊሲ ነው። ምንም እንኳን በሚያሳዝን ሁኔታ ላጭር ጊዜ ቢሆንም ተሳክቷል ብዬ አምናለሁ።

ሱዳን በአልበሽር መሪነት “ብሄራዊ ውይይት” ሞክረው ነበር ነገር ግን ባለመስማማት ተጠናቀቀ። የልሂቃን መግባባት እየተባለ የሚጠራው ጉዳይ በመጨረሻ የሥልጣን መጋራት ከመሆን ያለፈ ፋይዳ አልነበረውም።

ጊዜውን መለስ ብለን ስንመለከት የሱዳን ወንድሞቻችንና እህቶቻችን ካለፉበት አስቸጋሪ ሁኔታ የተነሳ ሁለቱም ወገኖች ሚናችንን በአዎንታዊ መልኩ ተቀብለውታል። ከሁሉም በላይ ግን የሱዳን ሕዝብ ኢትዮጵያ ረድታናለች ብለው ያምናሉ።

ሱዳን እንደሌሎች የአፍሪካ ሀገራት በአሉታዊ የታሪክ ቁርሾ ተጎጂ ነች። የሱዳንን የስልጣን ተዋረድ ስንመለከት ብዙ መፈንቅለ መንግስት ተካሂዶባታል፤ ይህ በራሱ የፖለቲካና የባህላቸውን ውስብስብነት ያሳያል። ስለዚህ የሥልጣን ጉዳይ በዴሞክራሲያዊ መንገድና ዲሞክራሲን በሚያንጸባርቅ መልኩ መስተካከል ያለበት አንድ አሳሳቢ ጉዳይ ነው። ሱዳን ብቸኛ ችግሯ ይህ ብቻ አይደለም አሁንም በዙሪያዋ እንዲሁም በማዕከሏ ሌሎች በርካታ ወሳኝ ጉዳዮች ያመሳቅሏታል። በአሁኑ ጊዜ ሥልጣኑ በሕዝብ እጅ ባለመሆኑ ሥልጣኑ በሕዝቡ እጅ እንዲሆን ይታገላሉ።

ኢትዮጵያ እና ሱዳን የረጅም ጊዜ የጋራ መደጋገፍ ታሪክ አላቸው።

በቅርቡ፣ የኛ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር በፖለቲካ ልሂቃን እርቅ እና የሱዳን ሉዓላዊ ምክር ቤት ምስረታ ላይ በጥረታቸው ያሳኩትን እናስታውሳለን፡፡ በተመሳሳይ ኢትዮጵያውያን ችግር ሲገጥማቸው ከሱዳን ጎረቤቶቻቸው ልባዊ አቀባበል ተደርጎላቸዋል። ይህ የሱዳን አመራር በውጫዊ ሁኔታዎችም ሆነ በተጽእኖ አምጪ አካላት ምክንያት የኢትዮጵያን ሉዓላዊ መሬት የደፈረበት ሁኔታ ተፈጥሯል፡፡  ለዚህ ጉዳይ ኢትዮጵያ አፋጣኝ እልባት ለመስጠት በነባር ቀጠናዊ ዘዴዎች ማለትም በኢጋድ አማካኝነት ትቀጥላለች።

የህዝብ ለህዝብ ግንኙነትን በሚመለከት ህዝቦቻችን በጋራ በመሥራት ብዙ መማርና ተጠቃሚ መሆን አለባቸው። ለዚህም ነው በአሁኑ ወታደራዊ ገዥዎች የተፈጠረው ከሱዳን ጋር ያለን ግንኙነት ያለፈ ታሪካችንን ያላገናዘበ እና ወደፊት ልናጎለብተው የምንችለውን አቅም አይመጥንም የምንለው፡፡

አስተያየት የለኝም። በዚህ ጉዳይ ዝምታን እመርጣለሁ። ሆኖም ወደፊት በሰፊው የምገልጸው ይሆናል።

በዴሞክራሲያዊ ሥርዓት ውስጥ የተሻለች ሱዳን እንድትኖር የሚተጉ ፣ ነጻነትን ፣ ፍትሕንና ሰላምን እውን የሚያደርጉ ፣ ምሁራንና ወጣቶችን (ወንዶችም ሆኑ ሴቶች) ሱዳን ማግኘት አለባት።

ሱዳን በአልበሽር መሪነት “ብሄራዊ ውይይት” ሞክረው ነበር ነገር ግን ባለመስማማት ተጠናቀቀ። “የልሂቃን መግባባት” እየተባለ የሚጠራው ጉዳይ በመጨረሻ “የሥልጣን መጋራት” ከመሆን ያለፈ ፋይዳ አልነበረውም። ነገር ግን እነዚህ ሁሉ ሙከራዎች ለሱዳን ፖለቲካዊ ጥያቄዎች ዘላቂ መፍትሄ ለማምጣት ገና ናቸው። እንደ እኔ እምነት ሱዳን ምንም አይነት “ደሞክራሲያዊ ተመክሮና መፍትሄዎች ” ከውጭ አትፈልግም። ይልቁንም ዘላቂ የሆነ የፖለቲካ መፍትሔ ከውስጥ መምጣት አለበት።

ለሱዳን ሕዝብ ትልቅ ክብር ስላለኝ ይህንን ጥያቄ መመለስ ያለበት በእኔ ሳይሆን በሱዳን ሕዝብ ነው ብዬ አምናለሁ፤

Long-standing state-building inadequacies are atthefoundationofEthiopia’spastwithviolence and instability. Diverging interpretations of the country’s political past, absence of social cohesion, and a lack of national consensus on signifcant state symbols and institutions are only a few of the issues. Ethiopia’s national dialogue is an opportunity to forge a new route toward peace, political tolerance, national unity, political and economic equality, and a shared destiny by expanding the debate about the country’s future beyond the traditional elite decision-makers. In general, the success of National Dialogues is dependent on widespread public support, availing information to the public, and importantly, media participation.
Media, arguably, plays a critical role in creating a well-informed public that gives credence to the process and outcome of National Dialogues. Two very different instances, Poland and Iraq highlight this critical point. While the media and public consultation activities in Poland (1990) signifcantly aided the overall dialogue process and contributed to a diversifcation of the political landscape and, eventually, a shift in power relations. In contrast, such critical roles were largely absent in Iraq (2004), limiting substantial input from opposition groups and civil society. Yemen (2013) demonstrates the immense diffculties of reaching ordinary citizens. Though Yemen had a well-developed media strategy and a designated body, the National Dialogue failed to catch the interest of the wider public. Thus, media, if properly utilized, can create public awareness and support for National Dialogue in all its phases.
The standing of the Ethiopian press is highly concerning. The reason for this, according to studies, is that the media landscape is more polarized than it has ever been and that portions of the media are being accused of having a negative role in the upheavals that have erupted across the country. It has been suggested that the trend seen in the media can be characterized as an enhanced ethnifcation process. As a result, ethnic membership and identity politics are becoming more important frames of reference in Ethiopian media discourse. Such a media climate is not favorable to conducting a successful National Dialogue.
The necessity of availing media outlets with varied viewpoints from multiple ethnic, political subscriptions and geographic locations on the National Dialogue greatly adds to its perceived legitimacy, rather than focusing on ethnic belongingness and identity politics.Benin(1990) is a good working example of this argument. The National Dialogue in Benin was aired live on radio, and photos of the sessions were published in the print media. The arguments were also recorded and made accessible on videotape. The Dialogue’s coverage increased public and civil society support by providing openness to the debatesandenabledBeninesecitizens, including those in rural regions, to stay informed about the most significant developments in the process.
Press freedom, according to experts, ensures that the media makes a substantial contribution to the National Dialogue. High levels of media monitoring and control in Sudan, for example, meant that the people had limited awareness of the national discussion and the drafting of peace deals. In Guatemala (1989), information on the progress and in the negotiation of agreements was not widely disseminated in the required languages. Increased buy-in and ownership among the people might be aided by an improved, and wider-spread distribution. This implies that the Ethiopian government must seek to promote media freedom to strengthen the media’s position in the National Dialogue at all levels.

It’s vital to remember that societal debate, as expressed in both social and conventional media, has an impact on discourse processes, whether we realize it or not. Even more constrained debate processes, however, are not immune to digital media since it is quick, easy to use, and can be used to monitor public opinion, all of which make it an appealing tool. The problem is that digital media material is diverse, and various negotiation parties’ ability to use digital media is unequal, which might lead to an imbalanced process. Furthermore, digital media may be a useful tool for individuals who want to disrupt or obstruct the process entirely. Whatever the dialogue process, digital media as a form of societal discussion has an enormous impact within a wider dialogue ecosystem.

The process of moral imagination requires being reflective of personal responsibility for political violence and acting towards transcending it and we do this by acknowledging the relational subjectivity we are in.It’s vital to remember that societal debate, as expressed in both social and conventional media, has an impact on discourse processes, whether we realize it or not.

The notion of hybrid media is a more complete approach to the complexity of the larger discourse ecology. We refer to hybrid media as the cohabitation and interaction of old and new media, which results in complicated fora for social debate. The concept’s main argument is that different media platforms should be viewed as parallel and merged, rather than as distinct and independent forms of societal communication. While social media is frequently highlighted in the mix, other media such as community radio, television, and newspapers may sometimes play just as essential a part in discussions, processes, as honing in on just one can lead to a lack of a balanced understanding.
The digital space, and the information therein, can be used to promote goals that are not compatible with the attainment of long-term peace; this might include propagation of hate speech or the dissemination of false information. Furthermore, the relevance of digital media must be understood in the perspective of a wider context, whether that context is the entire hybrid media complex or the conversion efforts. Thus, the Ethiopian government must subscribe to such communication and media concepts to arrive at a fruitful National Dialogue process.

HornReview: Dr.Mukerrem: having contextualized the current complex political gridlock in Sudan, what lessons can be taken for other states in the region?

First, there needs to be a solid understanding between all the stakeholders, i.e. amongst the political groups, academics, government, and civil entities. This means that all the groups need to agree on the fact that there is a problem. In addition to a common understanding between the groups, there needs to be a level of understanding among each group, i.e. each group should have a level of cohesion internally.
In Sudan, their national dialogue had multiple phases. Given the lack of agreement, on a rudimentary level, expectations of past privileges on the part of the military became a serious cause of concern for the other parties. This also happens when one or more parties opt to play politics. For example, Abdullah Hamdok, as the civilian head of Government, publically promised that“we are going to take care of our government” in the early days of the transition. However, Abdalla Hamdok later decided to expel the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNIMAS). Hamdok instead requested for another such mission more suited to the Transition; This new mechanism would also answer to the Sudanese Rapid Support Force(RSF).
As you can imagine, this was a great cause of concern for the Darfur people who accused the Rapid Support Force of being the Janjaweed paramilitary forces in different clothing. The people of Darfur decried the exit of UNIMAS expressing that the central government, with the military at its helm, will overlook their plight. The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), comprised of members of the civil society, think tanks, political parties, members of the Sudanese professionals Association, unanimously agree that the RSF has to be disbanded. Even though there are existing fractures within the military, it also has a firm and coherent stance in maintaining the RSF.

this was a great cause of concern for the Darfur people who accused the Rapid Support Force of being the Janjaweed paramilitary forces in different clothing.

The Sudanese military has relatively well-articulated aspirations and they have no interest in dissolving the Rapid Support Force.In the past, the RSFwaspartially supported by the government which gave it some legitimacy. However, it is well known that members of the Janjaweed forces are responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in Darfur. One such member is Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council. This shows, at the very least, a fundamental lack of understanding —or political will— regarding the core issues of each respective group.

Any attempts at resolving Sudan’s political woes have to be cognizant of the Military’s power and role in the statehood of Sudan.

HornReview: Do you believe all the parties had realistic expectations of the process and outcome?

I believe the nation’s dependence on the military and its vast network: economically, for security and stability, or otherwise, has been severely underestimated. With that in mind, mitigating over expectation is an important consideration. Many of the parties, and the public at large, expected to see a democratically powerful and economically vibrant Sudan in one or two years; they expected the military to back of from the political sphere quickly. Which would predictably be impossible. Sudan’s political history has always been under the dominance of the political culture of the military. Any attempts at resolving Sudan’s political woes have to be cognizant of the Military’s power and role in the statehood of Sudan. Over-expectation also prevailed in the parties’ anticipation to be allowed significant cabinet appointments.
In political bargaining, one might have hundreds of expectations, however, only 25% might be fulfilled. While the Ethiopian mediators played an important role in bringing the parties together, they did not address the issue of over-ambition. The civilian wing expected a lot to be achieved within a short period.

HornReview: Are you saying that transitional justice issues can prevent an agreement when presented as preconditions for negotiations?

Transitional justice issues are very complex, sophisticated, and should be addressed in with depth and sophistication. Arriving at an arrangement to properly, perhaps gradually, address them would be one of the building blocks of elite consensus. Proper diagnosis is 50% to 90% of the solution
Expectations of immediate answers to historic grievances are another form of over-ambition that further weakened the parties. Most ethnic groups, at one point or another, might be recipients of grief and injustice. However, how far back will states go to address long-standing grievances, perhaps at the cost of current peace. One must also examine if the people’s grief is institutionalized, or being aggravated for political gains.
I think one of the biggest misdiagnoses, that we see in global media, is the apriori labeling of the military as— a priori— repressive. These assertions are founded on the presumption that peace and stability will prevail even in the absence of the military. Sudan’s political culture, its political history 90% is composed of the military on all levels; all parties need to be cognizant of that reality in their search for a new political dispensation.

Ethiopia is preparing for national dialogue, also known as agärawi məkəkər. It is going to dialogue with itself as a means of seizing the violence spreading in the body politic. Political violence with its different intensity and form has been one aspect of Ethiopia’s political history. Despite their prevalence, violent moments are dehumanizing and destructive. However, they are not invincible social prisons that lock human society in the abyssum of dehumanization. Society can make such moments and recast them as a site for moral imagination (Lederach
2005) and social creative acts to transcend the dehumanizing and destructive elements. Violent moments can be used to mobilize social creative power against instrumentalized political violence. From the rich African library written and non-written; historical and metaphysical forms of the past, this generation can bring usable wisdom to transform the entrenched violence of our time. I like to share with you one of the pearls of wisdom we may learn from it as we prepare for dialogue, among others to seize the moment of our won violence.

In Ethiopian hagiosophy, there is a powerful story of violence and the possibility of imagination to transcend it. I used the term hagiosophy to refer to our (myself and a few colleagues at AAU) engagements with hagiography as a site of philosophy. It is an ongoing intellectual aspiration to locate Ethiopian written and oral sacred text from liturgy and historiography into philosophy mainly as one mode of decolonizing political philosophy.

The usable hagiosophy I am sharing with you today found in the 15th-century hagiographic text (Gädlä Krəstos Śämra) of saint Krəstos Śämra whose saintly imagination, reflection and transcending to the metaphysical binary to find the root cause of sin, destruction, and violence. Her journey began with the violence she inflicted upon her slave. She grossly sent flames into the servant’s mouth and killed her. She was seized by her capacity for this violence. She captured this moment and began to pray and imagine and struggled for a new possibility to transcend this violence. She prayed to be reunited with the dead slave’s body and soul. Her prayer listened and God resurrected the victimized slave.

In this hagiosophy, we learn how one could seize the moment of violence; use it as a time of reflection, critique, and soul searching to address the immediate and structural sources of political violence.

The new possibility began with this reconnection with the dead. What it means to resurrect the dead in the contemporary political real mis worth discussing. At least in our national dialogue remembering the dead and commemorating the victimized souls of our violence should be a priority. As survivors who have witnessed and lived or even participated by commission and omission in the spreading violence, we shall connect, commemorate and remember the dead. Krəstos Śämra inspiring entitlement begins with the dead and then goes to the survivors.
She further kept praying to find the structural and root causes of violence, offense, and sin in the world and the human condition. She articulated the human condition saying ‘there is no wood that does not smoke, and a human being that does not offend.” If to be human is defned by the ability of sin, offense, and violence, forgiveness is the response instead of criminalizing all humans. Criminalizing all humans leave the world as a place of criminals only as M. K Gandhi stated well “an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind”.
Considering forgiveness as a foundational response to the violence Krəstos Śämra kepton searching for the original and the source of this human condition. To her it was the original sin, that is the confict between God and Satan the source of all sins and violence on earth. She prayed and was allowed to travel to the metaphysical world to ask forgiveness to save the offenders, and sinners and reconcile the original confict between God and Satan.

In this hagiosophy, we learn how one could seize the moment of violence; use it as a time of refection, critique, and soul searching to address the immediate and structural sources of political violence. Such action is about taking responsibility at the individual and community level to transcend the violence and its destructive impact. Her unending quest for forgiveness to the offenders, including her attempt for the original offender Satan to be pardoned, taught us the power of forgiveness to create possibilities for the surviving society: both the victim and the perpetrator.
Moreover, the hagiosophy of Krəstos Śämra enlightens us on how to navigate and creatively act in search of addressing the structural and root cause of violence, without such response violence, remain as intrinsic to human and society’s condition. Our national dialogue, as a rare political process, must expose the structural cause of violence. Similar creative acts and responses to Ethiopia’s ongoing political violence are needed so that the community far and near can recast and seize the moment to address the destructive trend in the transition and the root, structural and historical causes of violence in the country.

Our national dialogue, as a rare political process, must expose the structural cause of violence.

Ethiopians missed the opportunity to build a political community through dialogue, and there are many missed opportunities to re-new the existing state and rebuild the political realm through dialogue. The latest addition is the moment of political violence we are inhabited since the 2018 political openings. Capturing this moment is an indispensable task to transcend the dehumanizing and destructive effect of the spreading violence.

The process of moral imagination requires being refective of personal responsibility for political violence and acting towards transcending it and we do this by acknowledging the relational subjectivity we are in.

In academia, the process of rebuilding a divided society affected by political violence is made intelligible through the notion of peacebuilding (Galltung 1975). Scholars underline that the ultimate goal of PB is seizing the violent moment through moral imagination and the transformation of conflict into peaceful action by working deeper into the causes of such conficts. What we learn from hagiosophy of Krəstos Śämra is a pre-modern project of peacebuilding that transcends villages and countries. Her imagination was a universal peacebuilding project. Many societies in the continent today are cited for their exemplary role in sizing and transforming violent moments. As we embark on this exercise our imagination shall be as wide as the vision of those societies who left their legacies by transcending the violent moment that conditioned their life.
The process of moral imagination requires being refective of personal responsibility for political violence and acting towards transcending it and we do this by acknowledging the relational subjectivity we are in. As we learn from the hagiosophy of Krəstos Śämra, capturing the moment requires accepting our agency in the making of violence and peace. Acknowledging that political violence is occurring in relational mutuality would enable us to mobilize our creative social power for transcending violence and its impact. The imaginative journeys of Krəstos Śämra to transcending the human and social condition can teach us humans are not prisoners of their structural conditions.
Reference
Lederach, John Paul The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2005.
Galtung,John.Peace,WarandDefense:Essaysin Peace Research, ed. John Galtung (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers), 1975.

This article is an exerpt from my ongoing research project as Fellow of the African Peacebuilding Network (APN)

Dr. Mukerrem Miftah currently serves as Assistant Professor in the Department of Policy Studies at the Ethiopian Civil Service University. With more than ten years of experience as a professor, researcher, and consultant in both Ethiopia and Turkey, Dr. Mukerrem’s academic interest and research focuses on religion and identity politics especially as it pertains to the Horn of Africa.

In Sudan several factors facilitated the eventual collapse of the expected political transition; but frankly speaking, the idea of smooth political transition is only available in theory we would never be able to find it in the actual world. In my view, the political transition in Sudan must take into account many important factors. One of them is the issue of ethnic identity. It is important to understand the relevance of ethnic identity, and the long-running ethnopolitical grievances in Sudan’s southwestern regions, Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and the BlueNile Region. It is equally important to understand the motive and claims of the various groups, political, armed, or otherwise, that claim to represent their respective people. Since their independence in 1955, there have always been questions of injustice, exploitation, and oppression in Sudan’s politics. We hear the same complaints of marginalization and exclusion, from root to branch, in Sudan’s political process today. Many of these groups believe that the political elite in Sudan, which assumed power upon independence, has always been unwilling to share power in the country’s economic and political engagements. And in my opinion, these identity crises in Sudan’s political system were snowballing for decades because they were never properly heard and addressed.
Identity politics at its core, from its genesis, growth, maturity, and functioning is entirely linked with the political aspirations, expectations, and plans of the political elite. This group’s success is entirely linked to one particular ethnic group to follow and subscribe to. Identity politics by its very natureessentially brings together society, meaning its political elites and normal citizens. Political elites cannot be politically viable unless and otherwise they specifically instrumentalize those identity markers. Many instances of intergroup conflicts tend to solidify intra-group cohesion by creating an in-group/out-group or us versus them dynamics. This type of rhetoric is powerful in sowing animosity between groups that comes significant through time because
the political elites tend to exploit the animosity to further their aspirations.
Sudan as we know it today, or the Northern part at the time, Islam was the dominant religion and the population largely considered themselves to have an Arab identity. One of the reasons that South Sudan got its independence was partly because of ethnoreligious cleavages which were left unaddressed in Sudan’s political sphere. It is widely known that Sudan’s politicians never entertained the legitimate demands of the people of South Sudan which are mainly composed of distinct Dinka, Luo, Nuer, and other ethnic groups. They primarily practiced Christianity,
specifically Protestantism and Catholicism, as well as other indigenous religious practices.
The successive regimes and military leadership, before Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir’s tenure, who ruled the country were largely ignorant of the conditions, grievances, and expectations of these ethnic groups, i.e. both of the people of the Sudan proper and South Sudan. The political transition in Sudan was headed by the country’s professional associations many of them were academics, and teachers, as well as the various professional associations, like the associations of medical and legal practitioners therein. Even though the upper echelons of the movement were spearheaded by the Sudanese professional associations, there were also partisan political groups, some with significant religious clout, others with significant influence and support from foreign actors like Egypt. Despite what some might think, Sudan has various recognized opposition groups.
An equally important factor is the inability among the existing political parties and associations to for gestrong political alliances; this is largely due to the identitarian and historic reasons I mentioned earlier. Several interest groups aspire for a strong politically viable Sudan. Unfortunately, there has never been an agreement between the groups. The political transition in Sudan failed, in part, because there was little consensus between the various groups claiming to represent the people. I think was one of the factors which led to the demise of the party; Hamdok’s eventual withdrawal from politics – though he was ideally situated to represent these civil society organizations and political parties.

these identity crises in Sudan’s political system were snowballing for decades because they were never properly heard and addressed.

For example, around five political parties claim to represent Darfur, and in many cases, they are yet to arrive at a consensus on the questions they would like to put forth, let alone the answers. The 2021 Juba agreement is one such example; the agreement establishes mechanisms through which claims of discrimination and other such injustices will be addressed. The Sudan People Liberation Front, an organization headed by Abdul Wahid, rejected the agreement.

As an additional example, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a powerful coalition of 10 parties and movements which has the support of the Sudanese Professionals Association, showed a genuine interest in having a meaningful political transition. In my view, the FFC made a tremendous effort to arrive at a solution in their dialogue with the Transitional Military Council spearheaded by Abdel Fattah alBurhan, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Shams al-Din Kabashi. In hindsight, it is clear that all parties had over-ambitious political aspirations, that were often divergent.

Although the Force for Freedom and Change showed initiative and willingness to engage the military government, the slit gap between the two entities has widened, so much so that “no negotiation, no partnership, no compromise’ seems to be their new position.

I believe the worsening economic conditions helped galvanize the protest movements which led
to the eventual ousting of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in late 2018.

The second relevant factor, apart from identity, is Sudan’s economic conditions, especially in the time that followed the secession of South Sudan. For over four decades crude oil export was the base of Sudan’s national economy, so, predictably, the economic shockwaves were significant after the succession of South Sudan in 2011. Despite attaining independence, South Sudan was also unable to forge a stable economy due to dependence on this national petroleum, which further exacerbated competition and inter-ethnic clashes.
The Sudan Republic was ultimately unable to bring about a substitute foundational economic source that would help fuel the national economy, especially given crushing western sanctions. I believe the worsening economic conditions helped galvanize the protest movements which led to the eventual ousting of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in late 2018. When it comes to Sudan and despite the absence of alternative economic source for the national economy, there are issues of identity as I have pointed out before raised by different ethnopolitical groups which, through time, gave rise to various armed groups, each fighting each other that further weakened the economy.
One of the core factors, that many tend to ignore, is the internal balance of power, particularly the influence, reach, and role of the military in Sudan. Understanding the actual operational capabilities, and long-term interests of Sudan’s military is critically important, so if one is keen to understand the power of existing networks, the history of the military in Sudan your strategy for a more meaningful political dialogue political transition could be much more nuanced otherwise its all going to be about exploitation.
The military was in power for decades since 1958/9; they wielded the power of the state, local and international economic investments, as well as paramilitary security structures that are ‘on call’. The military’s root to branch control of the state allowed them to amass huge financial resource that was, in turn, used to establish and fortify their networks; with the Egyptian military complex, for example.
Formulating a smooth political transition or finding a lasting solution for Sudan’s political future has to start with understanding the depth and intensity of the Sudanese military complex. The civilian stakeholders, organized and spearheaded by the Sudanese Professionals Association, expected the military’s immediate exit out of the Sudanese political sphere; which, in my view, is unrealistic.
Recognizing the power and ambitions of the militaryin Sudan paves the way for more political strategies to come out. What kind of strategy do the civilian leaders need to adopt to take gradual steps towards democratization? Because experience shows us that over-ambitious aspirations cause imbalances and friction among the elite which trickles down to the population. However, elite consensus can be achieved through a measured and realistic approach.
To add a layer of complexity, the United States and Western Europe took away foreign aid and trade investment for three decades due to accusations that the nation harbored a top Al Qaeda leader. However, the military’s stature and the economic vibrancy, and Sudan’s geopolitical circumstances essentially make it an Arab state. Sudan’s ties with Arab states in humanitarian aid, education, development assistance, and trade investment came as a lifeline.
The largest humanitarian donor to Sudan is Saudi Arabia; the Saudi government assisted greatly with well digging, capacity building for women, education infrastructure, and such. And the United Arab Emirates also consistently helped Sudan stay afloat. So in some ways, we observe a dictatorial sort of monarchy by the leader of the National Congress Party. Bashir was allowed to lead as a monarch through the positive reinforcement of the 3 different
forms of aid and investment from Arab allies. If this was not the case, and with dwindling oil resources, Sudan would not exist as we know it.
Setting aside rampant corruption, power grabs, and dictatorship proclivities, I believe that it is within Sudan’s grasp to be a viable nation-state. On one hand, if it is not just about custodianship of the whole country, accepting the military as it is for the sake of gradual democracy is contradictory as people are ‘institutional animals’. On the other hand, however, the military controls the nation’s sociopolitical and economic affairs; it is likely to further entrench itself into power, further dimming the prospects of an eventual democracy. This marriage between the economic institutions/ activities and the military is not limited to Africa. We observe the same phenomenon in the Middle East, along with vast networks for arms and military equipment sales, human trafficking rings. In the Horn, the Eritrean government is also accused of this.

The military’s root to branch control of the state allowed them to amass huge financial resource that was, in turn, used to establish and fortify their networks; with the Egyptian military complex, for example.

Another important example is the experience of Egypt. We know that there was a democratically elected government of Dr. Mohammad Morsi, but eventually, domestic dissent neighboring Isreal felt that the Islamist political groups would eventually become a national threat, they subsequently supported the Egyptian military leading to the eventual coup. The United States also played a significant role; as did the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who supported the military by giving billions of dollars in financial support but also millions of dollars in military support, engineering, and intelligence. We observe the same trend in Sudan. It is fair to assume that, while openly praising
democratic values and human rights, certain Arab states prefer to have strong regional allies that do not resemble a democracy. An important lesson from the Middle East, since the Arab revolution in 2011, is that the popular desire for a democratically ruled society is not sending significant signals to monarchs in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Monarchs who do not want democracy a popular democratic system of government based on popularity.

Ambassador Mohamoud Dirir Gheddi has served Ethiopia in a myriad of political capacities since the 1990s when he was first elected into the constituent of Assembly. He served four consecutive terms in the House of People’s Representatives, followed by ambassadorial and ministerial appointments. Of his most notable posts is his six-year Ambassadorship to Egypt, his advisory role in the Trilateral GERD Negotiations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan
as well as his efforts brokering the 2019 peace deal in neighboring Sudan. Ambassador Mohamoud Dirir Gheddi currently serves as Commissioner in Ethiopia’s National Dialogue Commission.

I think that it would be of vital importance to reflect upon the prevailing situation in Sudan, at that time, to understand the dynamics of the massive popular upheaval against the iron-fisted rule of Al-Bashir. The popular movement led by the Forces for Freedom and Change staged large-scale protests which demanded his removal from power. The protests were not only confined to the capital, Khartoum. The rallies gained momentum from December 2018
onwards, until his removal from power on 11 April 2019.
The military establishment, which was the machine through which Al-Bashir controlled power in Sudan for some three decades took over power at that stage. So, Ethiopia’s role; and indeed, the role of the African Union was to broker a power-sharing deal between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change, to avoid further bloodshed and the collapse of Sudan into the abyss of endless bloodshed and anarchy.
The rationale for Ethiopia’s involvement in bringing an end to the turmoil in Sudan and hopefully ushering in peace is rooted in Ethiopia’s foreign policy, particularly in the Horn. I believe that has been achieved, although, very, unfortunately, it was short-lived.

Looking back at the circumstances and challenging times through which our Sudanese brothers and sisters have been passing through, both parties have positively accepted our role. Most important of all, I should say that the people of Sudan genuinely believed that Ethiopia has come to their rescue.

The so-called issue of “elite
consensus” ultimately ended
up as nothing more than an
“elite power-sharing”

Sudan, like many other African countries, is a victim of its historical baggage. Looking merely at the issue of power, Sudan has witnessed numerous coup d’étas, that in itself shows the complex nature of their political culture. So, the issue of power stands as one serious element that has to be addressed democratically and through democratic means. But it is not the only problem of Sudan for that matter. It remains; however, the central issue, around, which a host of other critical issues revolve. Power is not in the hands of the people and they struggle to attain it,
to this day.

No comment. I prefer silence over that issue. However, I shall deal extensively with that in the future, in my
mémoire.

That remains to be answered by the Sudanese people, the intellectuals and youth ( both young men and women), who are craving to live in a better Sudan under a democratic system, that could realize freedom, justice, and peace.

Sudan has tried “National Dialogue” under AlBashir, but it ended in a fiasco. The so-called issue of “elite consensus” ultimately ended up as nothing more than an “elite power-sharing”. But all these attempts are yet to bring a permanent solution to Sudan’s political questions. I believe that Sudan does not need any “prescribed democratic solutions” from outside. Rather, a sustainable political solution needs to come from within.

I believe this question is best addressed to the Sudanese people as I cannot speak on their behalf. I cannot cross that line, since I have great respect for the people of Sudan.

Dear readers,

Studies have shown that civilians make up over 80 percent of the population directly affected by armed conflicts. In 2019, the world experienced its highest spike in state-based conflicts since 1946, with 54 state-based conflicts, and fifty thousand conflict-related recorded deaths. The nature of conflicts has also evolved in form; from colonial wars to interstate wars, to civil wars and as of recent decades internationalized civil wars (Palik, Rustad, Methi. Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2019). Whilst conflict
was on an upward trend before 1970, so too were the proportion of conflicts that were resolved by some form of a multi-party dialogue. However, the opposite is true today. National dialogues are increasingly described as an avenue to arrive at a national-level consensus, often to avert an impending deterioration. National dialogues are often presumed to be successful, in part, due to their comparatively inclusive and participatory nature. Whilst some scholars view national dialogues as a form of political settlement, where mutual concessions are expected, others view it as a diagnostic tool merely to assess the internal posture and cohesion, or lack thereof.

This March Edition will explore multiple theoretical and practical viewpoints on national dialogues, their use, and feasibility, as well as the necessary preconditions that would facilitate a fruitful national dialogue.

I would first like to extend heartfelt gratitude to Ambassador Mohamoud Dirir Gheddi for his willingness to share his experience, and expertise, by providing insight into Ethiopia’s mediation role in Sudan in 2019. As a lead
negotiator at the time, Ambassador Dirir briefly shares his experience as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Special Envoy to Sudan in Ethiopia’s endeavor to mediate between the parties.

I also thank Dr. Yonas Ashine, Assistant Professor at Addis Ababa University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations, for pushing us to explore alternate texts and
literature in our search for commonality and mutual understanding.

I am equally thankful to Dr. Mukerrem Miftah, Assistant Professor of Policy Studies at the Civil Service University, for taking time to sit with Horn Review for a detailed explanation of the dual phenomena of political transitions and national dialogues in the context of neighboring Sudan.

Lastly, I thank Dr. Samson Mekonnen, Assistant Professor of Communication at Addis
Ababa University’s School of Journalism and Communication for addressing the critical role of media entities in keeping the national dialogue process and design transparent, inclusive, and representative.

Bethlehem Mehari

نأمل أن يتم هذا الحوار الوطني الشامل بين كل فئات المجتمع. بهدف معالجة ً ا بين النخب بعض االختالفات الجوهرية لدينا ، فهو ليس حوار ً ا حصري السياسية فحسب ، ولكنه أيض ً ا حوار يتم على مستوى القاعدة الشعبية ايضا. من الواضح أن هناك العديد من المظالم الكامنة في مجتمعنا والتي إذا تركت دون معالجة ستستمر في توليد العنف. وتتطلب االنقسامات األخيرة طويلة األمد اضافة الى االنقسامات المجتمعية والسياسية والثقافية واالقتصادية من إثيوبيا الحوار وبناء تقارب في اآلراء على كل هذه المستويات. ويظل هذا هو هدفنا األساسي حتى نتمكن أخير ً ا من إنهاء سوء الفهم المستمر منذ عدة قرون والذي أدخل مجتمعنا في دائرة من الصراع أعاق تقدمه. نأمل أن يخلق هذا الحوار الوطني بيئة مواتية لبناء سالم دائم على أساس التفاهم المتبادل. أود أيض ً ا أن أذكر أن أولئك الذين وصفهم البرلمان بأنهم إرهابيون لن يشاركوا في هذه العملية نظر ً ا لقضيتهم التي تتعارض وال تتماشى مع هدف الحوار الشامل

نأمل أن يتم هذا الحوار الوطني الشامل بين كل فئات
المجتمع. بهدف معالجة بعض االختالفات الجوهرية
ًا بين النخب السياسية
لدينا ، فهو ليس حوارًا حصري
فحسب ، ولكنه أيضًا حوار يتم على مستوى القاعدة
الشعبية ايضا

على الرغم من أن الحكومة خصصت أمواال لجهود اإلغاثة المبذولة إال أن االستفزاز المتجدد من جانب الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير تيغري يستمر في التأثير على المدنيين األبرياء وتعطيل سبل عيشهم. وهذه الجماعة المعادية تواصل إعاقة إيصال اإلغاثة ليس فقط إلى إقليم تيغراي ولكن أيض ً ا إلى المناطق المتضررة من النزاع في اقلمي عفار وأمهرة. باإلضافة إلى منع وصول األموال والموارد المخصصة لهذه المناطق ، نحن نبذل قصارى جهدنا إليصال المساعدات دون عوائق. هذه أولوية للحكومة اإلثيوبية وهذا .مايرده المجتمع الدولي ايضا
بصفتنا إثيوبيين ، نعتقد أنه ينبغي علينا مساعدة الناس ، ونحن مهتمون في المقام األول برفاهيتهم وأمنهم. ولسوء الحظ ، كانت الجبهة تعرقل وتوقف أمام جهودنا. وإيصال المساعدة مرهون اوال بالوصول إلى المناطق المتضررة من النزاع. نحن بحاجة إلى النظر الى جميع الحقائق ويجب أن ندعو األشياء بأسمائها الحقيقية.هذا ما يحدث حاليا، ال يكفي االعتراف بهذه .الحقيقة على نطاق واسع فحسب ، بل يجب إدانتها بشدة
نحن نعمل بالفعل مع شركاء دوليين ، مثل برنامج األغذية العالمي، وبما ان أقلمي أمهرة وعفار هما األكثر تضررا من عدوان الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير تغراي ، فإننا ندعو شركائنا والجهات المعنية إلى التركيز بشكل أكبر إلغاثة هذه المناطق. ومن المتوقع حدوث بعض الفجوات في إيصال المساعدة وتسليمها ، وال تزال هناك فجوة واضحة بين الحاجة الملحة على األرض والجهود المبذولة حاليا في تلبيتها

It was an unlikely development when Sudan and Ethiopia, within the same period in 2018, observed positive political changes sparked by popular protests which led incumbents to abandon power after decades. This much sought after change that demanded democratization, was emphatically supported by the west as it was antithetical to former regional characterizations of unrest, human rights violations, and crimes against humanity, including genocide regarding Sudan.

Though the three-year storm in Ethiopia dissipated with the premiership of Dr. Abiy Ahmed, Sudan was yet to achieve lasting peace after the resignation of one of the continent’s longest-serving presidents – Omar Hassan Al Bashir. Hence, the then-popular 42-year-old Prime Minister of Ethiopia hailed for his peace initiatives with Eritrea, stepped in. Amidst managing internal problems and despite the Eritrean peace deal being unripe and marred with questions, Abiy facilitated the signing of an agreement between the Sudanese military and civilian wings of the popular protests.

Moreover, during a speech supported by chants, Abiy stated the Sudanese must be, “Custodians of peace and the guardians of dignity as they work toward building a democracy.” Congratulating the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) for their success and underlining that dialogue is the only way for a win-win solution, Abiy stressed, “In your commitment for dialogue and openness for engagement, you have all demonstrated that our historic African tradition of coming together for problem-solving will always be the beacon lighting our way to our greater potential for harmony.”

The agreement gave the FFC 67 percent of the 300-seated legislative council with the mandate of appointing the Prime Minister. The TMC became the supreme commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces with duties to chair the Sovereign Council and appoint interior and defense ministers. However, this optimism was short-lived due to the power struggle between the military and civilian wings of the transitional government headed by Abdallah Hamdok until his resignation in January 2022.

According to conversations between experts and Prime Minister Hamdok, the central problem to the Sudanese political quagmire is the power struggle between the military and civilian wings of the transitional government. The military wing, led by General Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan, did not want to relinquish power obtained from the resignation of Bashir. “The military wing has appeared to be resistant to change. They don’t want civilian oversight because they want to maintain their control over state assets,” expressed an international relations expert.

In addition, interference from foreign actors is implicated in complicating the developments in Sudan. Cognizant of this, the Ethiopian government repeatedly encouraged the Sudanese people to resolve their internal affairs by themselves. Following the military coup that ousted Prime Minister Hamdok, the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia states;

At a time when our optimism and our firm confidence in the existence of a way out of the current crisis; we also see the danger of slipping into the abyss of differences and the spiral of political polarization.We trust with every confidence that Sudanese experience and wisdom will prevail in completing the entitlements of the constitution document and the Juba Agreement for Sudanese Peace, to achieve the aspirations of the Sudanese people,” adding that, “we also warn against the interference of the forces of evil, which are trying to impose their hegemony on our region and undermine the independence of our fateful decisions.

However, the military did not refrain fromputting Prime Minister Hamdok on house arrest and others behind bars. General Burhan took power and declared a state of emergency leading to mass protests across the nation. This reverted the Sudanese political transition to square one, with the added criticism from the US in the form of the suspension of 700 million USD of emergency assistance and economic support funds. Later, in January of 2022, Prime Minister Hamdok resigned claiming the country to be at a “dangerous turning point that threatens its survival,” and it is “sliding towards disaster.”

… the central problem to the Sudanese political quagmire is the power struggle between the military and civilian wings of the transitional government.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) reported that “There are red lines of a different sort in the Horn of Africa, indicating that the developments in Sudan are attracting various interest groups such as the Gulf countries, Russia, and Turkey who have political and economic interests in the Horn region.

Furthermore, ACLED’s analysis underlines that both Sudan and Ethiopia are at a crossroads of internal strife, but have intertwined interests that need to support each other. In this sense, destabilization in one of the Horn nations extends out and involves various actors complicating matters further. Thus, ACLED reports;

This nexus of reciprocal support [between Ethiopia and Sudan] has been expanded and reinforced partly by the strengthening of multilateral organizations (including the African Union and, to a lesser extent, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn-IGAD) … and have increasingly understood that their survival is usually best served by strengthening ties and limiting cross border sabotage and subversion.

In an analysis forwarded by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Shewit Woldemichael argues that in addition to the “Deep-seated political and identity-based polarization that prevents Sudan from resolving fundamental issues of citizenship and statehood … the exclusion of political parties and two major armed groups will make achieving sustainable peace difficult.”

Shewit concludes that despite progress madeduring Sudan’s one-year transition, significant challenges remain including the imbalance of power between military and civilian actors, the disregard for provisions in the Constitutional Document which set terms for the transitional period, the dispute within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), and the eroded powers of the Sovereign Council. For the resolution of the crisis in Sudan, she advises external forces to refrain from exacerbating the preexisting divisions, but rather to contribute to the success of the transition in a positive manner. Shewit further expresses that regional and continental bodies provide political and technical support and that Sudan’s security apparatus works to restore the public’s trust.

… the developments in Sudan are attracting various interest groups such as the Gulf countries, Russia, and Turkey who have political and economic interests in the Horn region.

Nevertheless, not all sides admit to their shortcomings. The military blames the civilian government for all failures to ensure a transition within the 21-month time frame per the constitution. The civilian government, on the other hand, recognizes the shortcomings of both sides and hopes for settlement through negotiation. Cameron Hudson’spiece in the Atlantic Council notes, “Sudan’s transitional charter and the effectively forced marriage between civilian and military leaders it created was an artful way to address the winner-take all system that has long defined Sudan’s political existence. But in the current impasse, both sides feel like they are losing.”

As Sudan’s path to a democratic transition remains unclear, experts observe this lengthy and turbulent period, coupled with the crises in Northern Ethiopia, might embolden foreign actors to meddle further compromising regional stability. Given that the African Union does not have the mandate to interfere in political resolution on the part of state actors, it temporarily suspended Sudan from membership; reiterating its calls for all stakeholders to responsibly act in the transition.

Concerned with the ever-growing political crisis on the continent, Musa Faki Mahamat, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, said at the 35th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, that the Commission should not continue in a manner that it is considered as a simple secretary for member states.

As Sudan’s path to a democratic transition remains unclear, experts observe this lengthy and turbulent period, coupled with the crises in Northern Ethiopia, might embolden foreign actors to meddle further compromising regional stability.

Dr. Yacob Arsano currently serves as an Associate Professor at Addis Ababa University’s School of Political Science and International Relations (AAU- PSIR). Dr. Yacob’s research focus on hydropolitics, coupled with his adamant advocacy for equitable water use in the Nile Basin, makes him a leading authority on  inter-state relations in the Eastern Nile Basin.

His expertise, particularly on the construction  of the GERD project and the consequent  negotiations with riparian states, has allowed  for a scientific framing of recently emerging  water disputes in the region.

I am elated; so much so that I took it upon myself  to be at the GERD site to celebrate this important  milestone. Ethiopia, despite heavy foreign resistance,  managed to complete two rounds of reservoir filling.  The launch of the project’s partial-power generation  is not only an achievement worthy of celebration  but also serves to encourage Ethiopians to persevere  on this path. Despite the many challenges Ethiopia  continues to face, both foreign and domestic, I am  proud and encouraged by the incremental progress  we have made toward the realization of this project.

Though this milestone is worth the celebrations, both  the citizenry and the government should continue  to do as they have always done. From what we have  been told from the GERD Secretariat, the dam is 84%  complete; this occasion should also encourage the  current government to optimally utilize the allocated  resources for the timely completion of the project.

The generators at the Guba facility, at the GERD site, already have transformers that can handle up to 500kVa of power. When complete, this facility alone  is sufficient to power the nation given that this power  can be funneled into the existing power grids in the  country. In the future, when the dam can generate  power at capacity, the existing partial infrastructure  can help facilitate commercial use with our neighbors  in the region. Though there is always more work to  be done, Ethiopia seems to show similar progress in  its infrastructure development efforts.

The support from citizens, as you know, has been all inclusive: from young to old, poor or rich, urban to  rural dwellers, all have contributed what they can to  see this project to completion. The Ethiopian people  have been donating, buying lottery and government  bonds, texting 8100, as well as participating in  fundraising activities. Now that we have started  partial power generation, I hope for a heightened  enthusiasm for completing the GERD.

Though this milestone is worth the celebrations, both  the citizenry and the government should continue to do as they have always done. From what we have been told from the GERD Secretariat, the dam is 84% complete; this occasion should also encourage the current government to optimally utilize the allocated resources for the timely completion of the project.

It is no secret that this project is a long-standing  dream for Ethiopians. Since its inception, the Dam was  intended to uplift our destitute society. Not only is the  dam being built within Ethiopian sovereign territory,  but it is also financed by the Ethiopian people. This  milestone, if anything, should serve to encourage  cooperation with our regional partners. The lone  strategy of demonizing the entire country to make a  political point hinders our prospects of cooperation  in the long run. While Egypt insists on remaining the sole decision-maker on their developmental pursuits  with Nile waters, i.e. within their borders, the double  standard in their demands of Ethiopia is made all the more evident. Media in all three nations can do more to promote an egalitarian viewpoint that encourages equitable use between all riparians. As the Nile is a transboundary river, media coverage should uphold standard expectations from all parties. To this end, media outlets need to promote honest and pragmatic conversations on this shared resource and put a stop to the mockery and single-sided arguments that do not promote a cooperative approach.

After the construction, grid preparations, and two  rounds of reservoir filling, there remains 16% until  the project’s full completion. With subsequent  construction, and as the dam gets higher, we are left  with two additional rounds of reservoir filling. Yes,  the first turbine has started to produce electricity,  however, our goal should be to see the same  incremental progress with all thirteen turbines.  The government must also plan for the necessary  infrastructure development to meet the population’s  demands, as well as profit commercially by selling to  regional neighbors. Lastly, Ethiopia should pursue  other hydroelectric dams to better meet the demands  of our growing population in its pursuit of self reliance.